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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the visual communication of human dignity. With the opening of 
human rights museums, such as the Canadian Museum for Human Rights, human dignity’s 
visual communication has been exposed to new issues of corporeal and mediated expression. 
In response to photographic mediation and theory, which often poses individuals as central 
claimants or possessors of human dignity, human rights museums openly suggest that 
communities and relationships between individuals are central to human dignity’s visibility 
outside of the law. As such, I propose that curatorial mediation is important to the 
contemporary apprehension of human dignity because its notable forms – atlases, albums, 
and museums –help to shift conversations from individual human persons to communities of 
human beings. Exhibiting Human Rights: Making the Means of Dignity Visible theorizes 
human dignity as a relational property, which entails thinking about larger constellated 
strategies of representation. I theorize human dignity as a product of life shared with others, 
across families, communities, cultures, and borders, seen most dramatically in curatorial 
forms.  
Combining museological notions of curation with Walter Benjamin’s concept of the 
constellation, this thesis demonstrates how a theory of human dignity founded on relation 
also grapples with its tendencies towards rationality and immateriality. Working from these 
forms and concepts my key questions include: How has human dignity been visually 
depicted? How can a focus on curation help to support a relational theorization of human 
dignity? And, how can an emphasis on the history of the affiliation between human dignity 
and curation help us to understand human rights recent move into museums? Curation, I 
argue provides a framework that acknowledges how our means of existence create demands 
on others, thus expanding conversations about the ends of human dignity. Three case studies 
aid in the development of my argument: 1) August Sander’s People of the 20th Century 
(1910-1964); 2) UNESCO’s Human Rights Exhibition Album (1950); and 3) The Canadian 
Museum for Human Rights (2014). Shifting attention towards exhibitionary projects offers 
creative and constitutive language that speaks to the communities and alliances foundational 
to human dignity’s contemporary communication and significance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The exhibition of the future will be an exhibition of 
ideas rather than of objects, and nothing will be 
deemed worthy of admission to its halls which has not 
some living, inspiring thought behind it, and which is 
not capable of teaching some valuable lesson.  
—George Brown Goode, 1892; First Draft of a 
System of Classification for the World’s Columbian 
Exposition.  
 
For ideas are not represented themselves, but solely 
and exclusively in an arrangement of concrete 
elements in the concept: as the configuration of these 
elements.  
—Walter Benjamin, 1928; The Origins of German 
Tragic Drama 
 
This dissertation is about the visual communication of human dignity. The idea of human 
dignity has become one of the most prominent concepts under the umbrella of human 
rights discourse and has received an immense amount of critical attention in the last 
decade.1 However, despite the critical attention surrounding human dignity its cultural 
and visual significance has been narrowly articulated. Discussions about human dignity 
are most often relegated to spheres of philosophical or legal significance. Understood as a 
uniquely human value, human dignity is posed as inherent to the human person and thus 
largely invisible. It is something we are presumed to have, but not something we can 
necessarily see.  
                                                
1 These works, which will be surveyed in the following chapter, include: Agamben 1999b; Anker, 2012; 
Bergoffen 2009 & 2011; Duwell 2014; Kateb 2011; McCrudden 2013; Moyn 2014 & 2015; Rosen 2012; 
Sliwinski 2015; Waldron 2012.  
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Dignity is crucial to the project of human rights, but its definition and meaning 
remains contested and slippery. Its contemporary importance, beyond its place in legal 
documents, has been traced back centuries to philosophers like Immanuel Kant (1724-
1804) who posed human dignity as a value beyond a market price affiliated with the 
faculty of reason and to social attitudes, which saw human dignity as part of one’s social 
status (Waldron 2012). As I immersed myself in the literature surrounding human 
dignity, I began to realize dignity is a term that has evolved and reinvented itself, and its 
definition is malleable depending on context. Defining human dignity, beyond allusions 
to its distinctly human value, proved difficult, which made engaging with its visual 
communication all the more challenging.  
As a media studies scholar, I began to feel unsettled about human dignity’s 
contemporary communication. It felt odd to me that something so central to modern laws 
and declarations could feel so amorphous and immaterial. The tendency to have 
discussions about human dignity in philosophical or legal arenas seemed to limit more 
direct questions about its communication. There seemed a considerable gap between 
knowledge that the idea of human dignity is important and how it looks or is visually 
apprehended. If human dignity, as inherent or inviolable worth of the human person, was 
so important how could it be visibly grasped? How could I begin to engage the idea of 
human dignity, an idea not directly given to the eye, within the field of media studies? 
How could a concept that so often “seems at home in the law” be thought of anew in 
relation to broader mechanisms of communication and mediation (Waldron 2012, 13)? 
 These questions led me towards visual theory, which did help to put the 
relationship between human dignity and visual communication into context.  I found that 
human dignity was asserted in narrow visual terms, especially in relation to these three 
areas: normativity, absence, and emancipation. First, it seemed common enough to 
attribute dignity to normative notions of status, reserved for members of the clergy, 
monarchy, or state. Images of queens, such as Queen Victoria (Fig. 1), presidents, or 
priests are often said to have “an air of dignity” about them or exude a “dignified look.” 
Normative visualizations of human dignity connect one’s station to the abstract quality of 
human dignity via notions of self-esteem, self-worth, or self-importance. Second, 
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discussions of the lack of human dignity, as absence, have been firmly tied to the visual 
field, especially in the last decade. Visual theorists have come to demonstrate how 
photography is especially useful at capturing the “lack” at the centre of human rights 
(Linfield 2010, 37 see also Azoulay 2008 & 2012; Dean 2015; Sliwinski 2011; Sontag 
1973 & 2003). Photographs of dead or wounded humans from a myriad of historical 
scenes – war, famine, genocide – have come to play a central role in how we understand 
dignity in the visual world. The horrors of the Holocaust, in conjunction with the power 
of the camera, provided potent images of what those who were treated without human 
value look like, such as in the portrayal of concentration camp inmates after the liberation 
of Mauthausen (Fig. 2). Within discussion of dignity’s absence especially, an aesthetics 
of indignity has been used in newspapers, TV, and museums to come to the defense of 
human rights writ large. There is an assumed sense that witnessing the suffering of 
distant others will work to prevent future crimes (Dean 2015, 241). Finally, and more 
recently, the concept of dignity has been tied to the visual realm in terms of aesthetic 
emancipation. Sliwinski (2015) has argued that the invention of photography had an 
important impact on the “ascension of the idea of human dignity” (174). As the genre of 
portraiture was democratized in the 1800s, photography disrupted notions of status and 
gave subjects the power to construct their own image outside of state relations. Such was 
the case with Frederick Douglass (Fig. 3), who used photography to create an image of 
himself, as an African American who was worthy of the same status, respect, and value 
given to other citizens. As one of the most photographed men of the nineteenth century, 
Douglass drew upon his own body to stage a claim for dignity – as a status, as an intrinsic 
value, and as a site of composure – and demonstrated aesthetic emancipation through the 
camera as a medium, and the visual as a political field.  
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Figure 1: Queen Victoria, 1859, by Franz Xaver Winterhalter. Public domain. 
 
Figure 2: Survivors of Mauthausen soon after liberation, 1945, by Ray Buch. United 
States Holocaust Memorial Museum: 1989.324.3. 
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Figure 3: Frederick Douglass, 1856, unidentified author. Smithsonian Institution, 
National Portrait Gallery NPG.74.75. 
The emphasis, in each of these three areas, on the body and its representation has 
formed the basis for how human dignity is thought of in relation to visual 
communication. Distinct patterns began to emerge as these categories came into view, 
and slowly I realized that I was not just interested in how dignity was visually 
communicated, but rather how it could be communicated and apprehended outside of 
idealized or degrading images. The language surrounding these three areas so often felt 
exclusionary (reserved for royalty or elected officials), negative (found in instances of 
genocide or famine), or autonomous (seen as something one could make or be fully in 
control of). The language and representations of human dignity as normative, negative, or 
emancipatory made its visual communication into something that one holds, but does not 
share with others. These terms seem something of an anathema to dignity as a 
contemporary phenomenon, understood from an “everybody” and “every body” point of 
view, most famously communicated through the United Nations Universal Declaration of 
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Human Rights: “All humans are born free and equal in dignity and rights” (United 
Nations, 1948). Despite the fact that we now consider human dignity to be something we 
are all entitled to, discussions of it have either shied away from material or embodied 
connections or coupled it with notions of individuality and autonomy or extreme 
violation. How then do we begin to discuss the visual communication of human dignity if 
it is something everyone has or has access to without evoking differential or inequitable 
language? How can we talk about inherent or inviolable worth of the human person 
without deferring to uniformity or a false sense of universalism? These foundational 
couplings of normative, negative, or emancipatory theories are indeed important, but 
leave human dignity articulated within singular visions vis-à-vis a focus on iconographic 
or individual photographs.  
These questions are directly relevant to a development in Canada: the opening of 
the Canadian Museum for Human Rights in Winnipeg, Manitoba. In 2014, after over a 
decade of planning, building, and consultation—processes which piqued my interest as 
an undergraduate student in Winnipeg and provided an extracurricular education in the 
public presentation of human rights—the museum opened its doors. The question that 
framed the first gallery, “What are Human Rights?,” crystalized part of the problem I was 
trying to understand in terms of a more mundane communication of human dignity, and 
enlivened why the issue of human dignity’s visual communication was important to 
study. In this space, Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is etched 
prominently into the back wall: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights” (Fig. 4). In this gallery, the declaration of dignity is tied to visual representations 
of human bodies, as much as it is tied to legal and philosophical frameworks. As you 
enter the gallery a looping video of a series of men and woman rolls on a full-length 
screen to your left. Each subject tells the visitor what human rights mean to them 
personally. Directly following the video display, a timeline connecting one-hundred 
“ideas,” “events,” and “measures” stretches along the wall creating a multicultural and 
multimedia history of human rights extending from as early as 4000 B.C.E. to 2012 A.D. 
Underneath the timeline sixty images of people who have “advanced” our current 
understanding of human rights forms a visual basis for the textual and historical points 
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conveyed above. Figures such as Plato, Cyrus the Great, Harriet Beecher Stowe, Louis 
Riel, Martin Luther King Jr. and Gen. Romeo Dallaire become more than just stand-ins 
for the specific histories with which they are affiliated. More complexly, they become 
markers of human dignity and the struggle for it. The declaration that “all human beings 
are born free and equal in dignity and rights” thus becomes connected to a myriad of 
specific and historicized representations of bodies, cultures, and technologies. 
 
Figure 4: The Canadian Museum for Human Rights: view of first gallery, "What 
are Human Rights," photograph by author. 
For me, the CMHR began to open up questions about what it might mean to 
articulate dignity through more complex and less sensationalized forms, what it might 
mean to visually communicate this idea within the frame of curation and museums. Might 
these spaces offer an alternative route of communication that helps us to understand the 
visual communication of human dignity as more than the property of individuals? Could 
curation help to frame relationships at the centre of human dignity, and account for the 
mass of bodies and cultures that make up its shape? Although the UN declaration takes a 
noticeable place within the CMHR’s first gallery, the prominence of the human body in 
this and other new museums focusing on human rights brings forth new questions 
concerning the relationship between human dignity and the human body on the one hand, 
and human dignity and mediation on the other. In effect, these museums have embraced a 
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more corporeal and cultural understanding of human dignity, which openly suggests that 
the law is not the only logical home of this potent idea. Further, in spaces such as the 
CMHR, there is no longer a sole focus on dignity as a product of idealization, negation, 
or emancipation. Museums like the CMHR connect dignity with the body and with media 
in a way that demands further reflection, especially considering the recent surge in 
philosophical and cultural debates about the efficacy of dignity as a concept.  
Inspired by the CMHR, this dissertation proposes to theorize human dignity as a 
relational property and begins to imagine how human dignity might be thought of as 
something shared, as something built in and through communities. I use the term 
relational both for what it says about the necessity of thinking beyond individuals so 
often at the centre of human rights discussions, and for its descriptive alliance with the 
task of curation and curatorial systems. I propose that curatorial mediation is important to 
the contemporary apprehension of human dignity because its forms help to shift 
conversations from individual human persons to communities of human beings. Set 
against normative negative, and emancipatory frameworks, my relational understanding 
of human dignity speaks directly to its visual communication through the exhibition of 
human bodies en masse. In part, what follows might at times feel counterintuitive. 
Opening up the conversation about human dignity’s visual communication to themes of 
relation requires speaking in technical terms about curatorial systems themselves. I 
describe and analyze systems that I argue make human dignity apprehensible as much as 
I describe and analyze specific subjects or people that populate them. I understand 
relationality as a mode that “does not deny difference, but rather seeks to more deeply 
understand how our different histories and experiences position us in relation to each 
other (Donald 2012, 45).2 Relationality is especially important when thinking about 
human dignity because of the way it does not impose conformity or an easy sense of 
                                                
2 Dwayne Donald uses this definition in conjunction with what he terms ethical relationality. As he notes, 
“this form of relationality is ethical because it does not overlook or render invisible particular historical, 
cultural, and social contexts from which a standpoint arises. Rather, it puts these considerations at the 
forefront of engagements across frontiers of difference” (Donald 2012, 45).  
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universalism. Systems of curation can tell us a lot about the way relations are made 
across people, cultures, and time without reducing one form to another. In this 
dissertation, I investigate three notable forms of display: atlases, albums, and museums. 
These models demand a way of seeing human dignity that expands beyond the limits of a 
single frame or individual, and in so doing forces a reading of human lives and human 
worth as existing between frames. Though I understand human dignity to be a distinctly 
human value, I rely upon a media oriented lens to shift the conversation from individuals 
to communities on the one hand, and to enliven this idea’s material parameters on the 
other. Rather than seeing human dignity as something owned by the individual, I position 
human dignity as a product of life shared with others. For the purpose of this dissertation, 
I define human dignity as an idea that upholds humanity, not through the agency of the 
individual, but through the primacy of cultural systems. Thus, apprehending an idea not 
visible to the eye comes via relations, as a product of kinship across families, 
communities, cultures, and borders.  
My dissertation aims to situate the opening of new multimedia exhibits, such as 
the CMHR, within a longer history of display and exhibition that similarly attempt to 
map the cultural and embodied dimensions of human dignity. I use three case studies that 
date from the 1900s to the present to make this argument: 1) August Sander’s People of 
the 20th Century (1910-1964); 2) UNESCO’s Human Rights Exhibition Album (1950); 
and 3) The Canadian Museum for Human Rights (2014). I demonstrate how these three 
models aid in the apprehension of human dignity beyond the perpetuation of schemas that 
foreground autonomy or individuality. Each of these exhibits use images that connect 
integrally with the human body and juxtapose representations in ways that demonstrate 
how human dignity can and must be thought and communicated in complex visual 
spaces.  
The museological notion of curation and Walter Benjamin’s concept of 
constellations will be used to support my claim that the visual communication of human 
dignity depends upon media studies broadly, and curatorial systems specifically. The case 
studies are used to articulate both the problems and possibilities of embedding dignity 
within visual frameworks. In juxtaposing human bodies in social and cultural contexts, 
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exhibits perform important work in defining the ways that equality, universalism, and 
ultimately human dignity have been conceived, communicated, and contested. The 
dissertation focuses on how human dignity can be visualized beyond bodily violation or 
normative idealization, and commits to a sustained focus on the corporeal and mediated 
functions of dignity. My aim is to make the means of dignity and indignity visible within 
complex and constellated frameworks.  
Research Questions 
Throughout the dissertation, I remain engaged with three key questions currently 
underserved by human rights, media studies, and museum studies:   
1. How has human dignity been visually depicted? 
2. How can a focus on curation help to support a relational theorization of 
human dignity? 
3. How can an emphasis on the history of the affiliation between human dignity 
and curation help us to understand human rights recent move into museums? 
The first question is ultimately tied to the much broader question of how the concept of 
dignity is communicated generally. Communicating human dignity remains a 
fundamental problem given the fact that the idea of dignity has a long and complicated 
etymological and social history. As noted, dignity has been used to communicate the 
status of humans over animals; the exceptional status of the clergy, nobles, and 
parliamentary officials; the capacity for human reason; and the capacity for composure 
under pressure. When considering the visual communication of human dignity, many of 
these threads remain central even as human dignity has started to be used as a way to 
signify the inherent value of all human lives.  
Human dignity has emerged as one of the most prominent concepts among the 
collection of concepts that make up human rights and is receiving renewed attention with 
prominent legal and philosophical historians weighing in on human dignity’s conceptual 
legacies (Agamben 1999b; Kateb 2011; Moyn 2014 & 2015; Rosen 2012; Waldron 
2012). Dignity remains one of the most contested and abstract concepts available to 
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researchers and the general public because it poses as many problems as it seeks to 
resolve. On the one hand, dignity signals a base line from which all human beings can 
claim rights. On the other hand, it appears as just another word that grasps, sometimes 
unsuccessfully, at what it ought to mean to be human. As Joseph Slaughter (2007) has 
explained, dignity presents itself in the UDHR as a common sense tautology: “located on 
both sides of the law’s transitive ‘therefore,’ human dignity both precedes and derives 
from human rights, warranting their recognition and emerging from their declaration; 
thus, rhetorically, dignity...is both a founding natural rationale for, and the positive 
product of, human rights legislation” (76-77). In this sense, dignity communicates 
something that exists both before and after the law; in contemporary society, it is the 
groundwork for the existence of human rights, the product of its declarative and idealized 
vision, and something in need of protection. The majority of the renewed interest in 
dignity distinctly focuses on state apparatuses – legal, political, religious – and their 
functions in communicating and establishing the means of dignity as it exists “after the 
law”; that is, recent engagement with the concept of human dignity primarily emphasize 
the formal processes designed to claim rights or reclaim dignity.  
I contend that the contemporary museumification of human rights has made the 
concept of dignity more widely available to visual, cultural, and technological 
paradigms.3 As I focus on exhibitions, I aim to contribute to these philosophical and legal 
conversations by staking out ways in which representations make the means of dignity 
visible both adjacent to and outside of strictly legal frameworks. Legal and political 
communities are important to the workings of human dignity, but so too are cultural and 
curatorial systems. Examining exhibitions force us to practice seeing human dignity as a 
relational idea—across bodies and between cultures. This way of seeing is especially 
crucial if we are to grant the idea of human dignity a more nuanced form within media 
studies and throughout visual culture, as a transnational idea. Emphasizing the relational 
aspects of human dignity via exhibitions that disrupt simplistic notions of taxonomies and 
                                                
3 The CMHR is but one of many museums that have opened in the last five years which are dedicated to 
human rights. These include Museo de la Memoria y les Derechos Humanos (Santiago, Chile – 2011), The 
Centre for Civil and Human Rights (Atlanta, Georgia; USA – 2014), Kazern Dossen (Belgium, 2011).  
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mediation pushes us to reconcile social and visual hierarchies, and forces us back onto 
integral questions of human worth. Exhibitions such as atlases, albums, and museums 
have the ability to connect human dignity more firmly to mediated subjectivities outside 
of the law and provide a frame that might resist idealized notions of autonomous subjects 
that have largely left human dignity communicated as a utopian and abstract notion. 
My final research question, “how can an emphasis on the history of this 
relationship help us to understand human rights’ recent move into museums?”, dovetails 
with the broader concerns over the communication of human dignity. By taking a 
historical approach, I do not seek to find an origin of human dignity aligned with 
contemporary museums. The historical approach is meant to demonstrate how the 
contemporary museumification of human rights is indebted to issues of taxonomy and 
representation that have their roots in scientific racism, technological reproduction, 
institutional parameters, and partial archives. Sander’s People of the Twentieth Century 
richly demonstrates how the human body becomes laden with moral and domestic 
symbolisms that persist today, while UNESCO’s Human Rights Exhibition Album 
demonstrates how dignity’s inclusion in the UDHR necessitated a visual form. Taking a 
historical approach provides room to analyze when and how disruptions of dignity’s 
visible mediation occur, and ultimately why these shifts are important to our own 
contemporary understanding of its conceptual limits. 
Mapping the Dissertation 
This dissertation is composed of four main chapters. Chapter one provides a brief 
overview of the relevant literature that engages with human dignity and the museological 
notion of curation. To begin I will look more closely at the concept of human dignity, 
particularly in relation to the field of media studies. From there I explore the history of 
curation and Walter Benjamin’s concept of the constellation, both of which I believe are 
necessary to help understand human dignity as a relational property within media studies. 
Here too, I will also begin the historical work of connecting human dignity to modern and 
technological reproductions of which twenty and twenty-first century curation trades on. 
Combined, these threads inform the theoretical lens through which I analyze 
13 
 
representations of the human as the locus of human dignity beyond normative, negative, 
or emancipatory frameworks.  
The middle chapters proceed chronologically and use case studies to offer insights 
into how curatorial models might work in service of a relational theorization of human 
dignity. In chapter two, I examine August Sander’s book of photographs, Face of Our 
Time (1929), and his larger photographic project, People of the Twentieth Century (1910-
1964), asking how and whether the idea of a dignified human subject is available within 
his taxonomic and typological venture. Primarily addressing how Sander disrupts 
taxonomic and aesthetic functions of the body, I argue that his work helps to understand 
anxieties that underlie the connection of dignity with the body because of its relationship 
with physiognomy and its status as “an atlas of instruction” (Benjamin, as quoted in 
Berger 1992). Importantly, Sander’s project begins the process of laying out how visual 
spaces that move between finite subjects and infinite configurations are integral to 
understanding how bodily comportment works alongside human dignity.  
Chapter three turns toward the period directly following World War II and 
examines how the translation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) into 
UNESCO’s Human Rights Exhibition Album (1950) should be taken as integral to the 
formation of dignity as an international idea. As dignity became part of a declarative 
instrument, it also became something of a modern technology. There is a tendency to 
think about the UDHR and human dignity as a stable property, existing across cultures 
and histories in a uniform manner. However, the Exhibition Album helps to demonstrate 
how dignity’s new declarative functions should be tempered with its visual and varied 
communication. The album opens the declaration up to questions of its own use as it 
“reflects back a usable image of the law” (Wexler 2017, 101). Put differently, the album 
makes the ideas of the UDHR visible and relational. Indeed, the concept of human 
dignity benefits from the album as a form that both points to family relationships and 
attempts to extend them to an extreme conclusion. The album visually depicts the 
“human family” alluded to in the UDHR through a familiar, yet complex, media 
structure.  
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In the fourth chapter, I will address the Canadian Museum for Human Rights with 
specific attention paid to its first gallery. The gallery’s timeline will be explored in depth 
as a way to demonstrate the ways the museum expresses human dignity, and in turn how 
it reverts to a new normative visualization of this idea, as it delimits vulnerabilities and 
connections despite its technological innovation. As the museum attempts to move 
beyond an aesthetics that relies on images of indignity to communicate human rights, it 
struggles to reconcile what new relationships might be made beyond a politics of 
comparative oppression or inclusion. In this chapter, I aim to demonstrate how the 
CMHR tends to fix or solidify relationships between people and cultures, thus avoiding 
how human dignity is a relation made in negotiation and through developing frameworks 
of understanding. The CMHR’s emphasis on fixed relationships is especially clear in 
terms of its treatment of Indigenous perspectives and most recently as it has faced 
criticism in regard to one of its hagiographic human rights advocates. Thus, I aim to 
demonstrate how human dignity’s relational aspects must be embraced, both curatorially 
and culturally, if a positive articulation of human rights and human dignity are to be seen 
as something alive in these structures, and not as something that is indeed archived or 
achieved.  
In many ways, my dissertation is an attempt to refute the way discussions of 
human rights and human dignity are predominantly framed in terms of gateways of 
suffering or idealization. There has been substantial consideration of what is insufferable, 
cruel, and otherwise inhospitable in relation to the visibly violated human body 
(Bergoffen 2012; Hunt 2007; Ignatieff 2001; Linfield 2010). Unlike Payam Akhavan 
(2017), the latest Massey Lecturer and a renowned international human rights lawyer, I 
do not agree that “feeling injustice is the only means of understanding justice” (6). How 
human dignity is communicated must be thought of and imagined outside of injustice; 
feeling injustice is not the only means of understanding. The project of human rights is a 
work in progress. It is also a process in need of language that is both creative and 
constitutive when it comes to the “human,” the “people,” the “body,” and the 
“everybody” beyond naïve idealism. Shifting attention towards visual projects, which are 
not solely focused on broken or violated bodies, opens up new routes of communication 
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and offers a language that speaks to the communities, alliances, and relations that are 
foundational to the contemporary understanding of human dignity. 
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1 Human Dignity: History, Media, Curation 
 
Abounaddara, a collective of film and image-makers specializing in emergency cinema in 
the context of the Syrian War, recently issued a provocative claim: “dignity has never 
been photographed” (2017). Similarly, Ariella Azoulay (2013) has argued that 
universalism, a conceptual neighbor to human dignity, is “an idea deprived of body and 
form” (36). Both observations point to the way a desire for a singular image, as 
something to uphold or idealize, is insufficient when engaging with the visual 
communication of distinctly human qualities. Relying on or striving for a singular image 
of human dignity has lent itself to notions of idealization or autonomy only to be 
contradicted with a relentless stream of images of atrocity. Individual photographs have 
been read as proof that dignity is something that human beings claim or possess, or 
conversely that it is something which can be easily violated. Both sides of this spectrum 
have been central to the contemporary assumptions that undergird the visual 
communication of human dignity. That an aesthetics of indignity has been used to come 
to the defense of dignity itself is not only a prominent tactic in visual communication, but 
something that has been thoroughly considered and contested, while positive 
visualizations have been labeled as celebratory or unfaithful to the realities of global 
disparity.  
If we are thus aware of the limitations of photography in communicating human 
dignity, I take Abounaddara’s and Azoulay’s claims as a challenge to be more specific 
about the kinds of visions, technologies, and systems that can help us to think through the 
mediated parameters of human dignity, and in turn move it towards less binary 
assumptions. Human dignity is not just something made ideally or revealed in gross 
violation. Human dignity is made in and through relations and communities, amidst the 
promise of a shared world has made it a powerful and enduring idea. As such, I turn to 
curatorial models to help express my claim. While photography creates the images and 
reproductions central to the visions and technologies under consideration in this 
dissertation, it is not the act of photography or its subsequent representations in particular 
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that I am expressly interested in. As Azoulay (2012) claims, “the event that the camera 
sets in motion does not necessarily result in a photograph” (21). For my own purpose, the 
“events” that the camera sets in motion are indeed more systemic and related to modes of 
exhibition. I see a wide range of curatorial models – atlases, albums, and museums – as 
alternative routes to the visual communication of human dignity, routes that do not 
simplify its shape in idealized or degraded images. This chapter aims to position my 
claim within three broad conceptual moves. First, I provide an overview of the current 
discussions of human dignity as a way to situate how this interdisciplinary field has 
considered the differences between individuals and communities. From there, I connect 
these discussions to media studies more broadly. This leads into my main intervention, 
which proposes curatorial systems as alternative media that provide spaces to think with 
and about human dignity as embodied and relational. 
Dignity: An Overview 
Like the history of human rights, which only gained prominence in the mid to late 2000s, 
historical inquiries considering human dignity are a relatively new phenomenon.  In 
terms of human rights four periods are often foregrounded in their development: the 
Middle-Ages and Roman Law, the late 18th Century with the rise of the American and 
French Revolutions, the 1940s as a response to the Second World War and its aftermath, 
and most recently in the 1970s with the rise of global humanitarianism (McCrudden 
2013, 4). The surge in the study of human rights has given form to debates concerning 
their origins, particularly between Lynn Hunt (2007 & 2016), who positions the origins 
of human rights at the turn of the 18th century with the abolishment of public torture, and 
Samuel Moyn (2010 & 2016), who positions the origins of human rights after 1968, at 
the time of the development of international aid and humanitarian justice.4 I note this 
debate over the origins of human rights because it focuses current discourse around 
human dignity as well, as scholars search for and develop the origins of human dignity in 
similar moments and institutions. Like emergent histories of human rights, histories of 
                                                
4
 See Hoffman (2016) for a detailed overview of this debate. 
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human dignity are equally new and similarly fragmented. In many cases, histories of 
human dignity follow similar patterns, aligning its development with famous laws and 
declarations from the Middle Ages to the present. Similar institutional, etymological, 
philosophical, and cultural analyses have been playing out in the last decade, especially 
as the interest in human dignity has grown (Düwell 2014; McCrudden 2013).  
 Despite the fact that human rights and human dignity are both relatively new 
areas of historical inquiry, the study of human dignity does have its own particular 
contours. Human dignity is often considered to be foundational to human rights. Today, 
the invocation of human dignity signals a baseline value and respect of all human lives 
that make any program of human rights viable. In this way, whereas human rights define 
what humans are entitled to, human dignity defines a distinctly human value that anchors 
humanity and allows scholars and legal professionals alike to invoke human rights writ 
large. However, though human dignity seems to signal a baseline for human rights, it 
should not be thought of as simplistically universal. Its meaning and use heavily depends 
on context, and debates often fall within legal, philosophical, and of utmost interest to 
this dissertation, cultural themes, each of which has important ramifications for my own 
study.  
First, a large portion of the work on human dignity follows legal leads. These 
studies position our current understandings of human dignity in relation to specific legal 
documents outside of the dominant historical frames of human rights writ large. For 
example, the 1848 French decree against slavery (Scott 2013), the 1937 adoption of the 
Irish constitution (Moyn 2013), the 1949 adoption of German Basic Law (Goos 2013), or 
more recently the rulings of International Criminal Courts (Bergoffen 2012). Further, 
more contemporary engagements with the legal importance of dignity in South Africa 
(Fagan 2014), Japan (Matsui 2014) and India (Baxi 2014) have been crucial to situating 
human dignity as a distinct realm of legal study. Most of these endeavors are restricted to 
where and when the term or word dignity appears and to how it was and is used in legal 
processes.  
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Second, an emphasis on the philosophical origins of dignity is also important. 
Here scholars most often point to early notions of duty dating back to Cicero (Rosen 
2012; Düwell 2014) and Immanuel Kant’s theory of würde. Kant’s writing on dignity in 
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) is especially crucial to understand 
how and why dignity has been predominantly considered as immaterial and disembodied. 
Kant saw the rational being as the central subject of human dignity, and the abstract 
undertaking of reason as the central act. Bound by the categorical imperative, which tells 
us that an action or judgement must be moral in all circumstances for it to be considered 
good, Kant’s idea of dignity is similarly positioned within a rational and imaginative 
sphere (24). The process of reason responsible for undertaking Kant’s imperative is 
meant to happen independent of experience. For Kant, the rational being must be an end 
in oneself, and in dignity the person must not be used to reach another being’s desired 
end. In this sense, the means of existence (material and corporeal realities) are secondary 
when the faculty of reason takes care to act only when actions can be claimed to be 
universally good for all. Centering the faculty of reason constructs a metaphysical, 
idealized space with values that are easily distinguished. Kant argues:  
morality is the condition under which alone a rational being can be an end in 
himself, for only thereby can he be a legislating member in the kingdom of ends. 
Hence morality and humanity, insofar as it is capable of morality, alone have 
dignity. Skill and diligence in work have a market price; wit, lively imagination, 
and humor have an affective price; but fidelity to promise and benevolences based 
on principles (not on instinct) have intrinsic worth. (40-1) 
It should here be noted that Kant used the term würde, which is most often translated as 
dignity, but is also allied with value and worth in a more concrete sense.5 In any case, 
Kant’s philosophy of human dignity underscores clarity in distinction, a willed space for 
thought beyond out material selves, and a sense of security in how this idea ought to be 
                                                
5
 As Waldron (2012) notes, “’dignity’ here is the English translator’s term, not Kant’s. Kant uses the 
German term ‘Würde.’ There is a well-established practice of translating Würde as ‘dignity.’ But the two 
words have slightly different connotations. ‘Würde’ is certainly much closer to ‘worth’ than our term 
‘dignity’ is” (24). 
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deployed.6 For Kant, the mind and its capacity for reason and morality is the ground on 
which the concept of dignity is waged and won.  
For modern thinkers Kant’s theory seems to perform a dual function, as it signals 
one of the earliest conceptions of human dignity that is perceived as universal in nature 
and resembles a theory of dignity found within recent laws and declarations. Jack 
Donnelly (2015) explains that the period marked by the French and American revolutions 
is the beginning of a time when the concept of human dignity was transitioning from a 
normative concept to a taxonomic concept. Normative conceptions of dignity refer to the 
way this idea helped to create symbolic designations reserved for select groups of people, 
such as rank, virtue, and reason. In visual terms, we can return to Queen Victoria (Fig. 1) 
for reference to the outward presentation of her dignified station. Taxonomic conceptions 
of human dignity most resemble the way human dignity is thought of currently, as an idea 
or symbolic designation granted to all people simply because of their biological traits 
marking them as human (Donnelly 2015, 2). Kant’s version of dignity, which ascribes all 
humans a worth outside of a market place, is one of the first iterations of this idea that 
gestures towards a taxonomic or otherwise inherent version. While there is disagreement 
as to how or whether Kant’s theory informed later laws or understandings of human 
dignity (Hill 2013 & 2014; Kerstain 2014; Moyn 2013; Rosen 2012; Waldron 2012), one 
would be remiss not to count his understanding of free will founded in rationality as one 
of dignity’s historical and philosophical turning points.  
Finally, cultural manifestations of dignity, or inquiries that search for the presence 
of dignity within human history where dignity is not explicitly tied to laws or obvious 
invocation of dignity in name, make up the third broad sphere of its historical analysis. 
Predominantly, this dissertation exists within this cultural sphere, and proceeds from the 
observation that though human dignity might not be evoked in name its demand as a 
distinctly human value pervades the case studies examined here. Within more cultural 
                                                
6
 As much as Kant emphasizes reason, there is an underlying aesthetic, or at the very least imaginative 
component of this imperative dignity: there is a way in which the moral component must project options in 
and for the world. 
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considerations of human dignity Jeremy Waldron (2012) has staked out a theory of 
human dignity that is aligned with aristocratic notions of status as much as it is with 
moral or legal frameworks. Waldron argues that how we understand dignity today is 
directly connected to its “ancient and historical connection with rank,” which now 
translates to the idea that dignity expresses “the high and equal rank of every human 
person” (14). While Waldron places human dignity within the law—specifically, within 
the “bodies of law” that support his claim—there is a slippage between the normative 
arena of the law and the performative aspects of bodes within it that points to the 
complexity of human dignity’s cultural forces. Waldron states, “the sort of conception I 
am developing…presents dignity as a rank or status that a person may occupy in society, 
display in his bearing and self-presentation and exhibit in his speech and actions” (28). 
Thus, speech and outer appearances become markers of dignity before the law in 
Waldron’s work, but the same markers are unreconciled within society or culture at large. 
For my own purposes, Waldron’s theory is compelling, as it gestures towards the visual 
realm in a way that few other academics do. However, when we put his ideas into 
conversation with specific examples and historical trajectories, the footing becomes less 
secure. For example, the image of Frederick Douglass (Fig. 3) can traditionally be 
aligned with dignity as a status, as both a position one occupies and displays in self-
presentation. Douglass used his body and self-stylization to great effect, demonstrating 
how people of colour could occupy the same high-ranking status as white, land-owning 
men. Moving forward in time, the “upwards equalization” of human dignity begins to 
become less clear, as technology and self-stylization become prolific and symbolically 
charged; these confluences will be explored in more depth throughout the proceeding 
chapters. How are we to perceive human dignity as something displayed in one’s bearing 
that doesn’t become normative or aspirational? As Samuel Moyn (2014) has argued, 
“such rituals…seem fairly silly when applied to everyone” (22). Though Waldron 
radically opens up questions regarding human dignity parallel to the law, as it manifests 
in and on bodies, an underlying tension remains that sees human dignity as normative, 
that is as something meant to look and feel a certain way. Difference here remains 
problematic. Thinking in terms of relationality, which does not deny difference, but seeks 
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to understand how our different histories position us in relation to one another, Waldron’s 
theory does not go far enough in terms of human dignity’s visual communication.  
Although Waldron’s is one of the more high-profile contemporary thinkers to 
engage with human dignity via culture and the body, he is not the only or the earliest. 
Friedrich Schiller’s work, in the treatise On Grace and Dignity (1793), formulates one of 
the earliest relationships between dignity, representation, and the human form. On the 
heels of Kant’s theory of dignity, Schiller saw fit to question the centrality of reason so 
integral to Kant’s understanding of human worth. For Schiller, corporeal realities are just 
as important as the faculty of reason when navigating the means of human existence and 
thus the means of human dignity. Dignity, for Schiller, “is the expression of a noble 
disposition of the mind” (370; my italics). Bodily comportment, emotions, and reactions 
become places to find evidence of how humans conceive of their relationship to others, 
and ultimately how they see themselves and others as human. While Schiller’s 
formulation has often been solely aligned with the realm of aesthetic judgment, his theory 
of dignity far exceeds a visual encounter.  Schiller understands dignity as something 
made knowable through the confluence of material, corporeal, and moral worlds, of 
which the human is the central locus of evidence and study. However, rather than being 
simply another object of aesthetic study, the human is framed as a complex interface that 
meets the demands of moral obligations and the realities of corporeal being. The human 
being “cannot account the dignity of his moral purpose, cannot urge his preeminence as a 
moral creature, if he wants to claim the prize of beauty; here he is nothing but a thing in 
space, nothing but one phenomenon among phenomena” (Schiller, 343). Thus, in 
Schiller’s understanding, the dignity of the person is not tied to her aesthetic qualities or 
questions of her beauty alone. The realm of beauty treats objects and subjects as things. 
The realm of dignity understands people to be connected, vulnerable, and morally 
impactful. Schiller emphasizes the human capacity to master his or her own feelings, as a 
form of internal fortitude, that is in fact tested when put in contact with the realities of the 
material world.  
Schiller’s theorization poses dignity as a connective property. Human dignity is 
not the product of solitary or isolated reason, but rather proof of its existence can be 
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found within products of human interactions and reactions. The dignified person, rather 
than being one thing amongst other things, is vitally and necessarily animated and 
constituted in relation to others; he or she is a person whose demands are both tied to and 
reach well beyond the material self, yet it is the material self that gives the dignified 
person real and contingent force. With the introduction of a material dimension, a sense 
of real vulnerability is brought into the concept of dignity. In this light dignity becomes 
not only a moral exercise, but also a tangible product, which can be seen as capturing the 
ways in which humans are supported as more than just “things in space.” Schiller does 
not move completely away from Kant, but rather sees the body and its material 
possibilities as an integral part in our understanding of dignity. The body is not merely a 
thing getting in the way of superior morality; it is the medium that demarcates our 
humanity from other things of beauty.  
In this way, Schiller binds human dignity to the expressive and exhibitionary 
realm. In Schiller’s configuration, noble dispositions of the mind can be understood as 
being translated through the body: “we cannot say, that mind reveals itself in a willful 
movement, for this movement only expresses the material of will (the purpose) but not 
the form of will (the disposition). About the latter only the accompanying movement can 
teach us” (353). Dignity is thought to be readable in the body because of the tensions it 
communicates when humans are put in contact with the wills of others. Most notably, and 
iconographically, the evidence for such a claim was found within the Laocoön statue 
(Fig. 5), which depicts the agony of the Trojan priest as he witnesses his sons’ deaths at 
the hands of the snakes, deaths which were punishment for his own crimes. The scene is 
said to reveal:  
Calm in suffering, wherein dignity actually consists, although only by a decision 
of reason, becomes the demonstration of intelligence in man and the expression of 
his moral freedom. But, it is not merely in suffering in the narrow sense, where 
the word signifies only painful emotions, but at every moment the desiring faculty 
shows a strong interest, that the mind must prove its freedom, and thus dignity be 
its expression. (376) 
Thus, dignity is not about suffering per se, but rather about the human’s ability to 
recognize her place in a world where she is not always in control; it is about the moments 
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of disruption and mediation that occur when humans are brought into contact with one 
another. The tension between pain and peace or degradation and stoicism is a sign of a 
developed mentality that recognizes coexistence and personal control. In Schiller’s 
account of dignity there is a disjuncture between the natural instinct and bodily 
comportment, and it is in these signs of disharmony we find evidence of a particularly 
human quality and a particularly human worth. In this sense, dignity does not mark an 
unbound freedom or limitless agency, but rather a constant being in tension with the 
needs and concerns of others and an awareness of one’s place within a field of action and 
embodiment.  
 
Figure 5: Laocoön, photo by James Anderson c. 1845-1855. Digital image courtesy 
of the Ghetty's Open Content Program. 
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Dignity and Media 
Schiller’s reading of the Laocoön statue brings us to the mediation of human dignity. 
Shifting away from notions of objectivity, ethics, and metaphysics, Schiller allowed 
questions of aesthetics, representation, and performance to filter into philosophical 
discussions of dignity. Undoubtedly, these visual properties complicate what we now 
understand as one of the underlying principle of dignity as a contemporary concept: 
regarding and taking seriously the representational and performative aspects that intersect 
with human dignity risks undermining the establishment of inherent value bound to the 
person. Put another way, questioning the visual communication of human dignity, 
comingling its visual elements, introduces notions of difference in a way that calls into 
question the notion of inherent value, which is now considered core to the idea of human 
dignity. How, indeed, can the essential quality of our humanness be communicated 
within a diverse visual sphere without introducing new ideas of hierarchy? How can 
human dignity be responsibly thought of alongside difference? In many ways, there is no 
perfect answer to such questions. Pairing the idea of human dignity with visual 
communication necessarily troubles its perceived uniformity, which has until recently 
been protected by its place within philosophical and legal discourse.  
The mediation and communication of human dignity is, however, a growing 
concern. In particular, the place of the body, and its role as a medium of expression is an 
expanding field in current analysis of human rights and dignity. This dissertation expands 
upon recent thinking that affixes human dignity to the body in legal, political, and 
aesthetic ways (Anker 2012; Bergoffen 2009 & 2012, Sliwinski 2015). Importantly, these 
theorists have established connections, between dignity, the body, and media in ways that 
developed normative, negative, and emancipatory perspectives on dignity’s embodied 
properties via testimony, literature, phenomenology, and photography.  
Relying on the rulings of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Deborah 
Bergoffen approaches the embodiment of human dignity from the intersection of law, 
phenomenology, and testimony. She writes: “this body of law is a law of bodies. In 
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identifying slavery, torture, and rape as a weapon of war as human rights violations, it 
ties human dignity to bodily integrity” (Bergoffen 2009, 311). War and genocide mediate 
bodies in a way that disrupts their meaning and their materiality: “when my body is used 
as a thing the meanings it brings to the world are destroyed” (Bergoffen 2009, 312). 
Though Bergoffen does not abide by any stable sense that bodily violation alone marks 
human dignity, she does outline the importance of the body as a central signifier to 
pursuits of justice. Recognizing rape as a weapon of war, as a crime against humanity, 
acknowledged that visible scars alone did not define a violation of human dignity, and 
fundamentally reoriented the gendered dynamics of bodily vulnerability. Testimony is a 
vehicle of communication legible in front of the law, specifically in relation to the 
genocides in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, each of which saw rape used as a weapon. 
Bergoffen reminds us, “we cannot reduce any of these human rights offenses to matters 
of the material body alone. We must take account of the ways in which the human body 
is always the embodiment of a meaning making subject” (2009, 313). The subject’s 
power to give the world meaning is integral, and conceivably why testimony is so 
important to her study. Testimony is a process of reclaiming power to give the world 
meaning, and thus shifts the conversation away from the initial violation of the body to 
the pursuit of justice. While bodily violation is here the beginning of dignity’s 
communicative process before the law, it is not the end. 
From a literary and phenomenological perspective, Elizabeth Anker has been 
critical of the way our current human rights regime prioritizes bodily integrity as a 
vehicle of communication. She argues, “not only are [human rights] underwritten by the 
dual fictions of human dignity and bodily integrity, but they yield a highly truncated, 
decorporealized vision of the subject” (Anker 2012, 2). Anker sees dignity as a fiction 
that scripts the human as an inviolable body, despite the fact that violated and abused 
bodies can be found with little effort. Posing the body as “fully integrated and 
inviolable...whole, autonomous, and self-enclosed” serves to turn “corporeal integrity 
into something of a baseline condition that precedes the ascription of dignity and rights to 
an individual” (Anker 2012, 4). When corporeal integrity acts as a baseline for human 
dignity, we enter an exclusionary realm that forecloses the vulnerability and decay that 
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cannot be untethered from the human body itself. Not only are those born with specific 
“defects” excluded in this normative formulation, but deep assumptions about human 
dignity and bodily integrity ignores the body until it becomes a thing to be dealt with as it 
inevitably decays, which “when the body cannot be thus ignored, the liberal tradition 
generally treats it as an entity that must be repressed, quarantined, or otherwise mastered 
by reason” (Anker 2012, 4). Anker sees phenomenology as an answer to the quandary 
between inviolability and violation, arguing that we should affirmatively recast 
“embodiment as a ubiquitously shared site of disorder, flux, and brokenness” as a way to 
“overwrite the stigma and the shame that attach only to some bodies and not others” 
(Anker 2012, 59). Literature, she argues, acts as a site that can perform this recasting, as 
it challenges liberal and individualistic conceptions of the self. Anker importantly turns 
the concept of human dignity towards a messier, and thus less binary notion of human 
dignity that exceeds normative or negative tendencies and examines its own exclusions.  
Whereas Bergoffen and Anker see testimony and literature respectively as the 
vehicles that help to reframe questions of vulnerability and materiality in relation to 
human dignity, Sharon Sliwinski has posited that the invention of photography had an 
important impact on the “ascension of the idea of human dignity” (2015, 174). Working 
with the photographs of Frederick Douglass, the significance of which were briefly 
explicated in the introduction (Fig 3), Sliwinski sees three prominent versions of dignity 
– status, intrinsic value, and an ability to keep one’s composure during suffering – 
coming together.  In democratizing the genre of portraiture, photography disrupted 
notions of status, it gave sitters the power to construct their own image outside of the 
structures of repressive political relations, and it helped advocate for what might be called 
aesthetic emancipation. For Douglass, an early adopter of photographic portraiture, the 
medium and form provided a venue to create his own image and subvert discriminatory 
notions of value directly related to race and its manifestation on the body. He too could 
present an image of himself that captured an “air of dignity” and visually demonstrated 
his belonging, not to a class or race, but to a distinctly human category.  
Each of these contributions have been influential to the genesis of my own project 
and begin to set up the communication of human dignity generally, and within specific 
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realms of study particularly through legal testimony, world literature, and photography. 
Furthermore, they complicate the way human dignity has been communicated, and frame 
its visual terms in complex cultural terms, outside of philosophy and the law, that defy an 
easy sense of stability or autonomy. In turn, they pose the human body as a multifaceted 
locus of expression, mediation, and contestation.  
In effect, current debates concerning the mediation of human dignity can be seen 
as a response to themes of bodily inviolability and individuality that are so often posed as 
baselines for its existence. These themes have a long and complex history in relation to 
human rights, which have been well-documented. In Inventing Human Rights (2007), 
Lynn Hunt demonstrates how individuality became linked with human rights and human 
dignity around the turn of the 18th century in concert with the Declaration of 
Independence (1776) and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789). At 
this moment, a shift from state or feudal ownership of people to individual autonomy and 
self-determination was taking place: “torture ended because the traditional framework of 
pain and personhood fell apart, to be replaced bit by bit, by a new framework, in which 
individuals owned their bodies, had rights to their separateness and to bodily 
inviolability, and recognized in other people the same passions, sentiments, and 
sympathies as in themselves” (Hunt 2007, 112). In Hunt’s view, spectacles of suffering 
no longer had the desired effect of community restoration; the body no longer belonged 
to the state in the same way and thus its mutilation no longer provided positive 
affirmations of inclusion and morality. The slow swing of the pendulum from state 
ownership of the body to individuality and bodily inviolability began to create a new 
framework of human rights.  
As Michael Ignatieff (2001) argues: “human rights is a language of individual 
empowerment…when individuals have agency, they can protect themselves against 
injustice. Equally, when individuals have agency, they can define themselves what they 
wish to live and die for” (57). As empowering as this promise of individuality was and 
remains, it denies how the individual is, in fact, made by a myriad of cultural factors. 
Indeed, as Hunt admits, “the very notion of human rights inadvertently opened the door 
to more virulent forms of sexism, racism, and anti-Semitism. In effect, the sweeping 
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claims about the natural equality of all mankind called forth equally global assertions 
about natural difference, producing a new kind of opponent to human rights” (Hunt, 187). 
While we might see the move towards individuality as liberating on the one hand, it 
brought about a framework with equally troubling effects in terms of human dignity, 
effects that we are still coming to terms with today. As human rights named a new form 
of collective agreement untethered from monarchy, it offered another form of protection, 
by way of individuality that traded one type of subjection for another (Brown 2004, 455).  
Understanding ourselves as individuals sits in tension with the collective offering 
of human rights discourse writ large. The move towards “separateness and bodily 
inviolability” ushered in a way of understanding human dignity and its relationship to the 
human body that privileged purity over vulnerability and exalted individuality over a 
collective or social community. As human dignity began to be owned by the individual, 
rather than understood through the community, it became entrenched deeper into 
normative dichotomies of idealization on the one hand, and violation on the other. 
Though violation was no longer as instrumental to the state, it began to serve different 
purposes, making sweeping claims about the value of humans more generally. Even 
where the body was used as a way to assert aesthetic emancipation, as we saw with the 
photographs of Frederick Douglass in the 1800s, ascension of human dignity was 
personal and tied to ideal visualizations often along the lines of race, class, and gender.  
This dissertation attempts to contend with the movement of human rights and 
human dignity into the individual, and offer an alternative way of imagining shared 
ownership through a relational theorization. Despite the rhetoric of individual ownership 
that we are still left with today, and which will be explicitly analyzed in chapter four, our 
experiences of human dignity are made through relations with others, relations that must 
be named and theorized beyond scenes of violation or autonomous faculties.  
Dignity and Curatorial Constellations 
At its core, this project proposes a different media of communication – namely, curation 
– as a form that might help to situate human dignity outside of strict binary frameworks. 
While the same problems arise in terms of opening up human dignity to questions of 
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visible, and thus hierarchical difference, I argue that curatorial models provide structures 
that help to assert how our means of existence creates demands on others, thus expanding 
conversations about the ends of human dignity. Shifting attention towards exhibitionary 
projects offers creative and constitutive language that speaks to the communities and 
relations that are foundational to human dignity’s contemporary understanding, as a 
distinctly human value that is universal but not culturally uniform. My claim—that 
dignity is apprehended through relation—rests upon the observation that the idea of 
dignity is always already bound to the visual realm, a realm wherein the configuration of 
different subjects and elements is telling about the regard of human worth. I see the 
concept of human dignity turning alongside those moments where people are brought 
together, and where the limits of our freedom are indeed tested. I take Schiller’s emphasis 
on a tension, in his case between calm and suffering, and extend it to the tensions that 
arise when different people, cultures, and histories are visually brought together. It is not 
enough to focus on singular instances of violation or aspirational images of autonomous 
achievement. That we exist alongside the rights of others in time, space, and 
representation is key to understanding human dignity’s visual communication as a 
constellation of visible signs that allows for a universality of human rights without 
demanding conformity or dismantling differences.  
A sustained focus on problems of aesthetics, representation, and performance 
allows for a more complex understanding of human dignity beyond binaries of violation 
and purity on the one hand, and hierarchy and abstraction on the other. As McCrudden 
notes, “a rich history of dignity would combine these differing approaches” (McCrudden, 
2014, 6). Institutional, philosophical, legal, and etymological understandings currently 
speak to each other only in bits and pieces. I propose that the language and media of 
curation can help to make these connections perceptible, and might offer models that do 
not make these strands of knowledge compete with each other for prominence, but rather 
situates them within less hierarchical modes of knowledge. Seeing human dignity as 
relational—as a product of life negotiated and shared with others and as a property that 
values how our different experiences position subjects alongside one another—rather 
than as something owned by the individual or the sate depends upon a framework that is 
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not only curatorial, but importantly constellated. Curatorial forms dramatically 
demonstrate human dignity’s relational edges via kinship – across taxonomies, families, 
communities, and borders.  
 Curation 
The term curation has come to be used across wide swaths of modern life. This word is 
no longer relegated to art historical or museological fields. Content curation, data 
curation, digital curation, genetic curation, and cultural curation have become 
synonymous both with the way ever-growing amounts of information needs to be 
managed and with the way individuals have come to understand their roles in performing 
the task of information and cultural management in their everyday lives.  
The term curation has no simple origin, yet has already been provisionally 
entwined with the explicit movement of human rights into museums. The Latin root of 
curate, “cura” to care or take interest (as in curiosity), has been favorably looked upon as 
the realm of human rights meets the museological (Failler, 2015; Failler, Ives, Milne 
2015). Caring for others supports the care taken by curators to tell stories associated with 
human rights abuses and more practically look after the artefacts and material remnants 
left in the path of human rights’ progress and peril. In my own case, aligning human 
dignity with curation does not just signal a conscious effort to care for or make something 
of the past, but an ongoing and conscious effort to care for the present-conditions that 
make us human. As Lehrer and Milton (2011) note, “thinking about curation not only as 
selection, design, and interpretation, but as care-taking—as a kind of intimate, 
intersubjective, inter-relational obligation—raises key ethical questions relevant in an age 
of “truth-telling” (Lehrer and Milton, 4). My interest lies within the “inter-relational,” 
how embodied, cultural, and historical difference curatorially positions people in relation 
to one another without demanding conformity.   
Beyond the roots of care, there is a more granular historical link to be made 
between curation and human dignity in relation to law and bureaucracy, and as a concept 
that links legal and cultural concerns. As David Levi-Strauss (2006) elucidates:  
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Under the Roman Empire the title of curator (‘caretaker’) was given to officials in 
charge of various departments of public works: sanitation, transportation, 
policing…the curators regionum were responsible for maintaining order in the 14 
regions of Rome. And the curators aquarum took care of the aqueducts. In the 
Middle Ages, the role of the curator shifted to the ecclesiastical, as clergy having 
a spiritual cure or charge. So one could say that the split within curation – 
between the management and control of public works (law) and the cure of souls 
(faith) – was there from the beginning. (NP) 
Thus, from an early moment, curation combined the legal and cultural in a way that 
arguably continues to this day, and becomes more evident as the relationship between 
museums and human rights grows. Curation signals a set of relations that is not just about 
caring in the archival sense, but expanded outwards in terms of bureaucracy, faith, and 
value in the more humanistic sense. There is a strange affinity between human dignity 
and curation because of the way they both impart cultural value, which can neither be 
seen or measured. Both exist within economic spheres, to be sure, but are also aligned 
with notions of non-monetary cache. As Balzer (2014) notes, “the curator is someone 
who insists on value, and who makes it, whether or not it actually exists” (32). Dignity 
too insists on value, even when this value is not given to sight, and can’t be pointed to 
directly. Mining human dignity’s visual communication might seem strange in this sense, 
but I argue that dignity’s value can be seen through a curatorial framework where bodies, 
cultures, histories, and values collide.  
Playing off curation’s history in relation to clergy and divine notions of 
authorship, David Balzer (2014) has coined the term curationism as a word that describes 
the way curating has expanded beyond museums and exhibits. Curationism is not merely 
a descriptive role (noun) or a task (verb), but has rather become a way of being since the 
early 1990s: “curationism is, then, the acceleration of the curatorial impulse to become a 
dominant way of thinking and being” (8). Wine, music, books, and all other facets of 
culture can and have been curated. Expanding curation to these realms effectively points 
to the way culture writ large needs to be taken care of—managed, arranged, edited—by 
those with specialized knowledge (and in the case of online spheres and algorithms, 
specialized skills). 
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In this dissertation, I am not suggesting that dignity is yet another thing to curate 
by experts or self-described connoisseurs. Rather, my reliance on curation stems from 
both its broad dependence on the act of arrangement and juxtaposition and its merging of 
systemic and value-laden concerns. Curation is at once a method or toolkit of placing 
objects and images beside one another and a conferring of meaning between them. While 
there is often an element of happenstance within the process of curation, it is also full of 
purposeful and conscience decisions which are ultimately full of cultural value. 
Following the contemporary art historian, Hans-Ulrich Obrist (2014), who argues that 
curating is “simply about connecting cultures, bringing their elements into proximity with 
each other – the task of curating is to make junctions to allow different elements to 
touch” (Obrist 2014, 1), I argue that our sense of what dignity is, is similarly indebted to 
the connection of peoples and cultures as their elements are brought into proximity with 
one another. Curatorial models dramatically reveal the effects of such proximity, 
especially in cases where the body mediates and expresses assumptions underlying 
human dignity. For example, the groupings August Sander creates in the People of the 
Twentieth Century demonstrate how it is not just the inviolability of bodies that make a 
dignified life or define dignified movement, but a whole host of social characteristics and 
environmental constructs. Though we can strive to reach a place where each individual 
can make their own image and be regarded as wholly autonomous, the realities of our 
everyday entanglements are much closer to Obrist’s idea of curation. Moments where we 
are brought into proximity with one another are indeed the moments where human 
dignity is tested. Crucially, many of these tests occur outside of bodily violation, through 
the meeting of people in labour, culture, and communities. If “the very idea of an 
exhibition is that we live in a world with each other, in which it is possible to make 
arrangements, associations, connections and wordless gestures, and through this mise en 
scene to speak,” human dignity too is made through the worlds we inhabit with each 
other, and made through arrangements, associations, connections, and often wordless 
gestures (Obrist, 32).    
Focusing on specific curatorial models, I argue, helps to meet the challenge of 
being more precise about the kinds of visual communication that assist in mediating 
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human dignity beyond normative, negative, or emancipatory frameworks, and in so doing 
move towards a relational theorization. On the one hand, exhibitions continue to open up 
important questions about the connection between human dignity and mediated human 
subjects that photographic theory has already begun. On the other hand, the language and 
media of curation provide a framework for the contemporary theorization of human 
dignity that might resist idealized notions of autonomous subjects or violated bodies, and 
reposition human dignity as relational. As exhibitions have the capacity to hold and 
visually compare multiple objects at one time, they are prime places from which to 
situate human dignity as a more diffuse quality. Curation depends on plurality and logics 
of arrangement that are at once epistemic and systemic. The arrangement of concrete 
elements in these spaces can provide clues as to the limits of exclusion and inclusion 
within the human family, and concretely demonstrate how human dignity is shared and 
made across bodies of people and bodies of knowledge. Although dignity may never have 
been photographed, it can and has been exhibited.  
 Constellations 
More specifically, I am interested in a particular kind or strategy of curation that directly 
helps to expose human dignity as a relational property. In this dissertation, I am interested 
in types of constellated curating that disrupt taxonomies, histories, and ultimately 
cultural hierarchies with their disregard for temporal and spatial orthodoxies. Not all 
curating is constellated, and thus not all curatorial endeavors should be aligned with an 
articulation of human rights or human dignity that does not strictly depend on scenes of 
violence or indignity. Constellated curating or curatorial constellations help to make a 
relational theorization of human dignity more direct not only by foregrounding a multi-
media and multi-vocal approaches, but also by marrying the material concerns of 
exhibitions with conceptual language. Curatorial constellations help to make an idea such 
as human dignity visible as they foreground relationships between individuals, 
communities, and nations, as they move away from traditional models of time and 
history, and as they decenter an emphasis on instances of suffering as the main route to 
the visual communication of this idea.  
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I depend upon Walter Benjamin’s definition and use of the constellation to make 
this leap. Benjamin introduced the metaphor of the constellation in his habilitation, titled, 
The Origin of German Tragic Drama (1928), and directly and indirectly used the concept 
of the constellation and a constellatd approach to his writing and research that is 
instructive to our own moment, especially in relation to human rights on a transnational 
level. Though Benjamin’s use of the constellation as a metaphor is not one of his most 
well-known or regarded contributions, paired with curatorial models it is arguably 
instructive as we search out new ways of communicating human dignity, its history, and 
its present configuration.  
Benjamin’s habituation, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, was notably rejected by 
the faculty committee at the University of Frankfurt, and in turn ended Benjamin’s goal 
of becoming a faculty member.7 On its most basic level, the work argued for a 
reconsideration of Baroque drama over Classical drama. Beyond the unpopularity of its 
argument, Benjamin’s writing was and remains obscure and at times ill-defined in this 
work. Partly, this fault lies within Benjamin’s pursuit of truth as something eternal. 
Against the reality of the material world, a world constantly in flux, his pursuit for an 
enduring sense of Truth met real problems. From the first sentence of The Origin, 
Benjamin exposes his trouble, between ideas and their material elements, as it manifests 
between philosophy and representation: “it is characteristic of philosophical writing that 
it must continually confront the question of representation” (1928, 27). The “truth” of an 
idea is seemingly and endlessly tested against its representational situation. As Susan 
Buck-Morss (1989) has shown, despite Benjamin’s simultaneous engagement with the 
fragmentary and decaying nature of the world in other projects he was working on or just 
beginning at the time, in The Origin of German Tragic Drama he seemed enamored with 
a “metaphysical understanding of philosophy as the representation of eternal ideas, as if 
‘constellations’ of truth were impervious to precisely that transitoriness which was 
supposed to be truth’s most fundamental quality…. If the historical transiency of the 
                                                
7
 The rejection also caused this work to go unpublished in Benjamin’s lifetime. It was first printed in 1977, 
arguably when the diffuse nature of his inquiry became more palatable under a burgeoning postmodern 
regime interested in disrupting dominant ideas and truths. 
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physical world is its truth, how is a meta-physical speculation about it possible?” (Buck-
Morss 1989; 21). Undoubtedly, questions of truth and metaphysics held up against the 
physical world, especially the physical world Benjamin was a part of in the 1920s, would 
seem in tension. Developments in technology rapidly changed the representational 
structure of society, and an eternal sense of Truth more and more out of reach.  
I take Benjamin’s initial tension between Truth and the transitoriness of the 
physical world as the first link between human dignity and its visual communication. 
This tension seems sympathetic to our current moment as well. Though there is a search 
for dignity’s origins and its Truth within philosophical and legal contexts, the historical 
transiency of the material and visual world complicates this pursuit. On a most basic 
level, human dignity is confronted by the inherent transitoriness of the human in its most 
basic sense, as a form in a constant state of change and decay. Further, this concept is  
confronted by the transiency of the physical world, which has its own lines of cultural 
and economic disparity, alteration, and decay and which can be seen through changes in 
media and technology. Within the frame of Benjamin’s early struggle between ideas and 
their representation, which was never resolved in his own work, we begin to get a view 
into one of the problems facing the study of human dignity today. How can the 
metaphysical and historical origins of human dignity face the transitory nature of the 
human and physical world where it also resides? 
One answer to such a question comes by way of the heuristic of the constellation 
itself. Benjamin’s introduction of the constellation comes in relation to the same tension 
between eternal truth and worldly decay. In the “Epistemo-Critical Prologue” to Origin, 
Benjamin makes the following claim: “ideas are not represented in themselves, but solely 
and exclusively in an arrangement of concrete elements in the concept: as the 
configuration of these elements…ideas are to objects, as constellations are to stars” (34). 
The image Benjamin draws, of an idea making itself known through an expansive 
constellation, is evocative. How we hold an idea is here visualized succinctly. His 
sentiment foregrounds the way ideas are formed and mobilized from multiple sites, and 
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acknowledges how an idea is never perfectly embodied in one object, but instead made 
through a networked arrangement of multiple and often contesting objects.8 What is 
fascinating here is the tension between constellations as things that are thought of as 
eternal, as an arrangement of stars remains stable forming a recognizable image that 
allows constellations to become wayfinding devices, and the presence of what is arranged 
or admitted more generally, as a constellation that changes or is open to change. His 
claim suggests how an idea might change, through the introduction or omission of 
concrete elements or through a change in perspective. In Benjamin’s metaphor, which 
works in terms of objects and material assets, constellations become both wayfinding 
devices, presenting recognizable patterns, and at the same time open to changes in culture 
and technology.  
From the rejection of Benjamin’s early work, he went in two different directions 
with his philosophical writing, each taking forward the metaphor of the constellation in a 
distinct way. At the same time that he was working on finishing the Origin of German 
Tragic Drama, Benjamin was beginning to formulate the Arcades Project, which he 
would leave unfinished at the time of his death in 1940. Originally, Benjamin’s Arcades 
Project was conceived as a 50-page essay that would outline the importance of 
nineteenth-century French arcades—glass covered Parisian passageways that are seen as 
early prototypes of shopping centres or malls—to the project of modernity. However, this 
simple task ballooned: “Benjamin kept extending its ground and deepening its base, both 
spatially and temporally” (Buck-Morss 1989; 5). Like an expanding constellation, the 
relevance of the arcades expanded from their specific locations in Paris, to the city itself, 
to a broader problem of the modern condition. The patterns of modern life that were at 
                                                
8
 For Benjamin, there is a difference between ideas and concepts: “the concept defines a class of 
phenomena, the Idea determines the relation of the phenomena in the different classes of each other” 
(Bernstein, 23). In the context of tragedy, the concept of tragedy “defines a certain number of plays” while 
tragedy as an Idea “figures the relation of these plays to history in the widest sense” (Bernstein, 23). Thus, 
claiming that “ideas are not represented in themselves, but solely and exclusively in an arrangement of 
concrete elements in the concept” or “ideas are to objects, as constellations are to stars” is in the instance of 
German tragedy a way of critiquing the exaltation of a certain play over others. While never stated outright, 
Benjamin’s task in this work was to demonstrate how tragedy must admit other forms, that, while not 
regarded as highly, nevertheless make up the pattern or configuration of elements that make up tragedy in 
the first place. 
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first specific to the arcades began to become applicable to a whole host of modern 
experiences. In the Arcades Project an idea is not found in the appearance of one thing, 
but in the arrangement of many things: “Benjamin’s intention was to bring together 
theory and materials, quotations and interpretations, in a new constellation compared to 
contemporary methods of representation. The quotations and the materials would bear the 
full weight of the project; theory and interpretation would have to withdraw in an ascetic 
manner” (Tiedemann 1999, 931). In many ways the arrangements of these materials, 
quotations, and interpretations bears out part of what Benjamin was trying to reveal 
regarding the cultural effects of the arcades as an expanding set of materials and growing 
fragmentation of culture itself. Everything is both connected even through their 
separation. Benjamin’s method of collecting quotations and thoughts itself imposes a 
constellated way of thinking and writing. “Benjamin has simply not allowed us to write 
about his work as an isolated literary product” (Buck-Morss 1989, x). He turns scholars 
who use his work into detectives, finding clues and connecting dots across the mass of 
quotations and interpretations. Here the constellation became part of Benjamin’s method 
(and potentially a culprit of the project’s state of incompleteness).  
Closer to the end of Benjamin’s life, the metaphor of the constellation reappeared 
in his “Theses on the Philosophy of History.” In the first addendum to this essay, which 
was finished near the beginning of 1940, he writes:   
Historicism contents itself with establishing a causal connection between various 
moments in history. But no fact that is a cause is for that very reason historical. It 
becomes historical posthumously, as it were, through events that may be 
separated from it by thousands of years. A historian who takes this as his point of 
departure stops telling the sequence of events like the beads of a rosary. Instead, 
he grasps the constellation which his own era has formed with a definite earlier 
one. Thus, he establishes a conception of the present as the “time of the now” 
which is shot through with chips of Messianic time. (1940, 263) 
At the most basic level, Benjamin is here making a simple, yet important, distinction 
between historicism and historical materialism that is at the heart of his theses. Whereas 
he sees historicism as an attempt to detach oneself from the present “establishing a causal 
connection between various moments in history,” historical materialism is constellated, 
“shot through” with the knowledge of the present. Historicism presents an “’eternal’ 
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image of the past; historical materialism supplies a unique experience with the past” 
(262). His allusion to a set of rosary beads, which form a set sequence of prayers, gives a 
linear shape to the contentment of historicism, which itself is wanting to proceed 
sequentially.  
What Benjamin is calling for here is a way of thinking and writing filled with 
tensions between the past, the present, and the future, a way that acknowledges our 
unique experiences with the past from a particular moment. To varying degrees of 
success, Benjamin’s writing from the Origins of German Tragic Drama to the Arcades 
Project to his set of theses are all attempts to put a constellated way of thinking and 
writing into practice: “to the mind that would comprehend intellectual phenomena in 
terms of logical or chronological development wherein one thing leads to another, to use 
Benjamin’s metaphor, ‘like the beads of a rosary,’ his work offers little satisfaction” 
(Buck-Morss 1989, 7). Set between the desire for recognizable patterns and the decay and 
diffusion of the modern world, Benjamin recognized that a search for origins and linear 
thinking provided a limited set of information. 
Reading the history of human dignity itself as a rosary or sequential pursuit seems 
similarly simplistic, especially given its transnational and cross-cultural implications. 
Searching for origins or making linear historical connections provides one type of 
information about human dignity, but forecloses the necessity of apprehending it along 
multiple registers. What is, indeed, left out when connections are made between Kant’s 
theory of würde and international laws, notions of status, and idealized access to the law? 
What is overlooked when images of atrocity come to make up the visual archive of 
human dignity? In effect, these tactics perpetuate one facet and origin of human dignity 
rather than confronting its constellated and contested meanings.  
Thinking in terms of constellations does important work in conjunction with 
questions of perspective, universality, and each era’s position relative to the past, each of 
which will be considered in more detail throughout this dissertation. Through his work 
and the concept of the constellation, Benjamin spells out a relationship between ideas and 
objects that further helps to rebalance the somewhat neglected material dimensions of 
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human dignity, complicate the search for origins, and defy a reliance on sequential or 
individualistic histories. Beyond the poetic and imagistic evocation of the constellation as 
a metaphor for ideas and their relation to the material world, the constellation seems 
particularly pertinent in terms of human dignity because of the way it demands an 
expansive and networked view of its meaning. As human rights and human dignity have 
come to encompass a transnational and global importance, it is imperative to understand 
the meaning and significance of these ideas not just in terms of their idealized form, but 
as a complex set of relations. Such a shift is especially important as histories, cultures, 
and positions outside of Western interests are not just figured into existing frameworks of 
human dignity, but necessarily stretch and explode them accordingly.  
Current debates and discussions about human dignity require a sort of constellated 
thinking, one that does not reduce one form to another or eliminate difference, but takes 
diverse histories, traditions, and premises as part of dignity’s odd existence. 
Constellations are relational and concerned with the points of connection, rather than 
singularity or autonomy. Each point is needed to make up the bigger image. Writing 
about Benjamin’s constellation, Buchannan (2010) shows that “ideas are no more present 
in the world than constellations actually exist in the heavens” (Buchanan, 2010). Ideas 
and constellations exist only by way of other elements. The astrological constellation 
requires a myriad of stars to make up a recognizable image. Human dignity operates in a 
similar fashion. It does not exist in itself, but through a complex of relations. It is an idea 
necessarily formed through multiplicity. Engaging the idea of dignity, an idea not directly 
given to the eye requires a constellated view which enables us to perceive relations 
between individuals as more than self-governing autonomous subjects. In this frame, 
dignified subjects are essentially connected, but not essentialized. The visual presentation 
of dignity, I argue, ought to similarly defy a home in any one person, image, or object if it 
is to exceed the historical frames of normativity, absence, and emancipation that we are 
already comfortable with. Each person should similarly be thought of as a point within 
the constellation that makes this idea visible. 
Admittedly, these assertions feel quite large and unwieldy, and I do not have the 
time or capacity to allow all of the connections that could be made to enter here. In this 
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dissertation, I reserve my discussions to curatorial models specifically as a way to focus 
these discussions and begin preliminary conversations about human dignity’s visual 
communication vis-à-vis curatorial constellations. Specific systems are required that 
make human dignity’s relational properties apprehensible. Paired with curation, the 
constellation finds a home in contemporary debates concerning human dignity and its 
mediated forms.  
Whereas Benjamin’s emphasis lay on the collector, we can, as Claire Bishop 
(2013) argues, replace collector with curator in a way that demands a much more political 
reading of that which has been brought together within an exhibit to form the basis of an 
idea.9 Exhibitions have been home to complex media constellations for some time, but it 
is indeed their social dimension that makes them integral sites from which to evaluate 
how and to what end the idea of dignity is visualized and communicated. Though this 
dissertation focuses on media components of curatorial models and analysis of their 
visual components, the social dimension of this argument might be productively extended 
to the realm of visitor and audience studies. I have consciously excluded more direct 
discussions of museum pedagogy both because of the historical nature of this dissertation 
and because a proper theorization of how the concept of the constellation might be put in 
conversation with audiences would require a substantially expanded methodology and 
time commitment.10 A relational understanding of human dignity expressed through 
constellated curatorial models is indeed meant to re-coup elements of human dignity 
elided in more unitary and linear conceptions of it, and viewers and their diverse 
backgrounds and knowledges must be further considered as a crucial site of difference 
and ultimately as crucial contributors to missing points on these constellations. However, 
                                                
9
 The notion of collecting and collections was another constant thread in Benjamin’s writing, and though 
outside the scope of this dissertation, warrants more substantial reconciliation with current notions of 
curation. Particularly, Benjamin’s mediation on collections and collectors can be seen in The Arcades 
Project, both in its introduction and Convolut H (on the collector), and in his essay, “Unpacking my 
Library” (1931b).  
10
 Here the work of Roger Simon (2011 & 2014) can be pointed to as one example that demonstrates a 
trajectory from theoretically informed analysis to a substantial engagement with museum visitors and 
audience studies.  
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in this dissertation, I focus on how underlying media components of curation—
taxonomies, temporalities, juxtaposition, and representation—converge with the 
formation of the idea of human dignity. Admittedly, thinking about human dignity in 
such technical terms often feels counterintuitive and exclusionary of the diverse 
audiences that ultimately consume and contribute to these constellations. While humans 
remain central to this dissertation, what is equally at stake is the technical components of 
these histories, and the communities they uphold and support.  
This dissertation does not take exhibitions as “visual declarations” (Azoulay 
2013), but rather demonstrations how curation itself opens up small windows of 
vulnerability necessary to the project of human dignity along the lines of taxonomy, 
media, and the body.11 Methodologically, theories and histories of dignity are put in 
direct conversation with visual and museological analysis. While I maintain an emphasis 
on the material world in effort to avoid abstraction, my focus on curation in Sander’s 
atlas, UNESCO’s album, and the CMHR strive to avoid the desire to find an idealized 
image of human dignity. The CMHR is just one in a long line of curatorial examples 
wherein the body and its enmeshment in various technologies, forms a constellation that 
is telling about dignity’s diffuse and tenuous existence in the world. My brief description 
of the CMHR’s first gallery in the introduction was designed to establish a parallel 
arrangement: our contemporary idea of human rights and dignity is formed through a 
bringing together of different elements—laws, bodies, and events—and in the 
configuration of these elements. The cases used here not only become points of analysis, 
but are in many ways exercises in thinking with curation. By blending the threads of 
                                                
11
 Azoulay reads Edward Steichen’s The Family of Man exhibit as a series of “prescriptive statements” 
claiming universal rights. Steichen’s exhibit, which will be addressed in chapter 3, relied on photographs 
from across the globe, grouped in thematic clusters around broad themes – birth, play, work, love, death. 
Azoulay sees the plurality of experiences on display creating “scope of variations – from the optimal that 
should be universally claimed for all, to the one that demands intervention, correction, regulation, 
prevention or prohibition. Being part of a declaration, the scarcity of information about the photographs 
enables one to see the link of the situation presented in the photograph as entirely contingent and thus 
reversible in regard to the concrete historical context” (39-40). While I agree that variation and contingency 
are necessary to the visual exhibition of human dignity, I see curation as a tool that helps to map 
vulnerabilities, not only where intervention is needed, but in communicating everyday entanglements. 
Thus, I do not see this dissertation as analyzing cases that perform as visual declarations, but as a series of 
sites and forms that can more fulsomely account for the range of experiences that constitute human dignity. 
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human dignity and curation, I aim to trace how an essential quality of humanness can be 
communicated beyond falsely universalizing, idealizing, or degrading scenes. I am less 
interested in how museums endow visitors with rights or how visitors understand exhibits 
as communicating dignity, and therefore more focused on how curation has and can be 
used to map ideas of equality and dignity that span beyond national borders and across 
simplistic notions of time and progress. This work is not meant to advocate from some 
sort of ideal expression, but rather springs from an understanding of human dignity that is 
necessarily shared, relational, and vulnerable.  
 
History Between Hierarchy and Abstraction 
By taking a historical approach, I argue that the links between exhibitions, equality, and 
human rights were forged much earlier than the turn to “new museology,” which 
occurred in the 1980s (Macdonald 2007; Sandell & Nightingale 2012; Vergo 1989), or 
“memorial museums,” which grew in prominence in the 1990s (Duffy 2000; Sodaro 
2018; Williams 2007). Both shifts have been used to connect human rights to museums in 
the last ten years.12 This dissertation is an attempt to shift these conversation, not only 
                                                
12 Posed against “old” museology, which over-emphasizes the administrative methods of museums, 
including the work of curation, funding departments, and techniques of preservation, new museology aimed 
to open up the study of museums to more humanistic concerns, to the social communities built around 
objects, spaces, and educational models. New museology has been seen as integral to the movement of 
human rights into museums, as it names the reflexive attempt to make museums and their study more 
heterogeneous, effectively making community consultation integral to the act of curation and museum 
spaces more accessible to wider publics and subject positions (Failler 2015; Scharma 2015). These 
developments were indeed important as human rights began to enter museums, but, in many cases, does not 
fully consider the technologies foundational to these new heterogeneous ends. In part, my dissertation aims 
to consider the technology that underlies practices of multivocality and multiplicity. In terms of memorial 
museums, their study presents one of the earliest mentions of human rights and museums (Duffy 2000), and 
in many cases memorial museums, such as the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, have become 
synonymous with human rights in the aftermath of violence. In this vein, the link between human rights and 
museums is figured in relation to narratives and displays stemming from genocide and other extreme 
human rights violations. The rise of memorial museums can initially be linked to Holocaust 
memorialization, such as the Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial and Museum, the United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum, and Yad Vashem. More broadly, a genre of memorial museums addressing global 
human rights abuses and traumas closely followed. See Williams (2007) and Sodaro (2018) for a detailed 
history of memorial museums. While memorial museums do indeed demonstrate how human rights have 
been inherited through conflict (Purbrick 2011; 173), such a link focuses solely on the development of 
human rights and human dignity from a position of absence, and continues to trade on a promise that an 
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away from strictly contemporary museums, but also away from a primary emphasis on 
suffering and bodily violation. The CMHR and other contemporary human rights exhibits 
are in many ways making a concentrated shift away from a lineage of human rights based 
on extreme suffering through their invocations of positive stories and inspirational 
messages. A sustained focus on the nuances of positive stories, beyond a celebratory 
tone, is needed just as much as histories of violation if a more robust constellation of 
human rights is to be apprehended.   
I situate the historical beginnings of the connections between human dignity and 
curation around the turn of the twentieth century. Before the 1900s, museums and 
exhibits worked in tandem with the authoritative, oppressive, colonialist, and racist 
programs of the era of empire (Bennett 1995 & 2004; Hooper-Greenhill 1992; Mirzoeff 
2011; Rydell 1984). As Robert Rydell (1984) has shown, until the early 1900s, displays 
of race and culture played substantial roles creating and entrenching hierarchies of 
difference. Put otherwise, constellated approaches to curation were hard to come by. 
Many exhibitions, which were at once tools of education and entertainment, “excluded 
people on display from the so-called family of man” (Young, 100). The practice of 
making hierarchical and value laden distinctions between people (not to mention the act 
of literally placing colonized subjects in exhibits), largely went unchallenged until the 
twentieth century. Though Purbrick (2011) has made connections between early universal 
survey museums, such as the Louvre, and the discourse of rights, this connection sways 
towards citizens and nations, rather than universal pursuits.13 Though universal survey 
museums gestured to a wider mandate and scope, national interests were never far away.  
                                                                                                                                            
 
aesthetics of indignity can come to the aid of human dignity itself. In this respect, linking contemporary 
human rights exhibits with memorial museums leaves a wide swath of the history of human dignity 
excluded. 
 
13
 The Louvre provides an interesting study in the connection between museums and nationhood. In 1793, 
it became a public space. Herein another arm of the former princely regime was transformed and 
instrumentalized as an arm of the nation. Soon after, the collection was re-categorized into historical and 
stylistic schools, which performed the work of distancing the new government from the hands of the 
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Today, national interests are similarly never far away from human rights 
museums, which will be made explicit in chapter four in relation to the Canadian 
Museum for Human Rights. Making a definitive claim that there has been a “shift” from 
national interests to universal aims remains complicated in the realm of museology. 
However, my interest lies in cases where technology helped to make the shift from 
nationalistic to universal human rights through broader curatorial models and mandates. 
For instance, in the next chapter, I examine August Sander’s People of the Twentieth 
Century from the premise of how a “people” is constituted beyond national claims. While 
underlying assumptions about hierarchy and difference remain entrenched within some of 
the exhibits under consideration in this dissertation, what binds them is the attempt to 
avoid imperialistic classificatory language and comparisons, and instead formulate new 
schemes that demonstrate the tensions between peoples, cultures, and histories at the 
heart of human dignity, as an idea bound to the worth of all people. As will be explored 
in the next chapter, while the early 1900s was itself fraught with technological 
innovations that defined and ordered the human, it was also a time in which new 
technologies and methods of display posed challenges to the tiered narratives entrenched 
in universal survey museums, anthropological exhibitions, and world fairs that dominated 
the curated world. The borders of the nation and the scope of national laws are, in these 
examples, stretched in ways that begin to define human dignity as a relational property.  
Whereas the late 1800s had marked a change in the way dignity was conceived 
from a normative conception to a taxonomic one (Donnelly 2015, 2), the early 1900s 
opened up new visual routes for dignity’s development outside of philosophical or legal 
spheres. On a most basic level, this period marks a time in the explosion of technological 
reproduction broadly, and photographic reproduction specifically. Though art had always 
                                                                                                                                            
 
monarchy and placing the nation within narratives of national and civilizational progress (Duncan and 
Wallach 1980; 24-25). This development provided a base for a novel form of cultural and historical wealth, 
a wealth that is ultimately important if we are to connect dignity to the material demands of the museum. 
As collections were being rebranded and expanded in a way that represented the wealth of the nation 
explicitly, there was at the same time a reordering and valuing of human lives and dignity implicitly via 
strategies of display and cultural othering. 
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been reproducible, photography “freed the hand” from the labour of reproduction 
(Benjamin 1936, 219). Technological reproduction ushered in a speed and quantity of 
reproductions that allowed for new forms of comparison outside of museums or private 
collections, and as Benjamin notes, “around 1900 technical reproduction had reached a 
standard that not only permitted it to reproduce all transmitted works of art and thus to 
cause the most profound change in their impact upon the public” (1936, 219).14 The 
public became immersed in images in a new way, and importantly images of human 
subjects in a new way. On a more complex level, the early 1900s saw an explosion in 
symbolic value, specifically in relation to art history and photography which will be 
explored in more depth in the next section. Photographic reproductions of art and 
photographs of human subjects comingled in new ways, opening up discussions that 
traversed symbolic and human value. While human dignity was never called out in name 
within these discussions, how representations of the human being intersected with issues 
of self-stylization and human value along the lines of race, class, and gender were never 
far away. As I mentioned earlier, curation and human dignity both impart cultural value, 
value that in both cases is difficult to see or measure. Yet, as processes of curation were 
changing via technological reproduction, so too was the visual communication of human 
dignity. In relation to visual communication, representations of the human being began to 
be connected to symbolic and classificatory systems that emphasized social experience, 
materiality, and personal habits alongside aesthetic properties or morally loaded 
hierarchical categories, thus opening up human dignity’s cultural value in new ways. 
                                                
14 While I positioned the advancement of photographic reproduction as integral to the way human dignity 
came to be thought and known it should be noted that photography also paved the way bureaucratic 
violence, subjective instrumentalization, and rationalization. As Sontag notes, “photographs were enrolled 
in the service of important institutions of control, notably the family and the police, as symbolic objects and 
as pieces of information. Thus, in the bureaucratic cataloging of the world, many important documents are 
not valid unless they have, affixed to them, a photograph-token of the citizen’s face” (1973, 22). Similarly, 
Sliwinski reminds us that just as photography has been used in advance of democracy and emancipation it 
has also been used in systematic pursuit of oppressive practices. She warns that “the medium is at its most 
dangerous when it makes its users forget the vicariousness of its functioning” (Sliwinski 2015, 13). Both of 
these rejoinders can be applied to curatorial endeavors as well. While I focus on the expressive possibilities 
of curatorial models, they undoubtedly have been used to enforce hierarchies of difference and perpetuate 
racial stereotypes.  
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 Dramatizing Curatorial Change 
The work of Aby Warburg is exemplary of the change brought about by technological 
reproduction in the early 1900s, and highlights how the ease of photographic 
reproduction engendered a shift in the importance of curation itself alongside the 
symbolic importance of the human being. More pointedly, his work dramatically 
exemplifies a visual constellation in action, as it presents a marriage of ideas with 
curation in a stunning and complimentary fashion.  
Aby Warburg (1866-1929) was an art historian by trade, and an anthropologist, 
collector, and curator by intellectual pursuit. At the same time Benjamin was beginning 
his Arcades Project, Warburg was also experimenting with a different sort of constellated 
visual communication. Whereas Benjamin formed his constellation through quotations, 
texts, and interpretations, Warburg worked primarily with images. Warburg was, by 
many accounts, a complex man, and his ability to make connections across cultures, 
geographies, and taxonomies was perhaps both his genius and his downfall. In his early 
days he wrote about iconography, how images communicated symbolic rather than 
stylistic information, a method later made popular by Erwin Panofsky. After completing 
his doctorate, Warburg travelled to the United States. This trip, which began in 1895, was 
notable for how it brought together Warburg’s art historical and anthropological interests. 
He visited regions inhabited by Pueblo Indians and became enamored with their symbolic 
customs, particularly their pottery and the snake dance ritual.   
This trip would later become instrumental in Warburg’s recovery from depression 
and central to the formulation of his final project: Mnemosyne Atlas. Throughout his life, 
Warburg struggled with his mental health, and in 1921 was hospitalized in Switzerland. 
After almost three years there, he devised a plan to prove to himself that he was capable 
of being released and in control of his own thoughts. Central to his plan was a lecture on 
the topic of his choice. Warburg used his experience in the United States as the backdrop 
of this lecture, entitled “Images from the Region of the Pueblo Indians of North 
America.” Considered a successful exercise, the lecture brought his comparative lens into 
contact with contemporary concerns. Here Warburg began to think through the 
symbolism of the snake, not as it was unique to the Pueblo Indians of North America, but 
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rather how the snake connected many cultures and many beliefs. Using slides from his 
trip to the United States along with images from classical art historical paintings and 
sculptures, Warburg drew associations between histories and cultures in a dazzling 
manner. In effect, he disrupted the boundaries between art history and anthropology as he 
brought together cultural icons through technology. Ritual, symbols, and art were not 
evaluated on their aesthetic merits, but connected through the ideas and themes they 
helped to perpetuate.  
After leaving the hospital, Warburg began work on the Mnemosyne Atlas, a 
project that embodied his thematic and visually associative method. Beginning in 1924 
with the aid of a double projector, Warburg started to make uninhibited visual 
connections that defied entrenched art historical ordering and categorization that had 
been established in formal exhibitionary practice since the mid 1800s.15 In the realm of 
museums and curation, photography helped to advance the discipline of art history. As 
Donald Preziosi has argued, “art history as we know it today is the child of photography” 
(1989, 72). Beginning around 1900 there was a shift taking place within the fledging field 
of art history from an emphasis on stylistic properties of art to a newfound “science” of 
symbols or iconography. The increasing ease of photographic reproduction and the 
invention of slide projection helped to usher in the growth of symbolic interpretation. 
Alongside the juxtaposition of aesthetic symbols was a growing juxtaposition of 
humanistic symbols. Warburg’s Mnemosyne Atlas was at the forefront of the shift. While 
Heinrich Wolfflin, a prominent art historian is said to be the first to use double projectors 
in his art history classes, beginning around 1900 in Berlin, Warburg used this technology 
to new effect with his iconographic atlas (Schoell-Glass 2001, 206f). In 1924 Warburg 
began to use 150cm by 200 cm screens made of light metal, covered in dark cloth where 
he attached, arranged, and rearranged reproductions of artworks, postcards, and 
photographs with metal clasps (Schoell-Glass 2001, 185). The ephemeral nature of 
Warburg’s arrangements, aided by photographic reproductions, slide projectors, and 
temporary image boards, is noteworthy. As George Didi-Huberman has shown, “the fact 
                                                
15
 See Bennett (1995 & 2004), Duncan (1995), Hooper-Greenhill (1992), and Preziosi (1989) for detailed 
accounts of the history of art history as it intersects with curation and photography. 
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that the configuration of images can always be changed around in the Mnemosyne Atlas is 
a sign in itself of the heuristic fecundity and the intrinsic madness of such a project” 
(2010, 20). The atlas was a constantly changing series of constellations, and each panel a 
search for how an idea presented itself both through the body and through representation.  
Mnemosyne Atlas disposed of any verbal supports and became a visual space to 
perform or embody larger connections within the symbolic and social world. Each plate 
of Warburg’s project connected images and symbols through a theme or pathos.16 For 
example, plate 41a (Fig. 6), is an expressive constellation founded on themes of pain and 
sacrifice. Notably, these images are all depictions of the Laocoön, which helped Schiller 
to formulate his understanding of human dignity as “calm in suffering.” Warburg 
collected images that attempted to tell the same story, from antiquity to the Renaissance, 
yet defied a linear structure. It is here in Warburg’s work that the tension inherent in the 
constellation between an eternal search for patterns and wayfinding meets the 
introduction of new elements. By drawing together images from different eras, Warburg 
aimed to visually communicate how an idea is both recognizable over time and open to 
change – eternal and transitory.17 Together these images say something about the idea 
itself, in this instance pain and sacrifice, and how that might look differently through time 
and via different expressive media.  
                                                
16
 Specifically, Warburg was drawn to thinking through the emotive responses captured in these 
representations and used recurring emotions as a way to create constellations of human connections. 
Warburg was mapping pathosformel (or pathos formulas), which “illustrate this process, which one could 
define as the attempt to absorb pre-coined expressive values by means of the representation of life in 
motion” (Warburg & Rampley 2009, 277). Although never explicitly defined by Warburg, the term 
pathosformel embodies the comparative and connective thrust that undergirds much of his work. See Vidal 
(2009), Didi-Huberman (2017), and Rampley (2001 & 2009) for more on pathosformula.   
17 In Greek mythology, Mnemosyne is the personification of memory and the mother of the nine muses. 
From this we can already see one of the tensions arising in Warburg’s thought: the personification of 
memory in works of art and the generational changes that alter their symbolic meaning. Warburg was all 
too aware of the technological and political changes altering human gestures and therefore shifting human 
interaction during his lifetime. Not only was he aware of Darwin’s evolutionary theory, but Warburg was 
also witness first hand to technological innovation and great human destruction during World War 1, both 
of which greatly altered human gestures and human interaction. Atlas is best known as the Titan who was 
banished to hold up the heavens. In this character there is great strength, endurance and responsibility. In 
his hands lay the whole of humanity. From these two meanings we can see the Mnemosyne Atlas as 
mapping the generational, emotional, and technological changes in Western imagery of the human form.  
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Figure 6: Plate 41a from the Mnemosyne Atlas, 1927 (est.), by Aby Warburg. 
Copyright: The Warburg Institute.  
Warburg’s arrangements present an example of a constellation in perhaps its most 
abstract form, as they bring together art reproductions and documentary materials in 
dynamic ways.  In his image atlas Warburg dropped all pretenses to traditional art 
history. Instead of arranging images through a strictly temporal, stylistic, or hierarchical 
schemes, he clustered groups within symbolic structures that were meant to demonstrate 
the “carrying-on” of cultural iconographies and emotions through time and through the 
human body. Warburg used the form of the atlas, a form which will be explored in 
greater depth in the next chapter, to model comparative frameworks. What André 
Malraux (1947), would later come to define the “museum without walls,” which names 
the process whereby art was “freed” from museums with the advancement of 
photography and thus opened up to new areas of comparison, was the generative yet 
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unnamed starting point for Warburg’s Mnemosyne Atlas. For Warburg, questions of 
aesthetic inquiry began to overlap with questions of symbolic and humanistic inquiry 
across histories and cultures. While the advent of photography “seemed destined merely 
to perpetuate established values,” Malraux explored how “an ever growing range of 
works is being reproduced, in ever greater numbers,” opening up lines of inquiry into 
lesser known and otherwise marginalized works, artists, authors, and representations 
(Malraux 1947, 17).  I see the opening up of the “common heritage of all mankind” 
(Malraux 1947, 40) made possible by increased mechanical photographic reproduction as 
integral to the emergence of human dignity within the field of media studies. Without this 
technological advancement, our comparative lenses would be much different. The rise in 
the idea of a distinctly human value applicable to all coincides with these reproductive 
technologies that exposed symbolic connections beyond national borders. The generation 
of new lines of symbolic inquiry was integral to the connection of the idea of human 
dignity to processes of visual communication.  
What Warburg demonstrated, first through his lecture and then his atlas, was the 
idea that rather than being divided by time and space, class and culture, humans are more 
connected than they might have thought. Underlying Warburg’s image boards was a 
sense that the lines dividing art, humans, and periods were less opaque than the stark 
disciplinary and scientific classifications of art history and anthropology let on. Parallel 
to Schiller’s contention that bodies must be thought of as more than aesthetic objects or 
things when it comes to a property such as dignity, Warburg read the human body as a set 
of relations that endures and exists across time and space.  
Both in Schiller’s concept of dignity and Warburg’s image atlases, the body 
extends in space and time and creates demands on others that stretch the limitations of 
philosophy or photography. Here we begin to see an overlapping articulation of the ways 
in which humans embody their vulnerability both in the moment of their existence and in 
historical frameworks. Focusing on gestures of the body gave Warburg’s project a set of 
ethical and political stakes that exceeded the bounds of what was in his time a delimited 
art history, and exploded what curation could look like or do. 
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Constituting Relational Dignity  
My own project gains ethical and political stakes, not in attempting to map how people 
are affected by images, but by articulating the importance of curatorial models as they 
make connections between people that extend between our inhabited bodies. While the 
exhibits under consideration in this dissertation do not offer perfect solutions to problems 
we face in the making of a human community, they do help in understanding the different 
ways a relational theorization might be taken up through visual communication. In this 
light, a number of central motifs recur throughout the dissertation. Through the lens of 
the curatorial constellation human dignity becomes a relational property characterized by 
the following traits: as an idea that does not shy away from taxonomic, cultural, or 
historical difference; as an idea that does not trade on an aesthetics of indignity to come 
to its defense; as an idea focused on communities rather than individuals; as an idea made 
through technology as much as it is made through the subjects that populate curatorial 
systems; and, as a form of visual communication not directly given to the eye.  
This dissertation depends on curatorial models as the starting point for a broader 
conversation about how the idea of human dignity might be thought of as relational. In 
excavating the ways in which periods and peoples are connected through these systems 
there is a certain element of training ourselves to see how humans are aestheticized and 
subsequently how visual representation is connected to human dignity. Warburg 
abstractly demonstrates how different periods and symbols might all be connected via 
corporeal and mediated bodies. The case studies presented in this dissertation are much 
less abstract, yet they are undoubtedly instructive in terms of how material selves make 
constellated demands on others, and in so doing provide clues as to how taxonomies, 
media, and representation impart value that makes the invisible aspects of human dignity 
perceptible.  
For Benjamin, the complexity of the world began to present itself through the 
heuristic of the constellation. Benjamin’s method of accumulation began to mirror how 
he saw the heterogeneous and increasingly fragmented world of the arcades and the 
modern economy that was enfolding around him. Jonathon Crary (1992) argues that 
Benjamin’s mode of perception “was acutely temporal and kinetic” (20), and his allusion 
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to kinetic motion aptly describes Benjamin’s constellated view. Like the constellation, 
which we are only granted access to through the connection of other stars or objects, 
Benjamin’s encounters with overlapping technologies was similarly formative to his 
“kinetic” viewpoint, always in motion, always in dialogue with other facets of modern 
society.  
Dignity, too, requires a sense of kinetic heterogeny in order to become an 
international force, and requires it still. As Michel Foucault argued, “we are in a moment, 
I believe, when our experience of the world is less that of a long life developing through 
time than that of a network that connects points and intersects with its own skein” 
(Foucault 1984, 1). While we are past Foucault’s specific moment, our own feels eerily 
similar, and his description is important to human dignity’s resurgence. Our own 
moment, which is less like a rosary and more like a constellation, is also the moment of 
human dignity as an idea that must reach beyond exclusionary groups, national borders, 
and specific cultures – a moment where dignity must and is emerging outside of 
philosophy and the law more concretely. Through the lens of curatorial models, such as 
the atlas, the album, and the museum, we can come to see the tendency towards 
individuality and autonomy as merely partial when posed against the visual technologies 
of mass society. The project of individuality and liberal agency that has so long been at 
the heart of concerns around human dignity begin to feel like an illusion when placed into 
conversation with these material and curatorial models. Herein, my dissertation, and its 
emphasis on the embodied, the mediated, and the curatorial, begins to narrate a different 
cultural subtext wherein the relational properties of human dignity might be revealed.  
In part, my theorization of human dignity as a relational property pushes back 
against the overwhelming emphasis on narratives of violation that have predominantly 
been used to defend the project of human rights. While I do not focus exclusively on 
moments of inspiration or positivity, I aim to avoid the pitfalls of focusing primarily on 
bodily violation and begin to articulate a history that upholds a modicum of faith in the 
compassionate and imaginative goals of human rights. In so doing, I also aim to trace 
how human rights have entered the museum more recently, especially as these museums 
turn to instances of growth and justice, such as the CMHR. Susie Linfield has argued that 
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“we cannot talk – at least in meaningful or realistic ways – about building a world of 
democracy, justice, and human rights without first understanding the experience of their 
negation” (Linfield, xv). While I do not disagree that experiences of negation have been 
crucial to the surge in discussions around human rights as it intersects with visual 
communication, my approach proposes other meaningful and realistic ways of talking 
about human rights and human dignity. Formulating new avenues in terms of how human 
dignity might be communicated beyond instances of indignity is important, both as it 
relates to projects of creative expression and in relation to the promise and hope that the 
idea of human dignity can still offer. 
Criticism alone is easy. We need to learn to apprehend human dignity in the 
visual sphere, not only where lives are degraded without regard for their value, but rather 
across a wide variety of relationships that make up our lives. In instances of degradation, 
vulnerability has already been foreclosed. Similarly, instances where our individuality is 
presented as the only end of human dignity is equally delimiting. Curatorial 
constellations leads us towards the fact of our vulnerability, whether through taxonomic 
signifiers, historical and cultural diversity, or more plainly in the act of editing and 
arranging. In this way, vulnerability does not become something in need of overcoming, 
but rather something that defines our humanness and our dignity. Though not without 
their own faults, the curatorial projects under consideration in this dissertation forge a 
different path that connects human dignity and media as a response to the transnational, 
multi-cultural, multimedia, and constellated world we inhabit. Thus, my dissertation does 
not necessarily provide satisfying answers to the problems underlying the development of 
human dignity, but attempts to demonstrate a different way of envisioning the existence 
of human dignity within visual communication. I do not deny that curation and human 
rights still work together in detrimental ways. However, these limitations have been more 
pointedly expressed in other studies. I take it as a challenge to attempt to provide a 
history and language that is equally as compelling as that which relies on criticism or 
starts from the point of negation. Examining curatorial constellations does important 
work in this regard, as it defines an approach that blends the material, the ideological, the 
historical, and the ephemeral in important ways. A relational theory of human dignity 
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stems from an understanding of our mediated connectivity – from the locus of the body 
and the exhibition – rather than envisioning autonomy or individualism. Combining the 
language of curation and constellations, human dignity becomes tied not only to 
philosophical and legal visions, but to an ever networked and fragmented culture. The 
idea of the constellation forces us to look upon these aesthetic, technological, and 
material networks in a way that is committed to the underlying concerns of dignity in the 
first place – that is an awareness and acknowledgement of how our means existence 
create real demands on others in the embodied world.  
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2 Human Dignity En Masse: August Sander’s “Atlas of 
Instruction” 
 
The body is the most basic of all media, and the 
richest with meaning, but its meanings are not 
principally those of languages or signs, reaching 
instead into deep wells socked with vague limbic 
fluids. The body is not one with itself: it is a 
network. Sharing the same time and space with 
another is already pregnant with meaning before a 
single word is uttered 
-John Durham Peters, The Marvelous Clouds 
 
An atlas, George Didi-Huberman, writes is “a visual form of knowledge, a knowledgeable 
form of seeing” (2010, 14). Atlases combine different types of knowledge, mixing data 
with aesthetic representation, and introducing “a sensible dimension into knowledge” 
(Didi-Huberman 2010, 15). The way atlases mix forms of knowledge, has for me, 
become both metaphorically fertile and systematically helpful in terms of thinking 
through human dignity’s visual communication. Placing human dignity in conversation 
with atlases helps to fundamentally upend dignity’s disciplinary orthodoxies in 
philosophy and the law, and, as we will see in this chapter, forces an understanding that is 
both rooted in concrete beings and in their representation. Like Schiller’s introduction of 
aesthetic and material concerns into the discourse around human dignity in the late 1700s, 
atlases themselves introduce aesthetic concerns into scientific and philosophical areas of 
knowledge. Introducing the “sensible dimension” into discussions of human dignity does 
indeed introduce a “fundamental impurity” to the frenzied search for historical origins, to 
the reliance on binaries of violation and normativity, and the strict abidance to 
philosophical truths or legal particulars within its study. 
As a cultural and scientific tool, the atlas attempts to map or categorize the world 
from a particular position that is at once all-encompassing and impure. Like Benjamin’s 
metaphor of the constellation it provides a way of seeing and thinking that is filled with 
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precise information – about how things look and where they fit – and with imaginary 
potential. Atlases offer both methodical and arbitrary junctions and routes; their contents 
can be scanned from the beginning or a new beginning can be formed depending on 
location, destination, elevation, etc. Like curating, which Obrist (2014) himself describes 
as “a form of map-making that opens new routes through a city, a people or a world” (1) 
atlases express new routes, offering junctures that might not have been visible before, 
allowing different elements to touch that reach across technical and aesthetic concerns.  
The geographical atlas, as we know it, was revolutionized in the 16th century by 
Gerardus Mercador (1512-1594), who was a prolific cartographer, geographer, and 
instrument maker. There were compendiums of maps before his time, but by most 
accounts Mercador was the first to place an image of the Greek titan, Atlas, who was 
punished by Zeus to hold up the world for eternity, on the front cover of his map 
collections. In this way, atlases were seen to say something about the monumental task of 
understanding the world’s vast diversity in a finite amount of space, of holding it up to be 
seen. Atlases are, indeed, a response to this monumental task of understanding the world, 
and since the time of Mercador, moved beyond the job of charting the terrain of 
geography into charting more diverse visual and epistemic issues and ideas.18 
One such atlas, which attempted to chart the human world in the early 1900s, will 
be the subject of this chapter. August Sander’s Menschen des 20. Jahrhunderts (People of 
the 20th Century), was a compendium of early twentieth century people, categorized by 
social position, and mapped through categories of life and profession. It should here be 
noted that Sander himself did not describe this project as an atlas. It was, indeed, Walter 
Benjamin that called Sander’s work an “atlas of instruction” (as quoted in Berger 29, 
1992).19 However, I rely on the language and systems of atlases for their imaginary 
                                                
18
 While outside the scope of this research there are numerous connections to be made between anatomical 
atlases and natural atlases in terms of how the human came to be conceived, both as an individual and as 
part of value laden communities. For more on the proliferation of atlases outside of geography, see for 
example Mondino dei Luzzi’s De Anatomia, Ernst Haeckel’s Kunstformen der Natur (Art Forms of 
Nature), along with King (1996), Hill (1978), and Piper (2002).  
19
 This phrase is often translated as “training manual” (Benjamin 1931).  
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potential and for their usefulness as I begin to think about human dignity’s position 
between the world of ideas and routes of visual communication. The atlas is a model that 
not only captures tensions between the finite and the infinite, the technical and the 
aesthetic, and the pure and impure, but it also, more bluntly, opens up questions about the 
tension between the topographical and the subterranean, between what is seen on the 
surface and what is understood as a human characteristic. The problem of visually 
communicating human dignity follows these tensions, and Sander’s People of the 
Twentieth Century usefully exposes them.  
Despite Sander’s affiliation with photography and photographic analysis, in this 
chapter I demonstrate how his work should be read as a curatorial endeavor. The 
characteristics of the atlas are here used to make this case. Not only does Sander’s work 
explicitly combine aesthetic and scientific knowledge, thus creating a complex space 
from which to begin a robust conversation about the visual and cultural aspects of human 
dignity, but it also trains us to move between the finite and the infinite, between 
individual photographs and the curatorial system, and ultimately between individuals and 
their communities which I argue is necessary to a relational theorization of human 
dignity. Sander’s atlas combines different types of knowledge in surprising and 
problematic ways. And, just as other atlases open up a new region, country, or zone of 
knowledge to be explored, Sander’s atlas provides a new zone of knowledge about the 
human and its social relations that is bound to broader cultural problems that surround the 
idea of human dignity. Sander’s position within a comprehensive and taxonomic genre is 
helpful when situating his work alongside, and often outside, other visual projects that 
emerged around the same time, and which were otherwise delimiting human dignity. I 
admit that taxonomy and comprehension are not often looked at favorably, especially in 
terms of projects that order and aim to understand the human. However, taxonomic 
difference should not merely be read as undermining an essential human quality such as 
human dignity. Combined with the speed of photography, atlases aimed at the mapping 
of the human were indeed problematic, but their scope of vision is important in terms of 
how we see human rights entering museums today. 
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The Seeds of a Prolific Project 
It is difficult to delimit August Sander’s work, and specifically People of the Twentieth 
Century.20 Before embarking on this research, I had only engaged with his photographs 
in singular instances. John Berger (1992) had used his “Young Farmers” (Fig. 7) to 
highlight visual hegemony, and a photograph of an “Bricklayer” (Fig. 8) as a study in 
labour, strength, and grace. These particular cases cemented Sander’s historical 
importance in the history of photography, but did not situate his project in the realm of 
museum or curatorial studies.  
It wasn’t until Sander was mentioned in a lineage of examples that advocate for a 
visual declaration of human rights that my interest was piqued (Sliwinski, 2015). Here, 
Sander’s People of the 20th Century was listed alongside the photographs of Frederick 
Douglass as exemplars of dignity and the visual politics of emancipation. Photography, 
Sliwinski (2015) argued, could be used to construct an image of oneself that visually 
communicated equality and dignity through the mediated body. In the association 
between Douglass’ time and Sander’s there was, however, a swift movement from the 
photographs of Douglass to Sander’s larger curatorial project that used photographic 
images. A considerable distance seemed to separate these two examples. For Douglass, 
the camera was used to create a dignified image of himself, but for Sander, the camera 
was a tool to create an image of “the people.” Were the same photographic politics 
applicable in both instances? Their distinction began to put into perspective the problem 
of what forms human dignity circulated in and how it might work beyond individual 
instances or a negative framework. Was it possible to see human dignity in a project 
                                                
20
 Some attention should be paid to the translation of Sander’s larger project, which helps to align his work 
with the general trajectory of human rights I build here. In German, the title of Sander’s project is 
Menschen des 20. Jahrhunderts. The MIT edition translates this title as Citizens of the 20th Century, clearly 
aligning Sander’s work with a nationalist trajectory. However, most other translations provide a much 
broader prerogative, translating Menschen to “people”. This opens Sander’s work to a wider variety of 
readings in terms of people and their humanity. It is possible to take the translation of Menschen one step 
further and read it as Humans of the 20th Century, thus aligning his work with what it means to be human in 
a way that doesn’t rely on the lacunae negation. Here we come much closer to a positive visualization of 
human rights, Menschenrechte, than a strictly nationalist or citizen oriented reading. Going forward I will 
use People of the Twentieth Century except for instances where it is translated otherwise in direct quotes.  
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where the subjects are not in control of the production of their own images? How exactly 
did Sander’s images, which I had come to know as singular and iconographic, fit within a 
history of human rights exhibitions? And, how might they be connected to the concept of 
human dignity through curatorial constellations?  
 
 
Figure 7: Young Farmers, 1913, by August Sander. Public domain. 
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Figure 8: Bricklayer, 1928, by August Sander. Public domain. 
The sheer scope of August Sander’s People of the Twentieth Century is 
remarkable. What we know about the structure of this project comes via a few disparate 
sources: from a small book of sixty portraits, Antlitz der Zeit (Face of Our Time) (1929), 
which offered a mere glimpse into the larger image world Sander was creating; from 
notes and small exhibitions Sander made when he was alive; and, from an exhibition and 
corresponding publication orchestrated by his son, Gunther Sander, in 1986. The variety 
of these sources make People of the Twentieth Century difficult to explain and 
definitively describe. Like Walter Benjamin’s Arcades Project and Aby Warburg’s 
Mnemosyne Atlas, both of which were left unfinished at the time of their respective 
deaths, Sander’s People of the Twentieth Century was never completed in his own 
lifespan and remains shrouded in questions about its ultimate form and intent.  
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Importantly, Sander was adamant about how his photographs should be read 
together, as a curated system. He wanted his photographs to be shown, but not merely 
one or two at a time. Rather, he viewed photography “like a mosaic that becomes a 
synthesis only when it is presented en masse” (Sander 1986, 36).21 Though individually 
Sander’s photographs are striking, together they have a meaning far greater than a sum of 
their parts. As Hake (1997) has argued, shifting attention from individual images to the 
curatorial design Sander envisioned does important work. Sander’s “social physiognomy 
tends to be identified with specific images, and not with the selection and presentation of 
the full constellation. Yet it is precisely in the continuities and contiguities imposed by 
the book format that its critical intention must be located. Sander’s physiognomic project 
emerges from the relationship between images and not through the images themselves” 
(Hake 1997, 127). In this way, Sander’s metaphor of the mass draws direct parallels with 
Benjamin’s heuristic of the constellation. Each image is like a star, whose formation 
within the project is revealing of an idea or series of ideas. But what kind of ideas are 
Sander’s constellations of images meant to reveal? If ideas are never fully represented 
themselves, but are revealed through an arrangement of concrete elements, and if 
Sander’s work is but one such concrete arrangement, what idea or ideas does it invoke? 
And, is it possible to see the idea of human dignity as emerging from the multiple, and 
often contesting, sites that make up the networked arrangement found in People of the 
Twentieth Century?  
Most basically the ideas dispersed in Sander’s People of the Twentieth Century 
relate to occupation and social position or types. His photographs have an internal 
contradiction about them related to the idea of social types. Individuals yield to social 
types, yet these same types were meant to demonstrate fundamental differences between 
people. Sander’s subjects seem so singular, yet they are ultimately not tied to their proper 
                                                
21 Note that there is some disagreement over the translation of this phrase. Though this line comes from 
Sander’s notes and can be found in the catalogue that coincided with one of the first posthumous 
exhibitions, the words agglomeration, cluster, coalescence, concretion, and aggregation have been argued 
as more fitting translations of “mosaic.”  
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names, but to the types that they are meant to stand in for. His photographs work to 
demonstrate how a person’s labour manifests through a body’s movement. The 
“Bricklayer” (Fig. 8). pictured carrying the stack of bricks is meant to tell the viewer 
something about the position he occupies and the ease with which he carries out his task. 
However, beyond these concrete social roles, as a mosaic, mass, or constellation his 
curatorial arrangement attempts to communicate something more complex about humans 
as they intersect with an increasingly modernized and mass society. A brief detour 
through Sander’s career may help to shed some light on his projects and their importance 
to human dignity specifically.  
Born in 1876, Sander’s training as a photographer came by way of his military 
service, where he was a photographer’s assistant just before the turn of the 20th Century.22 
Eventually, he honed his skill enough to start his own photography studio, first in Austria 
and then in his home country of Germany. Situated in the Cologne region, which 
contained both fertile agrarian land and a growing industrial economy, Sander was 
ideally located amidst a wide variety of professionals, laborers, and other emerging and 
established social types. The intersection of urban development and rural tradition was 
important as Sander began to conceive of People of the Twentieth Century, which would 
consume a major part of his life. The project began around in earnest in the early 1920s 
as a task aimed at capturing an “objective” and comprehensive visual account of the 
social types of his milieu—to “fix the history of the world” (1931, 675) through 
photographs and their arrangement.23 Sander wanted to use his aesthetic instrument to 
“scientific” ends. While objectivity might have been his aim, the camera and its own 
political aesthetics would invariably sully his methodical pursuit.  
Sander set out with his camera across the region, taking photographs of a range of 
agrarian and urban workers. Farmers, bakers, secretaries, day-laborers, and the down-
                                                
22
 Sander was first introduced to photography in his home town of Herdord when a photographer visited 
the local mine. During his military service he was trained in Trier by a local photographer, Georg Jung. 
23
 Though Sander did not conceive of the project until the early 1920s, he did use many photographs from 
his early commercial ventures in People of the Twentieth Century. 
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trodden all became the subjects for this People of the Twentieth Century. The idea was to 
photograph the broad strata of social life and to compile these images into a series of 
portfolios as a way to capture the “face” of the time. Indeed, if we consider atlases to be 
“systematic compilations of working objects…dictionaries of the sciences of the eye” 
(Daston & Galiston 2007, 22), then Sander’s People of the Twentieth Century certainly 
fits the bill. Replace “objects” with “subjects”, and the image arrangements Sander was 
creating fall within this sort of optic organization. In Sander’s case, the subject matter 
remained the people, and the atlas a form to map their relations to one another.  
Undoubtedly, this attempt to fix the history of the world through photography was a giant 
undertaking. Living between two wars and unending social, technical, and visual changes 
provided endless changes that manifested on the bodies of his subjects. Sander’s attempt 
to “fix” the people within his project was thus met with the fact of their increasing 
transience. 
While Sander began working on the project in the early 1920s, he did not 
formally release details about it until 1929, at which time he published Face of Our 
Time.24 In this little book of sixty portraits, which acted as a preview for People of the 
Twentieth Century, subjects were identified by their occupation rather than name.25 
While the book follows the same general trajectory of types - from the farmer, to the 
locksmith, to the businessman, to the unemployed – its scheme was markedly different 
from the plan of People of the Twentieth Century. It is important to emphasize that Face 
of Our Time is structured as a series, as a set of subjects portrayed in their social roles.26 I 
note this because, as a prototype for People of the Twentieth Century, Face of Our Time 
is both an important pre-cursor to Sander’s greater ambitions and a distinct body of visual 
knowledge. 
                                                
24
 A small selection of Sander’s photographs were exhibited in 1927, but details of the larger project were 
not concurrently unveiled.  
25
 In Face of Our Time initials were placed beside the photographs of the subjects that Sander thought 
would be pubic figures. In later publications of this work some of Sander’s subjects have been identified by 
name.  
26
 See Appendix A for a full list of the types included in Face of Our Time.  
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Included with copies of Face of Our Time were leaflets that announced Sander’s 
larger ambition. The copy provides an outline of his visual atlas:   
The complete work consists of seven groups, which correspond to the existing 
social structure, and is to be published in about 45 portfolios, each containing 
twelve pictures. Sander begins with the farmer, the earthbound man, and leads the 
viewer through all levels and types of occupations. (as quoted in Sander 1986, 23) 
At first glance, this description seems straightforward. A project is formulated that was to 
encompass seven major groups and forty-five minor corresponding portfolios, with each 
portfolio containing twelve portraits. This would mean that roughly 540 photographs 
were initially imagined to communicate the strata of social types.27 The seven groups 
were to be comprised of the following categories: the farmer, the craftsman, the woman, 
the professions, the artist, the metropolis, and the last people. The forty-five portfolios 
correspond with more finite categories within these seven areas. For example, within the 
“farmer” category was “young farmers,” “the farm child and mother” and so on, while 
the “professional” category was to contain “the student,” “the doctor and pharmacist,” 
and the “clergyman” amongst others. In both instances, there is little indication as to how 
these categories emerged, though their significance seems to narrate Sander’s own 
conception of social structure. 28 
 Beyond the seven groups there was also a “germinal portfolio” or “portfolio of 
archetypes,” which was to precede the groups and act as a model for the project at large. 
The “germinal portfolio” was indeed conceived as something of a map in itself, as a key 
                                                
27
 The scale of this described project is made even more impressive against the number of Sander’s 
photographs at large. Even the printing plates for Face of Our Time had been confiscated and destroyed by 
the Nazi’s in 1936, most of his negatives survived World War II, only to be destroyed by a fire in 1946. At 
its highest point, there is said to have been over 40,000 negatives in Sander’s collection. Some 11,000 have 
been preserved in Cologne, and were used to “complete” People of the Twentieth Century posthumously. 
28
 See Appendix A for a complete breakdown of these subcategories. It is especially notable when talking 
about Sander’s role as a curator to think about the additions of subcategories from the project’s initial 
conception to the time of his death (Sander 2013, 26). New types were added along the way, with the 
subcategory “Farmer in the Second Half of the 20th century” added before World War II and “The 
Persecuted” and “Political Prisoners” added after. Similarly, categories encompassing “National Socialist” 
men and women were added to reflect political changes. Sander’s taxonomies were, in this way, flexible 
and open to change. His constellation of images expanded, rather merely subsuming new types under his 
original model.   
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to the relations Sander was aiming to build. Reflecting in 1954 Sander provided a brief 
explanation of this portfolio:  
In the year 1911 in my elective homeland of Cologne I began to work on my 
project Citizens of the Twentieth Century. The figures in the portfolio originated 
within my actual Westerwald homeland. People whose customs I had known 
since my youth appeared by their close connections with Nature to be excellently 
suited to the realization of my ideas in a germinal portfolio. Thus the beginning 
was made, and I proceeded to subordinate all later types to the archetype with all 
its generally human characteristics. (Sander 1986, 23)29 
Like the description of the project in general, this description of the “germinal portfolio” 
provides clues to Sander’s thinking, but no definitive answers. The portfolio provides 
hints as to how Sander conceived of the arrangement of society at large, broadly 
demonstrating movement from the individual (Fig. 9) to the family unit (Fig. 10) and 
from man to his surrounding community. In this portfolio, the 12 germinal portraits are 
categorized as:  
 The Man of the Soil (Fig. 9) 
 The Philosopher 
 The Fighter or Revolutionary 
 The Sage 
 The Woman of the Soil 
 The Woman Philosopher 
 The Woman Fighter or Revolutionary 
The Woman Sage 
The Woman of Progressive Intellect 
 Two couples, Propriety and Harmony 
 Three Generations of the Family (Fig. 10) 
                                                
29
 The translation of this passage brings to light important details as to the people and humanity these 
photographs represent. The above translation differs slightly, but significantly, from a translation found in 
Lange (1999), which reads: “The photos for the album were made in and around the Westerwald. People 
whom I had known in all their foibles and habits from youth onwards struck me as being suitable through 
their closeness to nature for realizing my idea of a master portfolio. That was how it all started, and I 
classified all the types I found under this original type with all the characteristics of the generally human” 
(Lange, 109). Whereas the first seems to emphasize the people, the second emphasizes their habits/gestures 
and it would seem as though their outer mannerisms/actions become more central than the person in and of 
him/herself. There is a difference between classifying all other types “in relation to” this group versus 
subordinating all other types to this archetype. Though these are slight changes, they should be considered 
when evaluating how we read the germinal portfolio, either as a key that helps to define generally human 
characteristics or as an exalted type.  
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By all accounts these twelve categories were meant to be repeated throughout the other 
45 portfolios, which “would have meant that a certain variety of basic human 
characteristics would have recurred on different social or cultural levels” (Keller, 23). 
Even though the leaflet from 1929 depicts the design of Sander’s project as “complete” 
the portfolios published posthumously do not logically correspond to the “germinal” 
archetypes. It is unclear whether Sander changed his mind about these types as germinal 
figures or whether the accelerated pace of social change outmoded his original plan 
leaving it impossible to “subordinate” all types of people to this model. These twelve 
archetypes do not clearly correspond with the seven groups that made up the rest of the 
project. While the first group does start with the farmer, the other groups do not proceed 
likewise.  
 
Figure 9: Man of the Soil, 1910, by August Sander. Public domain. 
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Figure 10: Three Generation of the Family, 1912, by August Sander. Public domain. 
As George Didi-Huberman notes, “an atlas often begins…in an arbitrary or 
problematic way, which is quite different from the beginning of a story or the premise of 
an argument” (2010, 14). Sander’s “atlas of instruction” does indeed begin in an arbitrary 
and problematic way. It begins from the premise of the “general characteristics of 
mankind” situated within rural or “earthbound” men and women. Though this beginning 
has been read as the premise of an argument, as an exaltation of agrarian workers and 
lifestyles, it is also notable in terms of the way that it uses curation.30 Within the system 
of atlases in general, Sander’s beginning makes slightly more, though still arbitrary sense. 
Many atlases start from an immediate or familiar geography, situation, or location, and 
expand outward. The map-maker becomes familiar with their own terrain before further 
exploration occurs. Sander’s own atlas starts in a similar fashion, with those people he 
had known, whose habits he had witnessed. Though still problematic, especially in terms 
of Sander’s own claims to objectivity and the claims of objectivity made by atlases in and 
                                                
30
 As noted in the collection published by Sander & Keller (1996) and later in the volume edited by Die 
Photographische Sammlun/SK Stitfung Kultur (2013), which now holds Sander’s photographic collection, 
Sander’s outline of the germinal portfolio seems to broadly correspond to his idea of time and social 
hierarchy, most notably in the way he separates professions bound to notions of prestige, how he positions 
men ahead of women, and his privileging of agrarian and rural workers. However, his scheme does not 
make clear what we are to make of these divides. 
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of themselves, this structure mirrors our own encounters with the world, which begin 
from a localized position and expand ever outward. This movement is true in terms of 
how we encounter the issue of dignity and community in our own lives as well; from a 
young age our families and our neighbours are those that we rely on for a dignified life, 
and as we get older that circle expands. Though Sander seems to start from an arbitrary 
position, the axis he leans on corresponds to these simplistic notions of earthbound and 
gender divided roles, which are problematic in our time, yet descriptive of the era he 
inhabited. 
While Sander was never clear as to what he meant by “generally human 
characteristics” or “mankind in general,” what is apparent is that no one person embodied 
all of these characteristics at once. While people stand in for their social types, no one 
person stands in for a model of society via their occupation or their habits. While Sander 
did offer a point of “origin,” there is little evidence for how or whether the next category 
“follows” from the last. The layout of People of the Twentieth Century entails a 
significant set of curatorial choices. And although Sander’s projects have been 
thoroughly examined in photography studies, they have yet to be given much 
consideration as models of curation. Sander was a prolific photographer, but he was also 
a curatorial thinker, and his place within a set of projects that communicate human 
dignity without trading on an aesthetics of indignity should be fully considered. Sander’s 
refusal to situate characteristics of mankind in general within a specific and exalted type 
is crucial to the connection between human dignity and curatorial constellations. In the 
following section these choices, which do not deny difference, will be looked at under the 
guise of physiognomy, a taxonomic practice whose ends in the first half of the twentieth 
century continue to shape the relationship between dignity, universalism, and human 
difference. 
Physiognomy as Moral Topography 
There is a risk that the juncture I am trying to forge between human dignity and visual 
communication might be read as a project that attempts to connect an otherwise invisible 
or inherent quality with the human body, thus creating a simplistic physiognomic 
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equation. Broadly, physiognomy is the practice of connecting physical features of the 
body with moral or otherwise intangible ideals. During Sander’s lifetime, physiognomy 
was a complimentary practice to nationalist agendas and racialized discrimination. 
Importantly, however, the ideologically and technologically fraught historical moment 
Sander was a part of is crucial to our current understanding of human dignity and its 
visual communication. This era not only grounds assumptions about the way dignity 
ought or ought not be connected with the human body, but it was also a time when 
aesthetic and scientific concerns were brought together to horrifying ends through the 
body. It is noteworthy that Sander’s project has itself been aligned with the physiognomic 
ideas that were popular during his lifetime, though as we will see his projects exist just 
outside morally and nationally coded physiognomic practices. Physiognomy’s connection 
with Sander’s photographic project must be met head on, as should any simplistic 
association between bodies that look a certain way and the idea of human dignity. I hope 
to demonstrate through a discussion of the idea of physiognomic essence, how we might 
reconcile our ongoing concerns about human dignity and the body through curatorial 
constellations, which provide a system for thinking ourselves as connected alongside 
aesthetic concerns, but outside of essentialized moral categories. 
The visual communication of human dignity should not be articulated as a one-
dimensional sense of harmony between the body and this idea or as simplistic individual 
autonomy, but as a complex understanding of how one’s countenance or carriage 
intersects with the inherent idea of human value. While this discussion might feel strange, 
as engagement with visual communication and self-stylization sullies claims of inherent 
value, we cannot ignore how bodily comportment is always at issue with the 
communication of human dignity. Though never said outright, the academic focus on 
photographs of atrocity bound to the idea of indignity is already connected to questions of 
comportment, “debate about atrocity photography’s focus on dignified comportment is a 
focus on how dignity looks and feels” (Dean 2015, 243). While I do not focus on 
photographs of atrocity here, I agree that we must confront the legacy of how one’s 
countenance relates to the idea of human dignity, and further offer curatorial 
constellations as one way to avoid essentialized moral difference. This section 
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interrogates the historical links between physiognomy, as a practice that links “inner” 
characteristics with the human form, and the idea of human dignity, which ascribes 
humans, finitely material beings, a formless value. In order to understand why and how 
Sander’s project provides a complex space from which to discuss the relationship 
between the human body and an idea on the one hand, and the people and social ideas on 
the other, a small detour outlining the routes of modern physiognomy and its connection 
with human dignity is imperative.  
While there have been discussions about physiognomy dating back centuries, the 
man who popularized the type of physiognomic relationship that would come to inform 
ill-fated theories of race and normative citizenship in the 19th and 20th centuries was 
Johann Kasper Lavater. From 1775-1778, Lavater published his fragments on 
physiognomy, which visualized and formalized his theory about the connections between 
moral characteristics and outer appearances. For example, those who were thought to be 
calm were considered to have distinct facial features from those who were considered to 
be bad tempered or woeful (Fig. 11). In metaphorical terms of maps and atlases, 
physiognomy speaks to topographical interpretation. What is given to the eye via the face 
is given value that extends beyond the realm of the visible. For Lavater, the face was 
meant to provide a map to help judge the destiny of one’s soul. As Cusack (2006) notes, 
Lavater hoped that physiognomic guidelines would help to discern those who were 
“marked for salvation – to recognize one another on the strength of specific physical 
traits” (764). Whereas language came to be seen as deceptive, physiognomic 
visualizations of the body became “infallible sign[s] of the moral constitution of the 
individual” (Cusack, 764). One could not merely verbally proclaim their place as a good 
or moral person. Rather, the body’s features were seen as more truthful markers of these 
characteristics (Fig. 11). In Lavater’s conception, there was a perceived harmony between 
the body and the soul, a totalizing vision that “beauty and ugliness have a strict 
connection with the moral constitution of man” (Lavater, as quoted in Berland 2005, 33). 
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Figure 11: Image of woodcut from Physiognomische Fragmente zur Beforederung 
der Menschenkenntnis und Menschenliebe (1775-1778), by Johann Kasper Lavater. 
Phelgmatic and choleric (above), sanguine and melancholic (below). Public domain. 
 Lavater’s visual theory had a significant impact on Frederic Schiller’s theory of 
dignity. Schiller, who as we have seen provided one of the first and most complex 
theories about the relationship between human dignity and aesthetic representation, made 
sure to distance himself from Lavater’s simplistic equation. He did this by shifting 
attention away from a perceived harmony between the body and the soul, and towards 
emotional and visual tension. As discussed in the chapter one, the most famous example 
of Schiller’s idea was found in the Laocoön group’s (Fig. 5) strained visual narrative as 
“calm in suffering” (Schiller, 376). Whereas Lavater was concerned with the fixed and 
ultimately measurable signs of the body—forehead, chin, nose, etc.—Schiller was more 
concerned with the mobile features of the face and body, or rather, the features that could 
demonstrate the tension and control of one’s mentality (Gray, 340). Thus, rather than just 
being a topographical endeavor, Schiller understood that human dignity could not be 
“read” or assumed through a harmony between the body and the soul. As such, Schiller 
developed a physiognomy of sensation that sees one’s countenance or carriage as integral 
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to the otherwise intangible quality of human dignity. Human dignity reveals itself in our 
carriage — through our bodies and our subsequent interactions with others, we are 
counted as more than things, and through movements we can be understand as expressing 
an awareness of our relations to the embodied carriage of others.  
 Schiller’s formulation of human dignity not only helps to counter the 
reductionism inherent to Lavater’s physiognomy (that the body is no different than the 
visualized soul), but also helps to ground my own understanding of human dignity as an 
expression of bodies in relation. For Schiller, dignity was indeed a relationship between 
human reason and the body, but one that denied a simplistic equation between “good” 
and a small nose or “bad” and a large forehead. If “calm in suffering” revealed the 
“existence and influence of a power independent of suffering” (Schiller, 376) – that is 
human dignity – then the place to look for this property is not in isolation, autonomy, or 
harmony, but through human relations. With Schiller’s introduction of an expressive 
dimension, two important items are married to dignity as a concept: the democratization 
of human experience via the ability to carry oneself as dignified through a demonstration 
bodily control and a sense of contingency that outwardly marked the effects of human 
interaction. As a broadly democratic and contingent property, Schiller’s idea of dignity 
depends on human actions and their effects, rather than isolated appearances, rational 
autonomy, normative ideals, or social titles. By refusing to defer to the ideals of those 
with power (church, monarchy, politics, etc.) in terms of what an ideal relationship 
between the body and soul might look like, Schiller opened up the body to questions of 
human will and social arrangement, and thus to human dignity as a relational property. 
It is interesting, however, that the sense of contingency and disharmony Schiller 
saw in human dignity was never really taken further. Control came to be seen in 
normative terms of bodily integrity and contingency become secondary with the rise of 
individuality and self-determination. Between Schiller’s time and Sander’s time, the path 
of physiognomy, and therefore the relationships between the body and otherwise inherent 
qualities took many twists and turns. Despite its religious, superstitious, and narrow-
minded beginnings, physiognomy was not just a short-lived fad. It found new homes and 
purposes, specifically in terms of composites, and more generally in terms of the creation 
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of racialized and national ideologies (Gray 2004; Rittleman 2010; Sekula 1986). In one 
publication on physiognomy from 1879 human dignity is included in a long list of how 
one’s faculties present themselves through the body, “agreeableness imparts a winning, 
pleasing look…ideality, a beautiful look; self-esteem, a dignified look” (Willis, 33). Here 
a continuation of human dignity as an idealization of status or station shines through via 
an understanding that one’s self-esteem is worn and could be outwardly measured.  
Whether or not this view seems outmoded today, the connection between self-
esteem and dignity was and remains essential to an ideal visualization of it. Notably, 
Lavater’s emphasis on the flat, immobile parts of the face became synonymous in 
physiognomic propaganda of the National Socialists and their supporters. During the 
opening decades of the twentieth century many German photographers and authors of 
“instructive” race based photo-books, such as those made popular by Hans Gunther and 
Erna Lendvai-Dircksen, generally focused on the specificities of the face and racial 
connotations of skull shape and genetic presentation, much in line with Lavater’s 
eschatological prerogatives.31 In this turn of physiognomy, what was considered “good” 
became tied to facial and cultural markers in ways that attempted to prioritize “good 
citizens”, rather than good Christians. 
In the majority of physiognomic works from the early 1900s, ideas of moral, 
racial, and nationalistic hierarchy were married to genetic features and biological traits as 
a way to valorize an ideal type. Difference was positioned both narratively and visually 
as dangerous to the nation and as something to eliminate through biological selection, 
laws, and ultimately genocide; in these eugenic projects, any sense of dignity is 
normative, a quality reserved for a select and idealized group, thus transfiguring old ideas 
                                                
31
 Erna Lendvai-Dircksen was a German photographer and eugenicist whose work advocated for a primacy 
of the rural German volk (Rittleman 2010). Along with her popular photobooks, she was also notably the 
main photographer of children for the German periodical, Volk und Rasse (People and Race). Hans 
Gunther promoted himself as a “race scientist” and published books such as Rassenkundes des duetsche 
Volkes (Racial Science of the German People) (1922) & The Racial Elements of European History (1927). 
Both used photography to their advancement, combining photographic “evidence” with scientific language 
so as to create strong alliances between hierarchical ideology founded in national interests with outer 
appearances. See Brückle (2013) Lange (1999), and Magilow (2012) for more on these and other 
physiognomic photographers and theorists. 
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of rank or status into genetic and racial forms. Through these examples we can see how 
the physiognomic framing of individuals as types to be deciphered through racial and 
physical categories delimits dignity. These are not people approached in a way that 
values their individual lives or experiences, but things subsumed under a strict ordering 
system. Alan Sekula (1986) summarizes the tenets of physiognomic practice and its 
effects concretely:  
Virtually every manual developed an array of individual cases and types along a 
loose set of ‘moral, intellectual, and animal’ continua. Thus zones of genius, 
virtue, and strength were charted only in relation to zones of idiocy, vice, and 
weakness. The boundaries between these zones were vaguely demarcated; thus it 
was possible to speak, for example, of ‘moral idiocy.’ Generally, in this pre-
evolutionary system of difference, the lower-zones shaded off into varieties of 
animality and pathology. (Sekula 1986; 12) 
Just as exhibitions were used to create and reinforce racial hierarchies in the nineteenth 
century, the body itself had become a site where hierarchical ideas of race, gender, and 
nationality were constantly being experimented with and developed.32  
                                                
32 We can see these experiments play within physiognomic projects at the time, which similarly used the 
idea of mapping and atlases to develop their own racist and exclusionary ends. For example, Hans Gunther 
used maps to segregate and define different races in his pseudo-scientific endeavors, going beyond where 
different cultures or races did reside into territory that defined where they ought to reside. Comparatively, 
we can see the most deceptive components of a physiognomic undertaking, which naïvely equated of the 
racialized body with geographical zones joining together in the 1933 exhibit, Races of Mankind. Mounted 
in conjunction with the 1933 Century of Progress World’s Fair in Chicago, Races of Mankind consisted of 
101 life-sized bronze sculptures crafted by Malvina Hoffman, each of which were to encompass one of the 
world’s racial types.32 Using the globe as an interface, and the conceit that mankind could indeed be 
mapped on a geographical level, Races of Mankind perfected techniques used at world’s fairs or human 
zoos in the newly founded sterile and scientific Field Museum. The artistic quality of these statues 
encouraged visitors to examine others who were “unable to respond or return the look. The exhibition 
encouraged a kind of voyeurism sanitized of shame in the culturally approved setting of a museum in which 
such seeing is given scientific sanction as the pursuit of knowledge and cultural sophistication” (Teslow, 
55). While a physical map was not added to this exhibit until after World War II, the reification of race 
along the lines of geographic region and cultural stereotypes was clear from the beginning. The exhibit’s 
condensed field of vision promised a clear pinnacle of human and geographical perfection. Like Hans 
Gunther’s Racial Elements of European History (1927), which valorized the Nordic type, Hoffman’s 
exhibit similarly places the White/Nordic man as the pinnacle of progress. In both the Races of Mankind 
exhibit and Gunther’s books maps were used to clarify their findings. The visual message inherent in both 
is that there is a specific way progress and human value appears across the world. In both instances ideas of 
progress and hierarchy overshadow any attempt at equality or universal dignity. 
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This new era of experimentation with the body and its physiognomic significance 
in the 1800s and early 1900s runs parallel to Hunt’s (2007) description of how state 
ownership of bodies gave way to individualistic and secular ownership of the body in 
conjunction with the new era of human rights around the turn of the nineteenth century. 
While the idea of the individual was beginning to take hold, it was accompanied by 
notions of group belonging based on cultural markers that extended beyond race, class, 
and gender into more finite principles of phrenology and physiognomy. As Shawn 
Michelle Smith (1999) has demonstrated, in the nineteenth century photography helped 
middle class Americans connect imagined ideas of “inner essence” to physical 
appearances: “the photographic sign invited one to participate in a leap of faith whereby 
the body might serve as index to an imagined essence. And by the same leap of faith, by 
the same process of metonymy, individuals could imagine themselves linked to others 
similarly represented, and thereby mutually affirm an imagined essence” (Smith 1999, 5). 
Detrimentally, a process of imagined essence collided not only with photographic 
technologies, but with social processes of imagined value and worth, especially as it 
concerned differences of race and gender. The visual landscape was used to affirm 
imagined differences by linking biology and imagined essence, while at the same time 
deferring ownership of such qualities to the individual. White authoritative frames of 
reference came to superimpose non-existent differences onto “other” populations, thus 
giving these imagined differences material forms. While this new era of ownership was 
not tied to the pain of physical torture, it was indeed linked to differential qualifiers of 
meaning that were directly tied to the body. In this way, while the individual came to be 
seen as the central unit of this new era of human rights, there was at the same time a 
limited sense that individuals could make their own meaning in the world, which 
Bergoffen sees as central to the contemporary connection between human dignity and the 
body (2009, 313). Group identifiers and morally laden taxonomies came to reside on the 
body, on the individual, yet the individual had little recourse to claim their own meaning 
in ways that did not conform to what was considered good or right. Thus, as people were 
thought to own their bodies and agency, they were also seen to own the harmful 
racialized and gendered dynamics whose significance resided on their bodies. The 
physiognomic equation of inner essence with outer appearance seems to foreground the 
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dynamic shift of bodily ownership that the new human rights era entailed and the myriad 
symbolic and human values that connect human worth with culture broadly.  
Defining New Territory: Sander’s Physiognomy 
We should be wary of projects that rest on an easy relationship between the body and the 
soul or the body and moralized inscriptions of race, gender, or class. The body cannot be 
seen as a morally laden topographical medium. The connection between human dignity 
and the body similarly cannot be about a perceived sense of harmony between the body 
and the soul or a simplistic observation about bodies that are deemed whole or inviolable 
or simply look a certain way. Why then start with a project created by a man who 
experimented with physiognomy? What can his curatorial vision possibly tell us about 
the relationship between human dignity and the mediated world? Looked at through the 
lens of archives that helped to fuse ideas of imagined essence to bodily appearance, 
Sander’s photographic projects are yet another site that might entrench unfounded ideas 
of difference (Smith 1999, 3). In this vein, Smith is rightly critical of Walter Benjamin’s 
praise of Sander’s photographs. However, there are important differences between 
Sander’s work and those that came before and after it that help to position People of the 
Twentieth Century as a site that can be used to differently imagine a relational 
understanding of human dignity beyond idealization, absence, or aesthetic emancipation. 
Importantly, Sander was mapping new territory in terms of the visual politics of the body 
in relation to mass society and in opposition to simplistic notions of hierarchy.  
Since Sander first published Face of Our Time (1929) his work has received 
mixed reviews: praise for its expansive scope and its position at the forefront of 
photographic portraiture (Aiken 2005; Benjamin 1931a; Lange 1999; Sander 2013, 16) 
and criticism for his aloof relationship between the politics of the body and eugenic ideas 
of racial purity (Jones 2000; Sekula 1981; Smith 1999). In many ways, Sander’s work 
situates itself just outside of the biological, psychological, and social stereotypical 
projects, which were gaining momentum and intersecting in the early 20th century around 
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questions of race, class, and gender.33 While many of these projects were engineered to 
help place people into specific moral and value-laden categories, such as the ones Sekula 
exposed above, Sander’s work was much less interested in ideological or moral types, 
which is evidenced in the way he linked physiognomy to profession or social position.  
Sander developed his taxonomy in relation to the roles people played in their 
daily lives, to his subject’s labour as farmers, mothers, doctors, artists, architects, and so 
on. Taxonomy – a process of naming and ordering – is a political technique. Effective 
taxonomies fade into the background, seem obvious and descriptive, rather than 
deceptive or exploitative (Hooper-Greenhill 1992, 6). Though taxonomy is 
predominantly considered under negative rubrics of bureaucratic oppression, it is also 
constitutive. In relation to the idea of human dignity, taxonomic difference should not be 
thought of as an anathema to its universalizing project. Thinking about the visual 
communication of human dignity requires more complexity than an ideal or uniform end 
where all humans are neatly labeled or described as “dignified.” We rely on taxonomic 
systems to make sense of the world and “make up” people and species beyond a 
taxonomy’s nomenclature, and this is true of human dignity as well. As Ian Hacking 
argues, “numerous kinds of human beings and human acts come into being hand in hand 
with our invention of the categories labeling them” (1999, 170). In this light, Sander’s 
categories are compelling. The subjects he constitutes are neither idealized or celebratory. 
They are also, not always direct or obvious. While some are photographed with the tools 
of their trade, others are not clearly aligned with these traits. Sander directs the viewer’s 
attention, not to categories of race or citizenship, but to people as they inhabit their labour 
and exhibit general characteristics. His labels do not fade into the background, but rather 
become part of what is compelling and instructive about his project. His taxonomy helps 
                                                
33
 It was not just racists or politically corrupt parties that were experimenting with physiognomic models in 
the early 1900s. Leesa Rittelman (2010) makes a strong case for the more general resurgence of 
physiognomy in Weimar Germany, as it “was not merely a sign of conservative racist dogma but a culture 
wide symptom of Germany’s interregnum identity crises” (147). As cultural transformation took place 
across all facets of German life – from the fields to the home to offices and industry – questions of national 
identity were raised in conjunction with the bodies that filled said roles. The surge in physiognomy was an 
attempt to marry nationalistic and otherwise intangible qualities with a visible and material form via the 
human body. August Sander is one of many photographers who was grappling with this connection. 
79 
 
us to see human dignity, not by giving everyone the same label, but by demonstrating 
how fundamental differences manifest through lived experience. Dignity must be thought 
in relation to these diverse experiences. Thinking about human taxonomies is one area 
where one’s countenance intersects with notions of value beyond atrocity or degradation. 
 Though we know taxonomic endeavors are inherently political, Sander was 
careful not to align himself with science or politics explicitly. From the leaflet 
announcing People of the Twentieth Century in 1929 there is a strong push away from 
these established positions. “This enormous task,” it reads,  
was not approached from an expert’s point of view. Sander had no scientific aids 
and was not advised by race theorist or social researchers. In other words, he 
relied exclusively on the direct observation of human nature, appearance, and 
environment; he followed his unerring instinct for the authentic and the essential, 
and embarked upon his mission primarily as a photographer. And he completed 
this mission with the fanaticism of a seeker of truth, without prejudice for or 
against any part, alignment, class, society. (Sander, 1986, 23) 
Sander attempted to depict his social milieu as it was and not how it should be. This 
prerogative – to shy away from imposing an alternate ideal on society through his 
taxonomy and arrangement – has been the cause for much of the ambivalence towards his 
work. Sander did not attempt to imagine a society devoid of the downtrodden or ill. 
Indeed, the lack of an idealized subject may ultimately have made Sander’s work 
irreconcilable with Nazi politics. Though it has been documented that the Nazis 
destroyed the plates for Face of Our Time in 1936, there is some academic trepidation in 
associating Sander’s images with a politics that outwardly defied the Nazi’s visual 
program (Baker 1996; Halley 1978). The destruction of these plates has been read as 
incommensurate with the National Socialist program, but Sander himself was never 
jailed. Though there remain questions about political alignment, I agree with Aiken 
(2005) who has noted that the lack of an idealized framework makes Sander’s work 
subversive in its own right: “what is missing...are images of handsome, healthy, resolute 
Aryans typical of the Nazi’s physiognomical views of the human race” (202). These 
omissions from Face of Our Time, and Sander’s arrangements are telling in terms of his 
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ideological alignment with a physiognomy corrupted by racist eugenics.34 In not 
conforming to a vision of progress so pervasive at the time, Sander quietly promotes an 
outline of society, rather than its idealized image. While the “earthbound man”/“farmer” 
do take up the opening positions within Sander’s curatorial arrangement, the project lacks 
any real directive, no instructions or advice on whether or how people should conform to 
the ways of the earthbound man. Indeed, this internal contradiction has flummoxed 
thinkers like Susan Sontag who voiced frustration with Sander’s work: “despite its class 
realism, it is one of the most truly abstract bodies of work in the history of photography” 
(1973, 61). 
Along with Sander’s subversive taxonomy, his view of what physiognomy was 
and how it worked alongside technology requires examination. Sander was, like Schiller, 
more interested in physiognomy as a product of one’s carriage and trade, rather than nose 
length or chin shape.35 In a radio lecture given in 1931, Sander outlined his views on 
physiognomy and its relation to the process of photography. At the beginning of this 
lecture physiognomy is framed as the act of apprehending the nature of another human 
being through an optic lens (Sander 1931, 677). However, rather than focusing on the 
measurable aspects of the face, Sander concentrated on full- and three-quarter-length 
images of his subjects, and valued the characteristic movements of human bodies as they 
intersected with social roles and labour: “not only a person’s face, but his movements 
define his character” (1931, 678). You can imagine this kind of physiognomic judgment 
                                                
34
 While Aryan soldiers do not appear in Face of Our Time, they have been included in subsequent 
versions of People of the Twentieth Century published posthumously.  
35
 Unlike Schiller, however, Sander seems uninterested in pathos. Importantly, and sometimes 
infuriatingly, Sander appears to engage only sporadically in sentimental affiliation. While many of his first 
photographs, such as the man of the soil (Fig. 9) are intimate and personal in comparison with photographs 
of businessmen and professionals that were taken later on in the project, this development is unsurprising 
given that he admits that he had known these first subjects in his description of the germinal portfolio. 
There is no clear way of seeing these differences in sentiment and intimacy as more than the differences 
between those “people I had known” and other social types that were needed to complete his project. The 
differences between the subjects Sander knew and those he did not is inherent to the project and to the way 
he worked. As a commercial photographer, many of the photographs were taken in official settings and 
later re-used while others were taken specifically for the purpose of completing People of the Twentieth 
Century. In many cases, it is not possible to define the circumstances of each photograph given how much 
information was destroyed.  
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as a part of everyday life as people act and move through the world. The baker or the 
locksmith exhibit their labour through the swirl of a whisk or quick move of the hand. In 
this way, Sander’s view of physiognomy is not merely a topographical endeavor; he does 
not assign hidden moral characteristics to the terrain of the body. It is not merely the 
surface of the body that provides clues to his subject’s professional characteristics, but 
their movement and actions. Their qualities are not magically inherent, but rather part of 
their life’s work and environment.  
With the addition of photography, the relationship between actions and 
appearances becomes complicated. A medium that is meant to capture a moment is 
employed by Sander to capture something much more temporal and animated. Herein lies 
a fundamental tension in Sander’s work. He seems to recognize that it is not just about 
the subject’s topographical appearance that makes his or her characteristics and yet he 
uses photography to capture the face of his time. To get around this duality Sander 
emphasizes the importance of the mass, and subsequently the importance of the curatorial 
endeavor to his visual understanding of society. He argued that “it is possible to record 
the historical physiognomic image of a whole generation and, with enough knowledge of 
physiognomy, to make that image speak in photographs. The historical image will 
become even clearer if we join together pictures typical of the many different groups that 
make up human society” (Sander 1931, 678). A mass of images is needed to make an 
image of the time. The idea of the “people” Sander was attempting to create could not be 
made iconographically, but necessitated curatorial thinking. 
A similar tension arises when placing human dignity in conversation with 
photography. Using singular photographs to visually communicate human dignity lends 
itself to notions of idealization or autonomy, only to be contradicted with a relentless 
stream of images of atrocity. When the surface of the body, especially in states of decay 
or violation, is read as proof that human dignity is something that can be easily violated, 
we hold ourselves back at the level of topography, attuning ourselves to certain kinds of 
violations while obfuscating those less visible. The constellation Sander was creating 
makes visible disparate human forms without reducing one to the other, and effectively 
opens up conversations about how this idea might look and feel otherwise. As such his 
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atlas acknowledges one of human dignity’s underlying concerns – that is, an awareness of 
how our means of existence create demands on others in the world. Though photography 
might not be the best medium to make these relations visible in obvious ways, examining 
its intersection with the human and its representation through a curatorial constellation is 
useful, as these bodies perform ideas of social and aesthetic value. 
 For Benjamin, deeming Sander’s project an “atlas of instruction” can be thought 
of in two ways as it relates to taxonomy and curation. First, Face of Our Time, did 
present a new taxonomy of humans connected through their social roles. Curatorially, it 
brought people together in a way that resembled Benjamin’s own mosaic thinking, which 
manifested through a layering of quotes, and objects, and interpretations in the Arcades 
Project. Sander’s assemblage brought together a whole host of different elements as a 
means of forming an historical image, forming an idea of the social shape in a highly 
complex fashion. Second, Benjamin’s fixation on Sander’s work might have also 
stemmed from his concerns about how commodification and mechanical reproduction 
were flattening the visual landscape and deadening the authentic aura of everyday life. 
Sander’s comparative form gave it distinct political stakes: People of the Twentieth 
Century might provide a place where viewers could learn to parse differences, and in so 
doing avoid a passive viewing of the people on the pages and in the world. For Benjamin, 
there was an anxiety that the world would come to wash over its subjects, and create a 
sense of “sensory alienation” in political and social life (Buck-Morss 1992, 4). As 
Benjamin writes in “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” 
“humanity that, according to Homer, was once an object of spectacle for the Olympian 
gods, is now one for itself” (Benjamin 1936, 242). Inherent in this statement is a warning: 
people can become immune to their own aestheticization or alienated from their sensory 
realities. The consequences of this kind of immunity would be that people in turn might 
begin to take joy in viewing their own destruction. Alienation from one’s own aesthetic 
situation, from one’s own physiognomic symbolisms and appearance, is thus at stake.  
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` Most basically, Sander’s atlas was a way of acquainting people with their own 
images, and with the way their own images related to others.36 Benjamin writes, “work 
like Sander’s can assume an unsuspected actuality overnight. Shifts in power, to which 
we are now accustomed, make the training and sharpening of a physiognomic awareness 
into a vital necessity. Whether one is of the right or left, one will have to get used to 
being seen in terms of one’s provenance. And in turn, one will see others in this way too” 
(Benjamin, 1931a; 520). Sander’s project, in this light, becomes one way of uncovering 
the aspects of society that may be hiding in plain sight, uncovering the way one’s 
comportment makes “value” in the world, and a way of communicating an idea of society 
not previously available vis-à-vis technology. As we will come to see in the final chapter, 
regarding the CMHR, there is a finite risk of levelling subjects or upholding them to 
hagiographic standards. In Sander’s time, and in our own, complexity is required to 
understand human relations. Sander’s compilation of images is nothing if not tied to the 
way that people are read and must learn to read others in terms of their carriage or 
countenance, not just in a snapshot, but in the social world. Thus, in relation to the visual 
communication of human dignity, which already intersects with issues of bodily 
comportment via atrocity, Sander’s People of the Twentieth Century becomes one site 
from which to imagine the intersection of human dignity and visual communication 
through labour and social constructs.  
Human Dignity Between the Finite and the Infinite 
Sander’s work does not strive to make a homogenous image of social life, but rather ties 
itself to fundamental differences between people, which manifest through lived 
experiences. His photographs are relational in a way that does not deny difference, but 
instead attempts to map how his subject’s experiences position them alongside one 
another. The baker, the locksmith, the farmers, the mothers, and society ladies are 
emblematic of these differences, and clearly demonstrate how lived experience and social 
                                                
36
 It should again be noted that many of Sander’s images were taken primarily as commercial photographs. 
In this way, they were taken in accordance with an “official” portrayal of the self, rather than a sense of 
casual or candid acquaintance. This makes a reading of his photographs, as an opportunity that allowed 
people to understand how their images and identities were read in public stronger.  
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constructs manifest in the body. Of course, this introduces a complex of relations that 
intersect with questions of gender, race, and class, which I will attempt to address below. 
Despite the fact that Sander’s subjects were taxonomically aligned with their social 
positions or aesthetic styling, the comparative framework of Face of Our Time and 
People of the Twentieth Century resist a sense of flattening or aesthetic alienation.  
In the introduction to August Sander’s Face of Our Time, Alfred Doblin argues 
that Sander’s photographic atlas has an important social function. Beyond instructing his 
audiences about the relational qualities of mass society, his work is said to be an answer 
to the aesthetic flattening of mass society, or at the very least a warning of its effects. 
Doblin, a writer and notable cultural figure of 1920s, claimed that Sander’s work makes 
his audiences more aware of the “leveling” of mass society: “what do I mean by leveling? 
Assimilation, the blurring of personal and private distinctions, the fading away of these 
differences under the stamp of greater power” (Sander 1929, 8). This statement seems 
initially at odds with any program of human rights. Intuitively, the fading away of “these 
differences” would appear positively in the fight for equality and justice. However, 
Doblin sees the blurring of distinctions as a negative development. The “stamp of greater 
power,” assumedly capitalism and the amalgamation of class distinctions that come with 
it, made people unable to recognize social distinctions and inequalities in a way that was 
detrimental to recognition and respect of difference. Despite the appearance of more 
choices and thus more room for individual expression, Sander is positioned as keenly 
aware that outer expression was co-opted by style and capital and therefore not the 
pristine canvas from which to measure inner characteristic, a relationship so popular with 
other physiognomic projects. The shift from the face as the main canvas of physiognomy 
to the body and its movements or habits, in fact reveals the failures of physiognomy, and 
makes visible the conditions of modernity that manifest corporeally and ideologically. 
The human could no more be a marker of calm or sadness or Germanness, as it was 
becoming the canvas of capital. In the same way, human dignity could no more be a 
marker of harmony between the body and the soul, or one’s outer shell and this inherent 
quality. It was, indeed, relations within capital and culture, that gave credence to a more 
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generalized sense of human value, which in Sander’s case we see most dramatically 
through his curatorial constellation. 
 Sander ultimately displaces any easy relationship between the human form and an 
inherent characteristic such as human dignity. His curatorial constellation, which shows 
how characteristics are dispersed through society, never found in one idealized body, is 
integral to this observation. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, one of 
Sander’s most famous photographs is the “Young Famers” (Fig. 7). In this image three 
young men stand on a rutted road. With their feet and shoulders pointed away from the 
camera, they are caught as if moving across the camera’s field of vision. Suits, hats, and 
evening canes stand out in relief on the uneven path and rural setting creating a contrast 
between their countenance and their surroundings. In John Berger’s (1992) essay, “The 
Suit and the Photograph,” the three farmers on their way to a dance are described as 
exhibiting a “special physical dignity” (34). Peasants, Berger writes, present us with a 
specific physical rhythm:   
…directly related to the energy demanded by the amount of work which 
has to be done in a day, and is reflected in typical physical movements 
and stance. It is an extended sweeping rhythm. Not necessarily slow. The 
traditional scything or sawing may exemplify it. The way peasants ride 
horses makes it distinctive, as also the way they walk, as if tasting the 
earth with each stride. In addition peasants possess a special physical 
dignity: this is determined by a kind of functionalism, a way of being 
fully at home in effort. (Berger 1992, 33-4) 
There is a way in which these farmers are caught between two worlds, plainly between 
their laborious work and the evening’s entertainment, but also metaphorically between 
their class and the outer appearance of their being. In terms of the importance of 
exhibitions in crafting their dignity, their placement within Sander’s curatorial 
constellation makes a case that their dignity is both theirs and made in relation to others. 
Their “functionalism,” self-representation, and styling becomes apparent through this 
comparative scheme that places these people in direct conversation with other members 
of the community.   
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Going a step further, I would argue that throughout Sander’s projects the dignified 
human subject is made through a curatorial constellation that relies on relationality and 
interdependence. Within Face of Our Time especially, an air of contingency is created 
that develops the importance of Sander’s manufactured social types as part of a 
constellation and part of a community. His curatorial arrangements submit what has been 
considered by some as a “utopian dream of a community without boundaries” (Hake 
1997, 123). This is especially true of Face of our Time, which presents an arrangement 
much less demarcated than the subsequent renderings of People of the Twentieth Century. 
In this prototype, there are no groups or portfolios that give the arrangement as definitive 
a shape as People of the Twentieth Century. In terms of a visual mapping, Face of Our 
Time provides a more general series of locations than a well-defined terrain or detailed 
representation. The “Young Farmers” existence and meaning is shared with each other 
and with the other types of people—sages, artists, doctors, architects, the unemployed—
as they are arranged in the book. Next to “the Notary” (Fig. 13) or the “Village Band” the 
roughness of the young farmer’s hands and off-lengths of their pant legs, mark them as 
physical laborers not used to moving through the world in such fine apparel. As Berger 
points out “the three men belong, at the very most, to the second generation who ever 
wear such suits in the European countryside. Twenty or 30 years earlier such suits did not 
exist at a price which peasants could afford” (30). While we might be inclined to think 
that the suits would mask their social class, Berger argues that their suits “underline and 
emphasize it” (31). Though Berger never states this explicitly, his conclusion is only 
made through a comparative framework, in relation to other photographs in the atlas of 
images. The farmer’s dependence on others for meaning defines their special physical 
dignity, which in turn is only special in so much as it appears differently than some of the 
other social types. Sander’s subjects form the concrete elements whose exhibition creates 
an understanding of how dignity presents itself in this image world as radically 
contingent. Put differently, Sander teaches us how dignified personhood is dependent on 
and established through arrangements that both refer to and endure within existing social 
constellations. 
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In many ways this tension, between static visual representations and the relational 
and comparative aspects of his project bears out one of the most crucial aspects of 
Sander’s work as it reveals the idea of human dignity. In his use of a physiognomic frame 
tied to a laboring mass, Sander is attempting to capture something not immediately given 
to the eye, in essence attempting to capture experience and value that occurs outside of 
the technological limits of photographic media. Sander does not attempt to capture an 
image of his time in one photograph and in this way, moves beyond photography or 
iconography. The relationship between dignity and the visual world is emblematic of a 
similar problem. As something often conceived of as “inherent,” dignity is not 
immediately given to the eye. Indeed, it is not something given to the eye in one finite 
material subject or object. For there to be a successful connection with the visual realm 
dignity must resist optic idealization. Susan Sontag has asserted that “though the poor do 
not lack dignity in Sander’s photographs, it is not because of any compassionate 
intentions. They have dignity by juxtaposition, because they are looked at in the same 
cool way as everybody else” (62). However, it is not merely a technical quality that gives 
the poor or disabled dignity within Sander’s projects. If that were the case than any 
project that used photography as a means of creating a comprehensive image or argument 
about a group of people might be thought of similarly, which we know is unfounded 
given the rise of eugenically driven physiognomic archives. Indeed, the camera does not 
grant dignity. Rather, dignity in Sander’s People of the Twentieth Century, and arguably 
within society at large is only made through the relations of meaning that underwrite our 
assumptions about what it means to have any number of visual properties that would 
come to be included in later laws and declarations: family, occupation, ability, and 
culture. Though not as sensational as the images of war and famine that have come to 
occupy our sense of what it means to have human dignity, as a function of bodily 
integrity, these more mundane relations are indeed telling about the state of human 
dignity through this image of Sander’s time. He does not attempt to fashion the poor or 
disabled in the image of a normative ideal, but treats their existence as important to and 
revealing of the social reality. This optic relationship is a crucial first step if we are to see 
dignity in the visual realm as more than a product of its negation. 
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In Sander’s curatorial constellation there is no one dignified type, but rather a 
curatorial method that connects the material and corporeal world, and conveys a number 
of different ideas, human dignity being one of them. Sander’s work helps to situate and 
define the dignified human person as inextricably linked with his social environments and 
the taxonomic systems that accompany them. This is nowhere more visible in the portrait 
of a disabled ex-serviceman taken in 1928 (Fig. 12). While we do not have information 
about the specifics of this man’s life or injuries, his uniform marks him as part of a social 
group marred by war. His past military service meets his present movements in a 
haunting way, as his mobility is bound to encounters away from the frame and to his 
current embodied and environmental realities, the design of which was not his own 
doing. Not only are his movements restricted by his injury and place in a wheelchair, but 
also his position at the bottom of a set of stairs demonstrates how the environment is 
itself immobilizing. The physical space, designed by the otherwise abled does the work 
of defining his movement.  
Importantly, however, this man does not come to embody what ability looks like 
alone. He is not simplistically positioned in a portfolio with other “Servicemen,” as a foil 
to their ability. Rather he is included in a portfolio labeled as “Itinerant Tradesmen,” or 
more colloquially people who travel for work. I mention this, partly because the 
“Disabled Ex-Serviceman” here holds an interesting position, he is both “disabled” yet 
marked as part of a laboring and moving force. In this portfolio, similar dichotomies 
appear between these men who are by and large visually disfigured, but labelled through 
their socio-economic roles, which are inherently defined by movement. This is not to 
argue that Sander dignifies these men by avoiding labels that shirk their ability, but he 
does introduce nuance to their social roles, especially in light of his own emphasis on 
characteristic movements as a route to the characteristics of mankind in general. Though 
their movements are indeed limited, they are marked as part of a group that is in motion 
by way of their labour. Furthermore, the “Disabled Ex-Serviceman” is not a man who 
defines what ability or disability looks like on his own and does not provide a singular 
image of a group that should be ostracized or avoided. While looked at in the same cool 
manner as everyone else, his inclusion is crucial to the formation of an image of the time.  
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Figure 12: Disabled Ex-Serviceman, 1928, by August Sander. Public domain. 
Another layer of this man’s relational dignity can be apprehended through a 
reading of this photograph within and between the types that make up Sander’s larger 
curatorial constellation. Set against the “Young Farmers” the movements of the 
“Disabled Serviceman” become more defined. His movement is incompatible with the 
rutted road that the farmers traverse. More simply, his movement is not compatible with 
his own surroundings. His is not a dignity made “fully at home in effort” (Berger 1992, 
34), but rather in spite of his social situation. Unlike the “pastry cook” or the “bricklayer” 
whose images bear the effortless marks of their professions and continued place within 
stable employment, the “disabled ex-serviceman” is defined by his past, and limited by 
his immediate social environment. These differences become all the more evident in 
relation to Sander’s photograph of “The Notary” (Fig. 13). While similarly positioned at 
the bottom of a set of stairs, the notary’s countenance and command over his dog tells a 
very different tale about mobility, inclusion, and access. These aesthetic differences do 
not merely name someone as part of one group or another, but show how one’s life is 
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grounded in the material world and built in relation to others. Here again there is no easy 
relationship between one’s outward appearance and one’s perceived dignity, but rather a 
way in which curation begins to reveal these associations, and begins to hint at the limits 
of exclusion and inclusion, along material, aesthetic, and social lines.  
 
Figure 13: The Notary, 1924, by August Sander. Public domain. 
 The juxtaposition of the disabled ex-serviceman and the notary map the ways 
their lives and characteristic movements are made different through the social 
environment, through things they are in control of and things that they are not in control 
of. Even if they were to never meet in person, their lives become linked through the 
image atlas, which puts them in relation. As the series begins to map these inclusions and 
exclusions, it helps to reveal the assumptions of what a dignified life might look like and 
provide clues as to where specific work might take place to remedy these problems of 
access and inclusion. In this way, it helps to reveal the more mundane areas where we 
might begin to read human dignity as vulnerable and relational. Here, dignity is not only 
made in relation to corporeal integrity, but in relation to situations of labour, the 
environment, and social stability. Though these intersections might seem obvious to us 
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today, Sander’s visual compendium is one of the first that examined the social, rather 
than the biological or racial, as the site from which these relations grow. The “Disabled 
Ex-Serviceman’s” inclusion, along with other people considered to be at the margins of 
society, helps to visualize the realities of human rights and human dignity beyond an 
idealized vision and as an ongoing project, “as they are not as they should be” (Sander 
1986, 21). His presence makes this constellation less of a dream state and more of 
exercise in apprehending the boundaries of social, embodied, and material manifestation. 
Within the confines of this man’s own life, it is not only his bodily integrity that defines 
his humanness, but also shifts in technology – his wheelchair being a modern appendage 
– and shifts in the way labor was configured and valued. The “Disabled Ex-Serviceman” 
helps to decenter any notion of an idealized or unattainable singular vision of what it 
means to have dignity, and demonstrates how shifts in material and technological 
configurations support or deny dignity.  
Here we might begin to see Sander’s atlas beginning to craft ideas about ability as 
it intersects with human dignity more broadly. In response to normative claims, Wendy 
Brown (2004) points out that “human rights configure subjects as either able or entitled… 
to protect themselves from what they consider unjust and define for themselves what 
their individual aims and ends are” (Brown 2004, 455). Sander’s atlas demonstrates how 
individual empowerment and agency are indeed contingent. The social dimension of 
these photographs demonstrates how individual aims and ends meet the means and ends 
of others in both diffuse and concrete ways. Here, making the means of dignity visible 
means exposing the uncomfortable reality that individuals are not always in control of 
their own characteristic movement and not always able to define their own ends. Human 
dignity is not just a matter of life or death, or ability or disability, or even bodily integrity. 
Human dignity is a matter of everyday entanglements. The atlas is a helpful tool in this 
way. As a form that offers aesthetic and epistemic knowledge, it allows these different 
junctions to meet in a way that moves beyond simplistic contrasts.  
 This is not to say that Sander’s People of the Twentieth Century solves the 
problems that come with a relational understanding of human dignity, especially as it 
concerns gender. Although Sander’s “germinal portfolio” sets up an equal-but-secondary 
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division between men and women, women and girls take up much less space within the 
larger project, and are given a specifically gendered grouping that is much more limiting 
in terms of roles women play in society. Though there are hints at the new positions 
women were occupying outside of the home—for example in the photograph of the 
“Office Worker” who is positioned amongst the technologies of the modern workplace 
(Fig. 14)—the majority of women are photographed as mothers or as social figures that 
support their laboring husbands. Women are, in this world, much less dynamic and their 
animation is sequestered in real ways. In this way, Sander’s images embody older 
conceptions of the human body “with differential consequences for women, whose 
sovereignty resides in sexual as well as moral integrity” (Dean 2015, 243). The 
contingency of the project, reveals these limitations, but does not propose a new way 
forward. If human rights figures people as otherwise “able or entitled” we begin to see 
through a focus on the mass or constellation how one person’s ability or entitlement rests 
upon systems which are distinctly coded along cultural lines. In this way, human dignity 
becomes distinctly constellated, through all areas of social life, including ability and 
gender. Women are not without dignity, but figured as otherwise able and confined. 
While we might see this as a sign specific to Sander’s time, gendered dynamics that reach 
across arenas of labour, ability, and action remain pertinent. Though outside the scope of 
this dissertation, the kind of relational reading I am describing via curatorial 
constellations might gain traction when placed in dialogue with current debates in media 
and gender studies, specifically in relation to feminist disability studies, which brings 
together the concerns of gender and disability as a way of demonstrating how notions of 
ability and equality reside in intersecting spheres.37 How indeed might a focus on 
curatorial constellations begin to provide a subversive archive that reveals contingent 
                                                
37
 See for example Garland-Thompson (2005 & 2011), Hall (2011 & 2015), Harraway (1990). I am 
especially interested in the potential connections to be made between Harraway’s oft cited question, “why 
should our bodies end at the skin” (Haraway 1990, 220), and the theorization of human dignity as a 
relational property. As Garland-Thompson notes, “a feminist disability approach fosters complex 
understanding of the cultural history of the body” (2011, 16). An expanded understanding of human dignity 
might productively compliment the interdisciplinary approach being taken in this field, especially as it 
relates to diversity and marginalization.  
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frames of ability, gender, and access and speak more broadly to human dignity as 
property that both resides at the interface of the human body and demands a relational 
understanding of our lives as both embodied and meaning making subjects? 
 
Figure 14: Office Worker, 1928, by August Sander. Public domain. 
 Sander’s curatorial constellation does not offer answers to the environmental and 
cultural ways that construct some people as inhabiting a special physical dignity. In this 
sense, there is no pretense to the “equality” between men and women or professionals 
and the poor. Sander’s objective, to photograph his subjects as they are and not how they 
should be, can, in the context of gender roles, feel unsatisfying. However, his technique 
of arrangement, of placing these categories into conversation, offers a method of reading 
the meaning of human dignity as fragmented and supported by a wide range of people. 
There is a clear way in which Sander’s subjects must be read as animated, enduring, and 
wholly contingent that not only makes us aware of the forces of aesthetic countenance – 
the clothing, styles, and carriage that mark us a part of one group or another – but also 
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points to the ways that shifts in power can come to constitute how human dignity is 
culturally and aesthetically supported. As Sander forces his viewers to read his images as 
a constellation, he demonstrates how the connection between an idea and a human body 
is not made in isolation or instantaneously. As an atlas, which teaches us “how to see the 
essential and overlook the incidental,” Sander’s work acts as a hinge between projects 
that entrenched social hierarchy and those that help us to read the manifestation of moral 
hierarchies via the visualization of the human form (Daston and Galiston 2008, 26). 
Placing the process of comparison and relation ahead of exaltation or idealization, 
situates Sander’s work just outside of the typical physiognomic projects. And, in so 
doing, begins to demonstrate how an invisible quality such as human dignity must be 
read between human bodies not in them. In relation, the subject’s humanness is not just 
about a posed moment or a sum of its described visuals, but mutually constitutive and 
embodied process that must be supported and over time through the communities that 
make up our lives. Sander’s curatorial constellation produces an idea of contingency that 
is not just visual, but importantly lived and embodied. 
Conclusion   
While atlases often begin in a problematic way, from a subjective position or location, 
they often end, as Didi-Huberman argues, with reference to “the unexpected appearance 
of a new country, a new zone of knowledge to be explored” (Didi-Huberman 2010, 14). 
For his time and ours, Sander’s atlas of instruction offers a zone of knowledge particular 
to the human, a zone which traverses scientific and aesthetic concerns, and which begins 
to carve out the complex relationship between human dignity and visual communication. 
In Sander’s conception of photography, “like a mosaic that attains synthesis only when 
viewed en masse” (Sander 1986, 36), a vision of curation is made that seeks to put these 
subjects in an infinite number of relations. If, as Deborah Bergoffen claims, “we need to 
think of dignity and integrity in terms of the way that we are, as singular and distinct 
from others, [and] also bounded to them in a shared world. What needs to be protected 
are the way as that this connection to the other is structured and lived” (2012, 30), then 
Sander’s atlas provides one such structure directly tied to the lived experiences of these 
subjects. Dignity is not made manifest in an image, but rather through a method or 
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process of apprehension that takes into account the relational and taxonomic properties of 
these social types. The constellated curatorial masse aids in understanding dignity’s 
visual parameters as integrally tied to the duration of one’s existence that resists the 
momentary nature of static representation. Seeing these social types as dependent on each 
other for meaning is a lesson in reading dignity’s contingent forces as obtaining synthesis 
en masse.  
We should be wary of projects that present an idealized dignified subject or ones 
that only draw our attention to momentary actions of good or evil. Sander’s work diverts 
our attention to the shortcomings of said projects through his insistence on overcoming 
the aspirational limitations of singular photographs or utopian visions of what society 
ought to look like, and provides an arrangement that demonstrate the importance of 
thinking through the complexities of what it does look like. Herein issues of essence, 
countenance, and contingency begin to reveal themselves. While photography had been 
in use for half a century before Sander began his work, techniques of reproduction were 
making it easier to amass images and to create comparative frameworks that did more 
than just reproduce hierarchy. As with any atlas, Sander’s Face of Our Time and People 
of the Twentieth Century will disappoint if one is to approach them from a chronological 
perspective with a definitive narrative arc. The mundane statements his images make 
become animated when placed in conversation to others in his scheme, slowly revealing 
social connections that on first glance were not obvious or terribly interesting. In terms of 
my own engagement with Sander’s projects, I have only scratched the surface of their 
interrelations, of how they might help us to apprehend a more diffuse sense of human 
dignity. Bringing together different types of people, Sander invented a way of looking 
that offered new visual information—an optic that allowed spectators to envisage 
themselves as bound to social networks based on labour rather than strict moral codes. In 
the case of Sander, it is not only the technology evident in the photographs, but also his 
representational arrangement that make “shifts in power” and being understood in terms 
of “one’s own provenance” visible in a way not encountered before.  
Together, these people become humans of the 20th century. In leaning on the use 
of the “masse” visible in exhibition, Sander brings to the fore contemporary problems as 
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we continue to amass bodies in exhibitions that “make up human society,” a problem 
which will resurface in the final chapter. There is an eerie way in which Sander seems to 
both predict and pose answers to problems of nationhood and belonging that would come 
to dominate discussions around human rights and dignity after the Second World—
problems that remain central. In creating an exhibitionary arrangement wherein people 
must be read in relation to others, and in which the aestheticization of the body is played 
out in relation to unnamed yet taxonomically configured others, Sander’s projects help to 
stake out vulnerability and dependence in tandem with the making and unmaking of 
dignified subjects. At the level of the nation, vulnerabilities were cast aside during the 
Nazi’s reign in Germany with great consequence, as Jewish subjects were deemed 
undignified based both on genetic features and on social roles, such as profession and 
religion.  
Importantly, the entwining of physiognomy, exhibition, and human dignity is an 
issue we are left grappling today. That is, when we think through the visual qualities of 
human dignity that have at their centre the human form, assumptions around 
physiognomy, a practice which by definition strives to connect “inherent qualities” with 
outer appearances, need to be met head on. In our time, there is a growing trend of 
connecting human dignity to poverty and social appearance. The practice of giving 
haircuts to the homeless as a way of restoring dignity has emerged as a celebrated act of 
charity. However, behind these acts of charity and transformation lie assumptions about 
human dignity and physical appearance, most basically that human dignity is not only 
part of our physicality, but linked to social conceptions of hygiene, occupation, and 
appearance. The vulnerabilities that Sander helped to show has interesting parallels: “as 
in our uneasy times, the material trappings of Sander’s world attest to the precariousness 
of daily life. The haves and have-nots seem equally vulnerable” (Keane, 2017). There 
was and remains a complex relationship between social roles, physical appearances, and 
the idea of human dignity. Sander’s focus on one’s actions or carriage in society helps to 
shift the focus from human dignity as a normative property to a property made in relation. 
The constant flux of personal style and technological innovation here make human 
dignity into an idea connected to suites of actions dispersed amongst bodies, and itself 
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adapting alongside the techniques of biology and technology.  Responding to the 
levelling of mass society, in Sander’s case, means seeing how changes in the material 
world registered or worked on the body. Complacency about these tangible effects are not 
an option, as they are telling about the way human value and worth work in tandem with 
outer appearance. This task might appear monumental, given the constant set of changes 
facing humans, but the form of the atlas can help in this line of thought as well. Didi-
Huberman writes that “if the atlas appears as an incessant work of re-composing the 
world, it is first of all because the world itself does not cease to undergo decomposition 
upon decomposition” (2010, np). The human too, undergoes decomposition upon 
decomposition, composition upon composition. It is thus necessary to commit to a 
constant engagement with the body and the aesthetic and scientific values that come to 
reside there. Sander’s project instructs us about the project of dignity underway at the 
time, but its taxonomic and comparative system can be equally useful in ours. While the 
human body is not the perfect place to attach values of dignity, the body remains central 
to our understanding of human dignity beyond scenes of suffering, idealization, or 
aesthetic emancipation. When paired with the curatorial constellation, the body becomes 
a central interface that draws relations of human dignity across points of labour and style, 
and within a frame that considers diverse facets of public life. 
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3 Human Dignity Between Declaration and Curation: The 
Human Rights Exhibition Album as a “Usable Image of 
the Law” 
 
From the time of its conception, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was a visual 
event. Less than a year after this momentous declaration was signed the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) had translated the UDHR 
into an exhibition titled, Les Droits de l’Homme, which was on view at Musée Galliéra in 
Paris from September to December of 1949. Objects, art, and lessons from history were 
used to showcase various attempts made to implement human rights both by name and 
spirit in the new declaration. This was the first official visual iteration of the UDHR. 
Though I begin this chapter with a short explanation of Les Droits de l’Homme, I will be 
attentive to several such visual communications indicative of the state of human dignity 
as it was publicly developed after World War II. Images of the UN’s General Assembly, 
the Human Rights Exhibition Album (1950), and The Family of Man (1955) provide 
glimpses of how cultural difference and visual communication were handled alongside 
the emerging institutionalization of human dignity. Strikingly, these cases do not trade on 
an aesthetics of indignity to come to its defense despite their temporal proximity to war 
and genocide. With an emphasis on the logics of the family album, these exhibits 
demonstrate how human dignity required constellated systems of visual communication 
outside of the law to construct a field of understanding tethered to culture and 
community.  
Les Droits de l’Homme is significant, not just because it was the first official 
iteration of the UN’s program of human rights, but also because of how it thematically 
brought together museological tropes from art history, anthropology, and history 
alongside current events. In the first room of this exhibit, a stylized solar system 
positioned humans within a larger cosmological context, and was followed by a showcase 
narrating the historical struggles of humans around the world in their pursuit to secure 
rights with reference to earlier laws, cultural artefacts, and photographs. This so-called 
“treasure room” brought together a cast of a prehistoric footprint, an etching of an early 
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alphabet, Thomas Jefferson’s draft of the United States Declaration of Independence, 
among other items under the auspices of culture and the law as “different in language, 
identical in spirit” (Bregengaard & Prag 2014). As one reviewer described this first 
space: “we are reminded of man’s early gropings with his conscience, or of the 
meditations of those ancients who were seeking to evolve systems of ethics or law or 
freedom...the cumulative effect upon the visitor of this bird’s eye view of human effort is 
that the long battle has yielded many victories” (Williams 1949, 201). To be sure, the 
exhibit did not only address victories, but, by all accounts, strived to demonstrate how 
and where work still needed to be done to make human rights universal. Most strikingly 
the positive tone was tempered with the inclusion of photographs depicting the horrors of 
World War II. At the time, what we now know as the Holocaust was never mentioned as 
a singular event, “while a photograph displays victims incarcerated in a concentration 
camp, this image appears to signify the general destruction of the war, rather than the 
particular persecutions of the Jewish people” (Bregengaard & Prag 2014).38 “Fascist 
denials of liberties” was in this sense more of a “human concern” rather than the concern 
of a specific race or culture (Williams 1949, 201). Indeed, making world history or events 
a human concern rather than the concern of a particular culture, race, or nation 
undergirded the entire show. While the history presented was predominantly Western, an 
issue I will return to, the vision of a shared humanity was from the outset stated in 
alliance with the vision of a shared history. 
The second part of the exhibition proceeded to look more closely at each of the 
UDHR’s thirty articles from a variety of cultural and historical viewpoints as a way to 
promote a sense of global progress and solidarity. Pillars were placed throughout the 
                                                
38
 This is not surprising given that “the Holocaust” as a term used to describe the Nazi’s program of 
genocide did not gain traction until the late 1950s and early 1960s in the context of the Eichmann Trial. In 
recent years there has been a growing reconsideration of how the Holocaust influenced the forming of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Most vocally, Moyn (2010), has argued that “contrary to 
conventional assumptions, there was no widespread holocaust consciousness in the postwar era, so human 
rights could not have been a response to it” (7). See also Moses (2013): ‘Nazi criminality in general rather 
than the Holocaust in particular was a background context of the UN human rights regime” (21). As we 
will see in the next chapter, these debates have more concrete repercussions in terms of the visual 
communication of human dignity in relation to the development of the CMHR.  
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room with one devoted to each article of the declaration. The declaration became more 
tangible and visually engaging as the formal language of the articles were paired with 
various artefacts and art. For example, the pillar devoted to Article 4 (the prohibition of 
slavery) combined an antique bronze slave in chains, the log of a slave ship, and a 
photograph of what is presumably the result of abolition, “Negro doctors in Nigeria.” As 
the visitor left the exhibit, a final reminder of personal responsibility and futurity was 
imparted through a machine that counted the births per second of children around the 
world—a literal representation of the newcomers to this planet provided a way to extend 
these rights beyond the exhibit and make them part of a visual and material reality.  
While fascinating in itself, the exhibit’s relatively short period of display coupled 
with the fragility of some of its artefacts made it difficult to sell as a travelling entity.39 
Instead, a relatively novel form of curatorial dissemination was developed: the exhibit 
was refigured and condensed into the Human Rights Exhibition Album, which was 
published in three languages (English, French, and Spanish) and upwards of 10,000 
copies were shipped to UN member states in 1950. The bulk of this chapter will look 
closely at the Human Rights Exhibition Album. However, in the next section I examine 
key moments and motifs of the UN’s visual communication leading up to the signing of 
the UDHR. Herein we begin to see how human dignity emerged through the frame of the 
UN, the technology of the declaration, and the optic frames that accompanied both. 
Though Les Droits de l’Homme was the first official exhibition, it was in many ways 
merely an extension of the visual language emerging around human dignity’s place in the 
post-World War II era. 
Interdependence or Catastrophe  
The founding of the United Nations and the conceit of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights was, arguably, an exhibitionary event before these institutions became 
synonymous with their declarative functions. The site of one of the UN’s first meetings in 
                                                
39
 Despite the “universal” nature of this exhibit, only five countries lent objects for display. There is a 
greater commentary to be made about museums and cultural imperialism inherent in this exhibit outside the 
scope of this dissertation.  
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Flushing Meadows, New York itself has a compelling visual and curatorial lineage. In 
1939, nestled between the end of the depression and the beginning of the Second World 
War, a world fair was held in New York City. Not unlike other world fairs, the New York 
fair heralded visions of progress and demonstrations of new technology around a broad 
aspirational theme: The World of Tomorrow. Central to the fair were two architectural 
feats, the Trylon and the Perisphere (colloquially the spike and floating ball) (Fig. 15), 
which together housed one of the main exhibits, Democracity! (Fig. 16). Herein a large 
diorama of an urban city plan that promised to promote democracy dazzled visitors with 
its visions of idyllic green spaces, friendly roadways, and strategically placed community 
centres. A bird’s eye view of this vision of democratic city planning could be seen from 
two rotating elevated platforms that spanned the perimeter of the Perisphere. Over 
speakers, a script was read that reinforced the democratic properties of this sight: “Design 
for the future. Men working together...bound by a common faith in man...independent 
and therefore interdependent” (Seldes 1939).  
 
Figure 15: Perisphere (right) and Trylon (left), 1939, by Samuel H. Gottscho. The 
Metropolitan Museum of Art: 1987.1100.404. 
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Figure 16: Birds eye view of Democracity!, 1939. New York Public Library.  
The assumption underlying Democracity! was fairly simple: better infrastructure, 
planning, and technology can make society more democratic. As the brochure reads, this 
is “not fanciful...not dictatorial;” rather, it was about a standard of living available to all: 
“for the borders of the world have shrunk – every man is the neighbour of every other 
man – interdependence or catastrophe” (Seldes 1939). Accordingly, the fairgrounds 
mirrored the planning seen in the Perisphere, and embodied an ordering system between 
the participating nations as the scale model had between cities, towns, and community 
centres. Democracy embodied something beyond the borders of the U.S. as a political 
entity, and became tied to transnational relations, technology, and infrastructure, which 
could be reproduced anywhere as long as the plans remained intact. Industrial zones fed 
the entertainment zones, and the pavilions hosted by different countries provided sources 
of knowledge and culture integral to the balance of the fair and its so-called “democratic” 
order.  
Despite the growing tension in Europe, Germany was the only country to opt out 
of this grand exhibition, citing financial strain (in the fair’s second season, 1940, the 
USSR was the only country that shuttered its doors). Despite attempts to make new world 
democracies since World War I, of which the fair was but one exhibitionary product, 
nationalism and the fight over borders, resources, and political ideologies swirled beneath 
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the architectural dream-world of the fair grounds. “Interdependence or catastrophe” took 
on a different tone as the world stage shifted from a fair ground in New York to the 
theatre of war in Europe. The technological infrastructures of imagined cities had nothing 
on the machineries of air-war and the concentration camp. And for five years the fair-
ground at Flushing Meadows lay mostly dormant as catastrophe after catastrophe 
impacted the world.  
As WWII carried on, the leading powers in the world sought to build another 
machinery of interdependence by way of the United Nations. The beginnings of such an 
organization came courtesy of war-time alliances in 1941 and pledges between those 
fighting against fascism in 1942 to provide maximum war effort and bound signatories 
from making alternate peace agreements (United Nations, “1942”). The first discussions 
of a permanent organization that would extend beyond the war were carried out by a 
small handful of leaders representing Great Britain, Russia, China, and the United States 
in 1944 at Dumbarton Oaks, a private mansion just outside Washington, D.C. Soon after, 
drafts of the agreed upon foundations of the United Nations were circulated to the public. 
In the next year, conferences held in Yalta and San Francisco helped to cement the 
growing constellation of interdependence. Ultimately, six bodies were to make up this 
structure, including the General Assembly, the Security Council, the International Court 
of Justice, the Secretariat, the Trusteeship Council, and the Economic and Social 
Committee. Though “independent and therefore interdependent” had been used to explain 
the city planning envisioned by the world fair, the same could be said of the governing 
bodies of the UN, each necessary to the smooth functioning of an international 
organization and to the growing need to materialize the understanding that 
“interdependence or catastrophe” had real consequences. 
The United Nations officially came into existence as of October 24, 1945, and as 
the UN grew so did its visual apparatus. With 50 initial members, the General Assembly 
was something of a spectacle itself. At the San Francisco conference in April 1945 2,500 
media representatives were there to witness the coming together of 3,500 delegates 
(United Nations, “1945”). In 1947, the site of the New York fair became the temporary 
home of the UN. The world returned to this stage in an augmented form. The fair’s 
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theme, “World of Tomorrow,” seemed even more apt in relation to the UN’s mandate and 
apparatus, with Maclean’s magazine calling this display “The Biggest Show on Earth” 
(Berton 1947, 69). The bombastic, visually stunning, and hopeful tones of the world fair 
were here transfigured within the aims and hopes of the United Nation’s itself. 
The transposition of the world fair into a world political organization should not 
go without notice, for there are many ways in which the establishment of the United 
Nations was itself an event founded on familiar tropes of world’s fairs. Sweeping 
photographs of the General Assembly, such as the one featured here (Fig. 17), became 
synonymous with the UN’s new world order. The diverse and massive nature of the 
General Assembly and its chambers came to communicate the core of the UN’s mission, 
helping to sell the burgeoning ideology in a concrete form. The curvature and 
arrangement of its desk nodded to the global desire and design of this material 
constellation despite the uncertainties that remained as to the ultimate power of the 
Security Council. Between a mass of flags, which put a finite number on the amount of 
countries participating in this new endeavor, world-maps (often borderless), such as the 
one condensed into the UN’s logo, and a visibly diverse contingency, the symbolism of 
the international and cross-cultural nature of this coalition is optically unmistakable. The 
differentiating markers founded in flags and maps gave way to a new order of people. 
The type of “imperial visuality” which had been synonomous with world fairs of the 
past, which made taxonomic and stylistic distinctions around different cultures as a way 
to enforce ideas about primitive or civilized habits (Mirzeoff 2011, 197), appeared to 
dissolve in the UN’s chambers. These were people connected in time and space in a 
distinctly new manner. In the UN’s chamber a shift in imperial power was visibly on 
offer. Though the imperial powers still largely ran the show, the forward-facing theatre of 
this new system consolidated the divisions of world’s fairs under the banner of universal 
governance and later human rights.  
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Figure 17: Plate 25 from the Human Rights Exhibition Album: meeting of the United 
Nations from the day the UDHR was signed (December 10, 1948). Photograph by 
author. Used with permission of UNESCO. 
Whereas August Sander saw photography “like a mosaic that attains synthesis 
only when viewed en masse” (1986, 36) the importance of the United Nations similarly 
attains synthesis when viewed through the lens of its visibly diversified constellation. 
Indeed, while the forming of the UN was itself important to our understanding of human 
rights, as important was this visual configuration. As human rights and human dignity 
came to encompass transnational and global importance, it was imperative to understand 
the ideas it promoted beyond an idealized form. The complex of relations configured in 
the UN’s chambers underscores Benjamin’s claim that “ideas are not represented in 
themselves, but solely and exclusively in an arrangement of concrete elements” (1928, 
34). To its advancement and detriment, the marriage of the UN’s mandate and ideas with 
its visual apparatus, a curatorial constellation, helps us to understand how this 
international organization came to shape the trajectory of the idea of human dignity. 
Here, the location of the ideas of human rights and human dignity are not founded in one 
person or object, but dispersed throughout the delegates, political gestures, and other 
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visual representations that make the UN function. Together this mass of representatives 
formed a new constellation, which made a statement about how the idea of human rights 
and human dignity was to be formed and protected, not through the voice of one nation or 
one ideal image, but through a cluster of elements. This did not mean that a new sense of 
harmony was founded in international relations, but rather a new form of managing and 
dealing with tension was promoted. The UN grasped for devices and declarations that 
would provide a front against the infinite diversity of its constituents and in the face of a 
rapidly modernizing society where change was a constant. In the same way that 
Democracity! promised that better city planning or infrastructure would create more 
democratic communities, the UN’s early visual language and mandate similarly promised 
that better infrastructure, planning, and technology could make society more dignified. 
Wherever the principles of the UN were adopted, a similar ideological transformation 
was promised, one that depended on the technological and infrastructural mandates and 
declarations executed in its name.  
One tool of the United Nations that encapsulates this technological promise was 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was officially adopted on December 
10, 1948. In this document, the idea of human dignity gained a new prominence. The 
concept of dignity is central to the opening statement of the UDHR’s preamble and its 
first declaration. They respectively state:  
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights 
of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world. (United Nations 1948, Preamble) 
All humans are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with 
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood.  (United Nations 1948, Article 1) 
The legal conjunction “whereas” in the document’s preamble establishes a unique 
relationship between human dignity and the world. “Whereas” means to take into 
consideration the view or fact of something. It is here interesting that human dignity, and 
its role as the foundation of freedom and justice, is considered a common held view or 
fact. This clause signals human dignity as an established view or fact that does not just 
exist in the law or philosophy, but as integral to society in some way. Whereas connects 
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human dignity to a broader world of lived experience outside of this declaration, as 
something that is not just a hypothetical basis for preceding forth with human rights. 
Recognition of the inherent dignity of all humans is thus not only understood as 
something that is important, but through this word symbolically tied to a vast network of 
established meanings and experiences. It is, however, telling in terms how these 
experiences were reconciled within the UDHR. Article 1 reiterates the centrality of 
human dignity, yet defers to immaterial facets of social life as a means of communicating 
its importance. Reason and conscience conjure a transcendent conceptualization of 
human dignity, again showing how it is easier to put forward an idea without reckoning 
with its mediated and embodied functions. In both the Preamble and Article 1, human 
dignity works in a similar manner as the Democracity! diorama: an established idea is 
needed to create the plan and is, at the same time, the intended outcome of the plan. The 
inclusion of human dignity in this declaration is similarly infrastructural and 
technological. In the case of Democracity! the technologies needed to help advance 
democracy included roads and neighborhoods; in the case of human dignity in the late 
1940s, the technologies needed to help advance this idea included a declaration and an 
international organization.  
As a declaration, rather than a treaty or other legally binding document, the 
UDHR sits in a peculiar position. A declaration is not law, it is an explicit and open 
announcement meant to clearly elucidate the state of a given idea. Though declarations 
are often associated with beginnings or new beginnings, past events, present knowledge, 
and future concerns, shot through this process of consolidation (Hunt 2007, 145). In order 
for human dignity to even be included in this declaration it had to overcome barriers of 
language, culture, and politics within the UN’s diverse constellation. This was, indeed a 
highly charged unfolding process of social transformation for these ideas and their 
interrelation. The mass of delegates so central to the UN’s visual scheme, and the ideas 
they brought with them, had to be merged into something clear and useful. The hope was 
that the declaration’s wording and broad understandings of human rights might be readily 
adopted in subsequent treaties, charters, or laws. In the spirit of a declaration, as an open 
announcement, the concept of human dignity should have been something easily used or 
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appropriated, in this case on a universal scale. The declaration requires other legal 
devices, such as laws or international bodies to help secure and enfold its ideas in society.  
However, dignity itself has had a limited audience since the signing of the UDHR. 
Though it has been taken up in subsequent laws, it has not reached the cultural saturation 
or relevancy that was initially desired. In many ways, the UDHR has come to be treated 
“more like a monument to be venerated from a distance than a living document to be 
reappropriated by each generation” (Glendon, 2002; xvii). This statement rings especially 
true in terms of the idea of human dignity, and the scope of current debates around what 
it actually means or does. It would seem as if those who drafted and initially implemented 
the UDHR were aware of this problem of translation and use. As Williams (1949) wrote 
“the historic document is well drafted, in simple terms, yet few of those who read and 
approved it can really visualize what it implies” (201). As we will see, the Human Rights 
Exhibition Album was one attempt to solve this problem of access and approval. The 
early sense that the ideas contained in the UDHR needed to be connected to a larger 
visual world, so that it might remain generative, rather than staid or monumental, was 
manifested within the album’s production and circulation. 
In the context of media studies and alongside the heuristic of the constellation, the 
attempt to treat the UDHR as something that is generative and taken up by each 
generation should briefly be considered within a rather old set of distinctions between 
technologies and techniques. The worry that the declaration might (or has) become a 
“monument” seems to capture the tension between eternal truths and fragmented culture 
in Benjamin’s early work. There is a desire for the declaration to be both durable and yet 
embody the diversity of global cultures. This desire for the durability can be aligned with 
John Durham Peters’ definition of technologies, as “durable materialities” (2015, 87). 
Whereas technologies, such as a hammer, a boat, or any other media that may both 
precede and outlast human interaction are seen as durable, techniques refer to the local or 
cultural gestures, skills, or other ephemeral practices that put these technologies into 
motion: “techniques have both biological and artificial histories; they consist both of 
suites of actions and of materials, even if those materials are the body of the 
user...techniques are material but are not necessarily durable, while technologies always 
109 
 
are [durable]” (Peters 2015, 91). Those who drafted the UDHR knew that the declaration 
should be considered as a technique, something connected to the bodies of its users, as 
part of their actions and comportment. The declaration was not meant to become a 
technology. Though universality was desired, for the declaration to be “picked up” and 
applied in a uniform manner, its broad constituency made this kind of relationship a 
tenuous proposition.  As we will see, the Human Rights Exhibition Album is one place 
where the technological brevity of the UDHR was challenged. The album demonstrates 
how the “monumental” language of the UDHR sits in conflict with the visual and cultural 
evidence that amass around it. The album explicitly attempts to tie human dignity to 
biological and artificial histories, and for this it should be commended. The declarative 
form ought to be seen as a technique par excellence, as a form that necessarily needs to 
be seen as related to a constellated world, as generative and embodied.  
The declaration was not meant to perform as a “durable materiality,” yet there 
often seems to be a desire that it should be visually, materially, and culturally produced in 
a uniform and durable manner, that it should be able to be mass produced like so many 
other “valuable” parts of society. It would be easy to place human dignity in dialogue 
with mass production, and in many ways the visual communication of human dignity as 
either normative or negative falls within such a frame. Visualizing human dignity as a 
product of bodily inviolability or scarring are indeed acceptably universal. However, 
these categories are not enough. They are important, but communicate a false sense of 
universality within the idea of human dignity. Bringing questions of embodiment and 
constellations into the mix necessarily alters these infrastructural assumption; as human 
dignity is tied to a changing visual realm, and to “biological and artificial histories,” it 
must be grappled with as a technique, and acknowledged as part of local or cultural 
gestures and skills. The album is itself one site where local and cultural skills become 
palpable, and where the relations – on the levels of nations, cultures, and families – that 
make up human dignity disrupt any monumental glare. Within the context of this 
dissertation, a similar dichotomy is present between frameworks that seek to define the 
“durable” parameters of human dignity – through a search for origins, lineages, and 
textual evidence – and those, like the constellated method underway here, that approach 
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human dignity from culture and media, which are constantly shifting and tied to suites of 
biological and artificial histories. Acknowledging that we are in need of a rich history of 
human dignity that approaches its legal, philosophical, and cultural manifestations is only 
part of the answer. Going one step further is examining how these threads have indeed 
come to light within different forms. In this chapter, the curatorial constellation found in 
the Human Rights Exhibition Album again grounds this process of examination, and 
further demonstrates how we might move away from those conversations that seek 
incontrovertible stability within the idea of human dignity that verges on a technological 
desire. If we are to see human dignity as salient and generative, it must be approached 
from the realm of technique, as something made in relation through negotiation and 
developing frameworks of understanding. Curation and exhibition provide one such 
realm where we can see a range of techniques that make this idea operable. Picking up 
from the discussions of taxonomy and juxtaposition of bodies met in the first chapter, this 
chapter aims to address how the UDHR and its use of human dignity might similarly be 
understood, not as “durable,” but as enduring. In the light of Peters’ distinction between 
technologies and techniques, Sander’s projects can be seen as closely connected with 
techniques, as he focused on the intersection of biological and artificial histories: between 
bodies and their labour and between bodies and their tools. In the following section I 
show how the UDHR was visually mobilized through the Human Rights Exhibition 
Album in a way that understood the importance of biological and historical connections, 
but did so within an institutional and often technological frame. 
Exhibiting a Declaration 
The UN made a concerted effort to activate the UDHR beyond legal and philosophical 
venues in the days and years after it was signed. Charged with developing and 
disseminating the understood and stated missions of the UN, UNESCO played a large 
role in figuring out how to deliver human rights to a growing constituency of nations. 
Dreams of a global educational infrastructure guided UNESCO’s early days, and when 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was passed in 1948, UNESCO played a 
major role in disseminating its contents across the globe. UNESCO’s preamble aptly 
asserts: “since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences 
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of peace must be constructed” (UNESCO 1945). Visual communication was key in this 
process as it promised to be a more “universal language” with which to communicate the 
message of human rights globally (Allbeson 2015). The Human Rights Exhibition Album 
stands out as one such example, where the need to communicate the UDHR to a broad 
audience is clear via its reliance on visual evidence and patterns.40 Modeled after the 
Paris exhibition, the album connected past, present, and future via artefacts, art, and 
documentary photographs, thus giving the declaration a scope much wider than the UN’s 
institutional parameters.  
The album came in a dark embossed folder (Fig. 18) and consisted of 101 pages 
of images with accompanying text. The album pages were 19 x 12 inches, and were 
separated between pages with images and pages with contextual captions.41 The general 
layout of the exhibition album was made to emulate the Paris exhibition, with an 
introductory section that similarly recounted the historical bird’s eye view of human 
struggle and fourteen subsequent sections that narrowed in on a specific right or cluster of 
rights.42 Many of the pages grouped different images together in the same patterns as the 
Paris exhibit, similarly connecting people throughout histories, such as in Fig. 19, which 
shows three different scenes representing the culmination of emancipation from slavery 
and equality amongst races. Despite the named function as album, the Human Rights 
Exhibition Album was meant to be exhibited in local libraries, community centres, and 
other public spaces. 
                                                
40 See Duedahl (2011 & 2016) and Kulnazarova and Ydesen (2017) for more on UNESCO’s early history 
and communication projects.  
 
41
 While the image pages were all full size most of the text pages came perforated so that only a small strip 
of text would accompany each image. 
42
 See Appendix A for layout of album. 
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Figure 18: The Human Rights Exhibition Album, 1950, photograph by author. 
 
Figure 19: Plate 32 from the Human Rights Exhibition Album, 1950, photograph by 
author. Caption: Abolition of Slavery/Equality Between the Races: Men of every 
race must have free access to public office, and no profession must be closed to 
them. The value of their contributions to science and art must be recognized by all. 
A. Working in the cotton fields of Alabama. B. Negro doctors in Nigeria. C. 
Governor Félix Éboué at the Brazzaville conference. Used with permission by 
UNESCO. 
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Figure 20: Human Rights Exhibition Album presentation instructions, 1950, photo 
by author. Used with permission of UNESCO. 
The album was comprised of three broad sections. The first sixteen pages are an 
historical intro that spans from 20,000 B.C. E to the late 1940s and illustrates the 
emergence of human rights. Here key technological (tools), linguistic (alphabets), 
political (revolutions), religions (Buddhism and Christianity), and legal moments (The 
Magna Carta and the American Declaration of Independence) are highlighted, which will 
be explored in more detail below. The second section has been called the “threat to 
human rights” (Bregengaard & Prag 2014) and shows how the Second World War 
endangered the progress of the past. The final section, the largest and arguably most 
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important as it regards the translation of the UDHR into a visual language, illustrates the 
emergence of the declaration’s thirty articles through 14 thematic groups.43  
The album came with very loose instructions on how to hang the sheets contained 
within its packaging. Three options were provided: recipients of the album could hang 
these sheets horizontally, vertically, or create their own clusters, an option that was 
“especially recommended” (Fig. 20). The instructions for this last option read: “the 
illustrated sheets and the appropriate captions may be pasted or otherwise attached to 
cardboard, stiff paper, thin sheets of aluminum or some other firm but light base. After 
the sheets and captions have been mounted in this way the exhibition may be arranged in 
any form desired.” It seems as though the creators of the album knew that recipients 
would want to emphasize a certain right or otherwise create new constellations out of the 
album’s pages to suit their needs. Though universal in aim, the local use value of this 
exhibition was promoted from the outset.44  
Introducing Human Rights 
Despite the knowledge that specific communities might want to emphasize different parts 
of the album, thus expanding its relevance and contemporary qualities, the introductory 
section seems to resist such knowledge. The album’s introduction seems caught between 
a desire to acknowledge that human rights have been taken up differently and will indeed 
look different at different times, while at the same time striving for universal or durable 
outcomes. Technology becomes a stand-in for this durability. Human rights emerge as 
both the result of different kinds and eras of progress and as a transfiguration of their 
benefits that could reach a global audience. As such, and more broadly, the cultural 
constellations of dignity translated into the album’s introduction finds little effect in 
particulars and aims to please as wide a population as possible. Diversity is indeed met 
with generalizations over and over. Though the album attempts to socialize the 
declaration, it does this in aversion to social particularities. 
                                                
43
 See Appendix A for complete list the 14 groupings in the Human Rights Exhibition Album. 
44
 See Lydon (2016) for a discussion of the Human Rights Exhibition Album within the Australian context.  
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In the introduction, photographs of a variety of objects, such as a clay foot, a 
papyrus that depicts the metaphorical weighing of a soul in ancient Egypt, architectural 
details from houses of worship, and people, at work, home, school, and other facets of 
life, come to constitute the way different cultures at different times attempted to “solve” 
the problem of human community. One of the earliest statements in the exhibition 
communicates the scope of the UN’s human rights project: “all races, all civilizations, all 
nations have made their individual and valuable contributions to what is today the sum of 
human rights” (UNESCO 1950, 4).45 While stories particular to a culture, civilization, or 
nation are told, they are always connected to a broader emphasis on global communities, 
using physical and cultural tools as a way to connect them. For instance, the caption for 
the album’s second image (Fig. 21) is especially telling in terms of the connection 
between technology and human rights:  
Earliest Technical Achievements: The humble inventions that helped man to rise 
above the animals were devised at widely scattered points on the earth’s surface. 
The first tools and the first handicrafts were evolved in all parts of the inhabited 
world by unknown craftsmen, nameless pioneers in mankind’s great adventure” 
(UNESCO 1950, 6).  
Here no special attribution is given to any culture, civilization, or nation. No special 
treatment is given to a particular inventor, ruler, or religious figure. No special accolades 
are even given to the names of particular inventions or discoveries. Fire, the wheel, the 
lever, paper, all remain unattributed amidst the global vision being set out by the exhibit. 
The tools that “helped man rise above the animals” are presented in a way that sees them 
as access points to universal inclusion. Decoupled from specific human bodies, these 
tools are filled with imaginary and utopian ideals. Tools that extend across time and 
between cultures effectively tie the ideas presented in the UDHR to physical objects that 
are both durable and transferable. The focus on tools, the materials that endure and are 
physically passed down, and the nameless or generalized sets up a technologically driven 
vision of human rights in a way that mirrors the problems inherent with the UDHR. There 
                                                
45
 Parenthetical page numbers associated with the album correspond those found on the pages and their 
corresponding captions.  
116 
 
is a desire that these tenets be passed down and reappropraited, but alongside of that a 
narrow vision of the limits of inclusion that is signaled by an aversion to individuals and 
particular actions.    
 
Figure 21: Plate 2 from the Human Rights Exhibition Album, 1950, photograph by 
author. Caption: Earliest Technical Achievements: The humble inventions that 
helped man to rise above the animals were devised at widely scattered points on the 
earth’s surface. The first tools and the first handicrafts were evolved in all parts of 
the inhabited world by unknown craftsmen, nameless pioneers in mankind’s great 
adventure. A. Prehistoric tools. B. Coloured drawing of a bison, Altamara (Spain). 
Used with permission by UNESCO. 
Despite the rather broad technological vision, the curatorial function of the 
introduction to the UNESCO Album does do important work in terms of thinking through 
human dignity as emerging through curatorial constellations, and supporting a relational 
theorization of human dignity that neither relies on the valorization of an ideal or 
sensationalized fear mongering based solely of the catastrophes of war so fresh in the 
minds of men. As the introduction surveys global engagements with conscience, ethics or 
the law, audiences are visually shown how human dignity does not have one origin or 
idealized image, but a myriad of points that makes up this postwar constellation. The idea 
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of human dignity here is indeed an “arrangement of concrete elements” (Benjamin 1928, 
34). Importantly, the introduction does not valorize an ideal image or dwell on bodily 
violation in the way that we have come rely on today. Here dignity is again found en 
masse, through a much broader community than Sander’s project (discussed in the last 
chapter). Despite a generalized feeling of progress, a diffuse vision is attempted, echoing 
the sentiment that all races and all civilizations have made important contributions.  
In the introductory section of the Human Rights Exhibition Album, the historically 
and culturally constellated thinking has interesting consequences, as it attempts to 
illustrate how equality and inclusion was diversely conceived. Though “human dignity” 
is not evoked in name within these first pages, the vignettes draw inspiration from what 
scholars now see as disparate “origins” of human dignity. Images from legal, religious, 
and political moments are put together and make a pointed contribution concerning the 
multiple and contested origins of human rights and human dignity. For example, the first 
image from the introduction (Fig. 21), asserts a philosophy of human dignity first 
attributed to Cicero. “The humble inventions that helped man to rise above the animals” 
qualifies our humanness as something we have against other species; dignity is here 
something humans have because they are considered to have rational brains and can 
organize and build accordingly. This idea has recently been taken up by Michael Rosen 
(2011) who explains that setting human dignity against animals is not just about “what 
position some individual or group occupies in relation to other human beings as a 
particular society, but what position human beings as a whole occupy in the order of the 
universe” (Rosen, 12). Another example of “origins” from the introductory section is the 
inclusion of Christian imagery and teachings. Michelangelo’s Moses, The Tympanum of 
St. Peter’s Church, and the Plan of Rome from Tres Riches Heures all come to help 
define the Christian contributions to human dignity. This thread has recently been taken 
up by Samuel Moyn (2015), who positions the rise in the expediency of human rights 
around Christian directives made in the years before the end of the Second World War.  
Indeed, all facets of what today have become singular areas of study with the 
question of human dignity at its core are here represented. Law, philosophy, and culture 
are unmistakably constellated in a way that scholars today have yet to consider. 
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Contributions from diverse nations come to constitute the idea of dignity as more than the 
contributions of individuals and as something that incorporates a wide variety of values 
and beliefs: Phoenician script from Egypt, a bust of Socrates from Greece, a painting 
depicting society built on reciprocity and duty from China, the Magna Carta from the 
United Kingdom, and an engraving from the destruction of the Bastille in France, to 
name a few. This constellation does indeed provide a rich history of human dignity that 
does not subsume cultures under a strict ordering system, but allows their experiences to 
speak to the idea of human dignity, here under scrutiny. To be sure, there is an 
overwhelming bias towards Western cultures and Enlightenment ideals in this 
constellation. However, the approach was novel for its time and instructive for our own. 
Long before anthologies were written staking out the origins of human dignity (Düwell 
2014; McCrudden 2013), the Human Rights Exhibition Album created a curatorial 
constellation of these origins ahead of our time. 
This broad strategy of inclusion within the album runs parallel to how human 
dignity was thought of in relation to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the 
first place. Christopher McCrudden (2008) demonstrates how dignity’s place within the 
UDHR was born out of a process of appeasement. Diverse national interests were 
consolidated in this small but powerful word in order to provide a groundwork for 
perceived and actionable unity. In McCrudden’s estimation “dignity was included in that 
part of any discussion or text where the absence of a theory of human rights would have 
been embarrassing. Its utility was to enable those participating in the debate to insert their 
own theory. Everyone could agree that human dignity was central, but not why or how” 
(2008, 678). While calling dignity a placeholder in the UDHR might go too far, it is clear 
that its purpose was in response to multiple histories and uses. It was at the time 
constellated throughout a myriad of laws, philosophies, and cultures, which all upheld its 
value, but could not agree on its definition. Indeed, the drafting of the UDHR is really a 
remarkable and instructive moment that demonstrates how an idea was concretely 
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contested on a transnational scale.46 Today, while it might seem infuriating that dignity 
was never concretely defined by the declaration’s drafters, its untethered state is a 
testament to the constellated relations that made up this organization. Mirroring the 
importance of the declarative form, which was used so that the ideas would be taken up 
and utilized by subsequent generations, dignity in the UDHR was similarly constellated, a 
technique applicable to both biological and artificial histories.  
The historical diversity of the introduction begins to crack open the technological 
language of the UDHR to questions of culture and biology. Despite the attempt to focus 
on the technological aspects of human rights – the nameless, the generalized, and the 
tools – the curatorial strategy, which delves into history, sits in tension with this desire. 
To that end, the introductory section of the Human Rights Exhibition Album demonstrates 
an important, if not optimistic and progressive view of how human rights and human 
dignity evolved from disparate cultures. Dignity is not formed through an idealized 
vision, but gestured toward through the curatorial strategy as evolving and open to 
change. Through the album, dignity becomes something “that is both timeless, in the 
sense that it embodies basic values that are not subject to change, and adaptable to 
changing ideas of what being human involves” (McCrudden, 677). What it means to be 
part of the human family is here held in relation to the technologies of the past, the 
promise of the UDHR, and the particularities of diverse constituents. Wedged between 
the imagined infrastructures of a new human rights era, and the accumulation of past 
events, the album demonstrates dignity’s history in a different light, and shows itself to 
supply a “unique experience of the past” (Benjamin 1940, 262). While flawed, the 
introduction properly begins to unravel the technological conceits of a universal human 
rights project, and instead puts its tenets in relation to broader suites of cultural actions.   
                                                
46
 For a further example of the transnational and transcultural contestations that gave rise to the UDHR, see 
Glendon (2001) and Goodale’s (2018) respective discussions of the UNESCO Philosophical Committee 
and the 1947-48 human rights survey.  
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The Album as Constellation 
Just as it was helpful to examine the curatorial logics behind the atlas, as a way of reading 
Sander’s People of the Twentieth Century, it is similarly important to examine the Human 
Rights Exhibition Album in terms of its overarching scheme. In this section, I examine the 
form of the album as a way to further these observations, in particular, by focusing on a 
specific type of curatorial constellation that can help us to understand later visual projects 
that connect human dignity with culture, media, and the body. Of course, just as Sander’s 
People of the Twentieth Century was not a typical atlas, the Human Rights Exhibition 
Album was not a typical album. Coupled with its large scale and intended use as an 
exhibition, what sets this album apart is its departure from traditional family bonds on the 
one hand, and typical museological categories of style, aesthetics, and periodization on 
the other, as it prioritizes the theme or idea of human rights as its central organizing 
force. 
 The Human Rights Exhibition Album presents one of the most explicit venues 
where the relational aspects of human dignity are found in both a literal and transfigured 
sense. The form, as album, helped to communicate a more intimate and familiar 
understanding of human rights. Albums were and continue to be things that people would 
feel comfortable with, and this choice of form speaks more broadly to the reach that was 
desired and the audience that was anticipated. More generally, the album sits at the 
border of many threads of knowledge: as the public face of our private lives, as the 
familiar or everyday meets milestones and grand events, and as a recognition of the past 
(of memories) meet our dreams or desires for belonging. The album is not a simple site of 
preservation, but rather offers a complex set of relations between the people within the 
album and the diverse demands of temporality, expectation, and curation.  
 Using the form of the album to communicate the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights links the desire for close familial connections with the transnational force of a 
large intergovernmental agency such as UN. As Marianne Hirsch (1997) has argued, “if 
one instrument helped construct and perpetuate the ideology which links the notion of 
universal humanity to the idea of familiality, it is the camera and its by-products, the 
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photographic image and the family album” (48). Together the photographic image and 
the family album were key to the development of the Human Rights Exhibition Album, 
and helped to make the big ideas contained within the UDHR feel familiar to the masses. 
In many ways, the album turns on a desire for what Marianne Hirsch calls the “familial 
gaze”:  
The familial look, then, is not the look of a subject looking at an object, but a 
mutual look of a subject looking at an object who is looking (back) at an object. 
Within the family, as I look I am always also looked at, seen, scrutinized, 
surveyed, monitored. Familial subjectivity is constructed relationally, and in these 
relations I am always both self and other(ed). (9) 
The Human Rights Exhibition Album attempted to create family bonds; it aspired to 
create a sense of family within an aestheticized and historical field.  Though the Human 
Rights Exhibition Album did not rely on photographs in the same way as typical family 
albums, the sense that “subjectivity is constructed relationally” is similarly generated. 
The subject looking at the album’s pages is meant to both be a subject looking and a 
subject being looked at, and in this way, feel connected to people and cultures that might 
otherwise have felt distant. As a tool meant to construct relationality, the album, and 
specifically the Human Rights Exhibition Album plays on this form within the global 
context. If human dignity was something available to all, the family album was one way 
to make this inherent quality known and felt within a global sphere. As it directs its 
viewers to both see the objects within as subjects, and themselves be understood as “seen, 
scrutinized, surveyed, monitored”, it trades on a material form of empathic relations 
without relying on an aesthetics of indignity founded on bodily violation so familiar in 
subsequent memorial museums and human rights appeals.  
What makes this album unique, beyond the appeal to a universal human family, is 
its use of artefacts once considered to be “at home” in universal survey museums. Unlike 
universal survey museums, such as the Louvre, which relied on original artworks or 
professional copies, the album was freed from this realm of authenticity in compelling 
ways in terms of our understanding of human dignity and its curatorial forms. The 
creation of this album depended upon photographic reproductions of various artefacts and 
art that had before this never been grouped together to make an explicit argument about 
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the “human family.” In turn, this new argumentative model opened up what it might 
mean to compare histories and cultures under such an expansive umbrella. Binding 
questions of universality, family, and cultural history, the album is an explicit example of 
a shift from exhibitions that focused on style, period, or categorization to that of ideas, of 
human rights and human dignity. Whereas family albums had contained a real sense of 
immediacy in regard to who and what was contained within them, the Human Rights 
Exhibition Album shifted the genre. Here the focus is not on individual lifespans or 
family genealogy, but on eras, epochs, and civilizations. 
The Human Rights Exhibition Album thus enlivens Andre Malraux’s (1947) 
notion of “the museum without walls” in compelling and problematic ways. The museum 
without walls came about by way of the explosion in photographic reproduction. In his 
now famous exploration in the Psychology of Art, Malraux explores how photography 
came to affect both the museum and the use of art. The transformation of portraits, 
sculptures, etchings, and so-on into sets of photographs produced a monumental shift in 
their meaning. As we saw, for Aby Warburg, amassing photographs of great works and 
playing with their arrangement allowed him to create new connections between large 
swaths of art history and human emotion. Though Malraux was not all in favour of this 
new era, he did make a crucial contribution regarding the universal and relational effect 
of reproduction itself.47 Malraux takes note:  
Alongside the museum a new field of art experience, vaster than any so far 
known…is now, thanks to reproduction, being opened up. And this new domain – 
which is growing more and more intellectualized as our stock-taking and its 
diffusion proceeds and methods of reproduction come nearer to fidelity – is for 
the first time the common heritage of all mankind. (1947, 46)  
While we should be wary about any claim made to a “common heritage of all mankind,” 
Malraux’s observation about a new field of experience opened up by photography is 
important. Not only did this new domain effect the field of art history, which was once 
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 Malraux was critical of how photographs of famous artworks altered their scale or diluted their colours, 
thus claiming that the type of comparison photographs of art produced were indeed “fictitious” (1947, 24).  
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situated closer to museums themselves than academia, but it also made the products 
housed in museums open to a much broader range of interpretations.  
The Human Rights Exhibition Album used this development in photography to 
great effect. As the album brings together different cultures, histories, and geographies 
through the medium of photography and the curatorial strategy we see how a belief in 
“the common heritage of all mankind” was both fundamental to the UDHR’s new 
formulation and communication of human rights, and at the same time how limited its 
universal language was. What was “common” was indeed limited to artefacts from five 
countries, with institutions like the Louvre, providing many of the exhibit’s originals. 
Undoubtedly, the Louvre itself has a troubled history with art and artefacts plundered 
from around the globe, and its contributions should not be taken as value neutral (Freier 
2017). Though the curators were interested in expanding inclusion to a global audience 
through images and artefacts that were not Western in and of themselves, its reliance on 
universal survey museums, as archives to its endeavor, undermines its global appeal and 
exemplifies its limited scope.  
Contending with Cultural Difference 
In the last chapter, August Sander’s People of the Twentieth Century exposed how 
the idea of a people might be read within the frame of an atlas, between the finite and the 
infinite and more generally between photography and curation. Sander’s projects also 
began to expose how taxonomic difference should not be read as an anathema to the idea 
of human dignity. Within the Human Rights Exhibition Album, the idea of the people is 
transfigured to the level of culture and histories, and the issue of taxonomic difference is 
expanded to the realm of cultural difference more broadly. Here we can begin to ask: 
what does it mean to visualize human dignity across eras? Is it responsible to compare the 
struggles or methods of ancients with those African Americans in the abolitionist era or 
the labour movement? Does the album equivocate cultures or injustice that is itself an 
anathema to human dignity as a property made in relation – across borders, cultures, and 
kin?  
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 It is only recently that the Human Rights Exhibition Album has received critical 
attention, thanks in large part to the Human Rights Exhibition Project hosted at Columbia 
University.48 One of the most vocal reviewers of the Human Rights Exhibition Album, 
Tom Allbeson (2015), has taken to comparing it to Edward Steichen’s blockbuster 
exhibit, The Family of Man, which was unveiled at the Museum of Modern Art (New 
York) in 1955. Here a short detour into Steichen’s The Family of Man exhibit, which 
shares both temporal and thematic alliances with the Human Rights Exhibition Album, 
should prove to be helpful. Comparing these two exhibits situates the Album in a larger 
arena of analysis concerning images, reproductions, and curatorial constellations.  
Unlike the Human Rights Exhibition Album, the Family of Man exhibit was a true 
blockbuster, travelling around the world from 1955-1962 and seen by many millions of 
people. It has been heralded for its position at the forefront of photographic exhibitions 
and analyzed for its role in creating a humanistic lens during the Cold War period (Garb 
2014; Sandeen 1995; Sekula 1981; Turner 2012). Like the Human Rights Exhibition 
Album, Steichen curated The Family of Man around common facets of the human 
condition – birth, play, labour, love, family, and death – categories that served human 
commonalities, rather than differences. Stylistic and aesthetic concerns took a back seat 
to humanistic themes, which was in itself a departure for a museum of modern art. 
(Turner 2012). Importantly, both exhibits began a process of blending thematic and 
aesthetic interests, an intersection that academics are still working through today. 
Museums, which were until this time thought to align with artistic, historic, or 
ethnographic schools of thought were beginning to give way to broader and more 
interdisciplinary questions about the state of the human.  
Though innovative in its curatorial techniques, The Family of Man was famously 
and vehemently criticized by Roland Barthes (1957) for the way it dared to compare 
different cultures. Barthes saw only similarity and unity in the exhibit’s images, such as 
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 For more on this project visit: http://www.exhibithumanrights.org/. 
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the oft-compared photographs of an American family and an African family (Fig. 22).49 
In response to the question of what this kind of comparison could tell us about the 
human, Barthes saw a vision that was indeed durable and transferable, a technologized 
view of human difference: “keeping only the similarity in behavior, the unity of a species 
is here amply moralized and sentimentalized. We are at the outset directed to this 
ambiguous myth of the human ‘community’, which serves as an alibi to a large part of 
our humanism” (1957, 100). Barthes claimed that unity – in families, love, child birth – 
derives from pluralities and diversities, whose ultimate similarities point towards 
something as deceptive as the idea of human nature. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Installation view of The Family of Man, 1955, unknown photographer. 
Allow me to linger on Barthes reading of The Family of Man for a moment. We 
should, indeed, be skeptical of any representation that naturalizes humanity, divorcing it 
from history. As Hannah Arendt aptly noted, “when the Rights of Man were proclaimed 
for the first time they were thought to be independent of history and of the privileges that 
history had bestowed upon certain strata of society” (1949, 34-5). There had to be a sort 
of historical forgetting about the relationship between human dignity, as a value reserved 
for some high-ranking people, in order for the larger project of human rights founded on 
                                                
49
 Comparisons between the American family (large photo on the left) and the African Family (largest 
photo on the right) have been used by multiple scholars to analyze the exhibits portrayal of universalism, 
family, and nature (Barthes 1957; Hirsch 1997; Azoulay 2013).  
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this distinctly human value to proceed; history and tradition had to give way to a new 
constellation of relations. However,  
This new dignity was of a perplexing nature. It replaced historical rights with 
natural rights; it put ‘nature’ in the place of history, and it assumed tacitly that 
nature was less alien to the essence of man than history. The very terminology of 
the Declaration of Independence as well as of the Rights of Man – ‘inalienable,’ 
‘given with birth,’ ‘self-evident truths’- implies that man’s nature which 
supposedly developed under the same necessity that compels a child to grow up, 
was the premise from which his laws and rights were to be deduced. (Arendt 
1949, 35).  
In this light, Barthes’ concerns about the naturalization of the human family, and 
subsequently human dignity, was not merely a concern of visual communication. Barthes 
assertion that The Family of Man suppresses the “determining weight of history,” which 
in turn holds spectators “back at the surface of an identity” was indeed a problem of 
declarations aimed toward universality more generally. For Barthes, the visual genre 
promoted a false sense of unity and stability, without truly grappling with the realities of 
injustice or inequality. Photographic mediation left him unsatisfied that audience 
members could gather anything beyond their surface values. For Arendt, the apparatus’ of 
human rights—laws, declarations, treaties—were similarly inert and divorced from the 
weight of history. The trajectory of history, in which “man’s mastery of nature would 
reach a point where he could conceive of a possible destruction of the earth through man-
made instruments” put the idea of natural law into question. (Arendt 1949, 35).   
 By turning attention towards the Human Rights Exhibition Album, I am not 
advocating for a reliance on what may be perceived as a naturalization of human dignity. 
Indeed, I see the Album as necessarily expanding the UDHR’s ahistorical qualities. 
Allbeson (2015) has relied on Barthes and Malraux to make his own critique of the 
Album:  
In decontextualizing cultural artefacts and placing them in a relation of 
equivalence with one another, the museum without walls created by the exhibition 
album does not respect diverse cultures or accommodate difference. UNESCO’s 
instrumentalization of cultural artefacts in the visualization of a world culture 
rather imposes the divorce of culture from its bases in individual experience, 
suggesting particular fixed cultural identities as represented by the material on 
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display. Synthesizing diverse artefacts and ways of life into a unified visual 
narrative of civilization’s progress thus effectively denies both meaningful 
differences between communities and any change within them, in favour of the 
universal ideal. (2015, 399-400)  
There is a lot to unpack here: the charge of reification and equivalence, the lack of 
respect for diversity and difference, instrumentalization, the accusation of fixing cultural 
identities, and creating a universal ideal. Rather than seeing the rise of reproduction, and 
its use in the album as an opportunity to think through how the human family might be 
differently imagined and exhibited within a frame of media, there has been a distinctly 
negative appraisal of projects like the Human Rights Exhibition Album, as it concerns its 
construction of a visual constellation. For Allbeson, even though there is a distinctly 
historical component to the Album, he claims that artefacts and images brought together 
merely flatten “the contradictions and conflicts of the past under the image of a shared 
heritage for an imagined global community” (2015, 394).  
 However, this critique glosses over two important distinctions between the 
Human Rights Exhibition Album and The Family of Man that should be considered. 
Unlike The Family of Man, which did not attach dates to its photographs and in turn 
promoted the idea of stability or synchrony over time (Hirsch 1997, 57), the Human 
Rights Exhibition Album made no attempt to conceal its temporal or historical markers. 
Dates are included on each of the captions, and the variety of objects, from carvings, to 
paintings, to photographs, gives a sense of historical depth that The Family of Man does 
not have. History and time are not flattened, but rather expanded through the layering of 
diverse media photographed in the exhibition. Further, the images in the Human Rights 
Exhibition Album were nothing if not tied to the idea of justice, even if it was a fairly 
optimistic version. True, the album does not grapple with injustice or inequality in a 
particular or robust way. However, the point of the album was not to act as a 
compendium of inequalities or as a primer on cultural difference. Focusing on the content 
of such exhibits, on what is included or excluded, does tell us a lot about the limits of 
universal inclusion and cultural value. Taking stock of which narratives are told is an 
exercise in comprehending cultural power relations and mapping memory practices. 
However, this kind of exercise tends to peer beyond the media structures themselves, and 
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the subsequent narrative limits they invoke. Examining these structures expands what the 
“visual communication” of human rights can mean. Barthes,’ and subsequently 
Allbeson’s, general wariness that exhibitions can do productive work in terms of 
communicating humanistic principles meaningfully stems from an almost exclusive focus 
on symbols, and a desire that the complexities of other historical forms be faithfully 
upheld in curation’s depth.  
 Thus, visual and curatorial depictions of human rights are often looked at as less 
rigorous than other forms for the way they approach history, for what they include, and 
ultimately what they leave out. Importantly, these critiques leave us back where we 
started. Focusing on the content of these images does do important work as it concerns 
assessments of equality or actual overcoming of colonialism, imperialism, racism, or 
gender discrimination, what will in the next chapter be discussed in relation to 
“representational justice” (Lewis 2016, 11). However, I contend that this is not the only 
way to assess these early visual contributions that aesthetically thematize the human 
family. Shifting attention from the content of these images to the media of curation and 
mode of mass dissemination is necessary if we are to think of the constitutive capacity of 
curation, as a set of tools that can help to imagine human dignity otherwise. Examining 
the Human Rights Exhibition Album on the terms of curation, as a model that brings 
diverse forms into proximity with each other, is imperative in order to more fully 
examine what new kinds of knowledge the album generates.  
Indeed, the concept of human dignity benefits from the form of the album for a 
number of reasons. Unlike Allbeson and Barthes before him, I see the familial and 
relational function of the album as crucial to the continuing relevancy of human rights 
and human dignity outside of the law. Coupled with the reproductive capacities of 
photography, for the “first time the common heritage of all mankind,” human dignity was 
given a form that defied a false sense of naturalization. Of course, we should not be 
blinded by an unrealistic sense of unity or progression, but the gathering of diverse 
cultural artefacts under the frame of human rights was a key development to human 
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dignity’s visual communication, and how it has entered the sphere of museums so 
forcefully in the last ten years. 50 
Three basic points support the connection between human dignity as an idea and 
the album as an organizing force. First, the photographic album allows a collection of 
objects without their removal from source communities, which is key to the continuing 
entanglement of museums and human dignity (Freier, 2017). While this might not have 
been the prerogative of the Human Rights Exhibition Album itself, we can and should see 
the album as subverting norms of collection and exhibition that rest upon imperial and 
colonial plunder. Second, the photographic album allows a scale of comparison 
unavailable in traditional museums stemming from prohibitive economic factors. And 
finally, the album allows different frames of inclusion and categorization to prevail, both 
along the lines of human connection and along the lines of legal protection. August 
Sander’s projects enlivened questions around taxonomy and human dignity, and the 
Human Rights Exhibition Album again defines new territory connecting people through 
systems of rights rather than morally or nationally charged values. Human dignity must 
also exist alongside these three systemic points, as a property and practice of relation that 
does act upon forced removal or assimilation, as an idea in constant negotiation with the 
scale of our international system, and which is open to new frames of inclusion and 
categorization.  
 The form of the Human Rights Exhibition Album mirrors the initial consideration 
of human dignity in the UDHR in a much more transparent way. Just as the declaration 
worked from diverse cultures and disparate histories to create a useable language, the 
photographic album similarly presents us with works from slave ship’s log to a 
photograph of Japanese women working in a chemistry lab to demonstrate its cultural 
                                                
50 Currently, the question of a “common heritage of all mankind” is reaching a different level of cultural 
and political significance in relation to the visual communication of human dignity. As museums make 
their collections digitally available to the internet connected public, and as giant corporations such as 
Google invent algorithms that sort and divide art and people by new taxonomies, the question of how we 
can apprehend human dignity through these institutions and platforms becomes more urgent. 
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diversity. Importantly, rather than cultural difference being encompassed into a word or 
declaration, the visual constellation of the Album exposes the neat unity of the UDHR’s 
declarative language. Dignity is dispersed across specific actions around the world and 
throughout history. As an album that is not just about a family, but rather a large and 
growing aestheticized human family, the Human Rights Exhibition Album is a testament 
to what human dignity looked and felt like at the time, not a monumental law or stable or 
entity. In this way, the album is a prime example of what Laura Wexler has termed the 
“state of the album” (2017, 100):  
If ‘the state’ is a place, a condition, and an administrative construct, ‘the state of 
the album’ is all of the above. It refers both to a material object or place – a book-
like thing or, more metaphorically, something like a box or a drawer or a wallet, 
where pictures are stored – as well as to the kind of order that results from the 
way that pictures are thereby disposed…I am proposing to add the family 
photograph album to these other archives as an index of accountability. The very 
coming-into-being- of family photographs depends upon and is secured by the 
optics of governmentality. When you are seeing the family album, you are ‘seeing 
like a state’...it is governments that determine not only what social and biological 
forms will be recognized in the legal regime as a family, but also which members 
of said family forms will be able to be available to be photographed as such in the 
first place, and in what ways they may or not become visible. (Wexler 2017, 100)  
Wexler’s understanding of the family album as an optic of governmentality provides a 
useful frame for grasping the Human Rights Exhibition Album, as it allows us to see that 
the album is not only a cultural representation of the UDHR, but an important indicator of 
the ways that laws, declarations or other state/institutional mandates may or may not 
become visible. Most notably, albums “reflect back a usable image of the law” (Wexler 
2017, 100). In this conceptual move, my initial discussion of the UDHR as a generative 
instrument, and human dignity as a cultural technique becomes palpable. If we are to 
think of human dignity within the UDHR as more than a monument to be venerated from 
a distance or a staid and durable technology, the album is one place where we can see it 
become a living document with real impact in terms of the way it requires visibility to be 
effective. If the declarative form of the UDHR was employed in order for it to be more 
widely used and appropriated as a cultural technique, the album is but one overtly 
cultural example. Here human dignity is given distinct forms, forms which do not solely 
rely on an aesthetics of indignity as a means of communicating its merits. Further, human 
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dignity is again made in relation, from the locus of the family to the level of “all races, all 
nations.” Cultures and histories meet in a way that pushes the boundaries of an idealized, 
or wholly autonomous conceit, and instead begins to imagine how the declaration might 
be mobilized. Again, its limited vision of inclusion can be critiqued from our vantage 
point over half a century later, but its attempt to map these relations in a concrete way is, 
from the lens of curation and media fascinating, and something to draw from. The album 
made the declaration accessible in a way the UDHR’s formal institutional platforms 
failed to do, and this is indeed a step in the right direction.  
 
Figure 23: Plate 43 from the Human Rights Exhibition Album, 1950, photograph by 
author. Image descriptions (clockwise from top left): A. Interior of the Bastille. B. 
Reading room in Sudbury Prison. C. Prisoners working in the model penitentiary at 
Imrali. D. Prisoner in cells. Used with permission of UNESCO. 
As one example, the album’s 43rd page is particularly illustrative of the relational 
aspects of human dignity that are bound to the curatorial constellation (Fig. 23). This 
mosaic shows four scenes of historical and representational diversity that align with the 
“abolition of inhuman practices,” effectively illustrating and extending the UDHR’s 
articles regarding the quality of treatment before the law and humane conduct. From top 
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left clockwise the images portray: a sketched interior of the Bastille dating from the 18th 
Century, a photograph of prisoners working in a “model penitentiary” in Turkey, a 
photograph of a reading room in a UK prison, and an 18th century engraving of a prisoner 
in a cell by Jan Luyken, who was known for his realist depictions of torture. This 
diversity of images compliments the plate’s caption alluding to the connection between 
punishment and education on the one hand, and education and crime on the other: “there 
has been widespread penal reform. The aim is now not merely to punish the criminal, but 
also to reform and educate him. At the same time, it is being increasingly realized that to 
open a school is to close down a prison” (UNESCO 1950, 43). While this last statement 
might seem premature for the time (especially given the subsequent rise of the prison 
industrial complex over the latter half of the 20th century), there is a way in which this 
grouping demonstrates how the frames of inclusion were being expanded in the area of 
legal punishment. It also provides a starting point for thinking about other frames of 
inclusion. The abolition of inhumane practices was not only waged against those deemed 
worthy in front of the law for impeccable behavior, but to those similarly caught up in 
this system for behavior that did not reflect an ideal image. While the transition from past 
to present, signaled by the transition from etchings to photographs, does promote a 
progressive and optimistic outlook, it also reflects back a usable image of the declaration, 
not only in that “all humans are born free and equal in dignity and rights” but also in 
terms of Articles 6-9 of the UDHR regarding torture, recognition before the law, fair 
trails, and arbitrary arrest. There is undoubtedly a critique to be made of this grouping, 
and others in the album, which obfuscate ongoing acts of torture, discrimination, or other 
violations. And, in many ways, the valorization of progress might be seen as a 
continuation of idealization or personal ownership.  
However, like the UDHR, the Human Rights Exhibition Album should not be 
thought of as the final word or the only representation of the declaration, but merely as 
the first official attempt at reflecting back a usable image of the law. Like the family unit, 
the human family should not be thought of as something stable and unchanging. Family 
albums usually present us with a specific period of a family’s life; similarly, the Human 
Rights Exhibition Album presents us with one period or moment of human dignity’s 
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lifespan. The Human Rights Exhibition Album presents a compelling venue from which 
another constellation of dignity makes itself visible and wherein curation aids in our 
understanding of dignity’s then contemporary use.  
As a reflection of its time, wedged against the end of World War II and the 
beginning of Cold War, the album projected what seems like a naïve hope to us today, 
but which was indeed novel for its time. The conscientious opening up of the ideas of 
human dignity and human rights to different cultures and histories, whether in name or in 
visual inclusion demanded that these categories become something thought of in relation, 
as open to changing ideas of what being human involves in both rational and materialist 
terms. UNESCO saw the purpose of the exhibition as “not simply to present historic 
documentary evidence on the progressive recognition of human rights in different 
countries. Primarily, it aims to show the debt that mankind today owes to the fighters for 
freedom of the past and that the task they began will only be complete when the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights has been converted into fact” (UNESCO Courier 
1949, 5). In this way, the exhibit is thus meant to visualize an ongoing project, not an 
exaltation of a completed one.  
Conclusion 
In practical terms, we can easily reimagine the ways the Album’s constellations might be 
updated to reflect back a useable image of human dignity for our time. The Human Rights 
Exhibition Album opened up the monumental functions of the UDHR, effectively 
visualizing different junctures between cultures and histories. When we imagine or make 
these curatorial arrangements anew, we engage in a process that sees human dignity as 
enduring, but not representationally durable. The technological conceit of this new era of 
human rights has the possibility of being undone again and again when put into 
conversation with curatorial practices that draw out the visual manifestations of this 
being-together into an accessible and relational constellation. Diverting focus from the 
content of the images to the mechanics of their arrangement provides another venue from 
which to engage with these exhibits, while not miring us in their historical shortcomings.  
Despite the fact that human dignity’s move into the UDHR has largely been 
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signaled as a turn towards a homogenous and durable sense of its importance, the 
historical and material realities that make up the album’s constellation work to undermine 
this vision, as it communicates ongoing differences and historical weight. Curation not 
only connects cultures “bringing their elements into proximity with each other”, but it 
also performs a sort of “pollination of culture or a form of map making that opens new 
routes through a city, a people, or a world” (Obrist 2014, 1). The concept of dignity 
should similarly be seen under this framework, as a concept that does not hive off 
cultures or sets itself aside as a technologically durable concept, but as a concept that can 
open up new routes through a city, people, or a world. The idealized form of human 
dignity founded in the UDHR is here tested against a material world. Though this was by 
no means a comprehensive test (i.e.: there were many pressing issues not included in the 
album that would have tested the idea of human dignity even further), it is instructive in 
its own right.  The Human Rights Exhibition Album reflects back a usable image of this 
declaration. Though flawed, and dated, we should take its attempt to demonstrate these 
visual routes and roots seriously, rather than condemn them for not living up to the 
standards of other historical genres or our own historical vantage point.  
Writing about The Family of Man, Barthes vehemently argued, 
To reproduce death or birth tells us, literally, nothing. For the natural facts to gain 
access to a true language they must be inserted into a category of knowledge 
which means postulating that one can transform them, and precisely subject their 
naturalness to our human criticism. For however, universal, they are the signs of 
an ahistorical writing. (1957, 101)  
Similarly, writing about the Human Rights Exhibition Album in 2014, Bregengaard and 
Prag assert that “when different emancipatory movements are stripped from their 
historical context and visualized through the lens of human rights, the political 
contestations they represent are occluded” (np). True, we are in most instances not given 
the specifics of certain historical moments and are not familiarized with the political 
contestations they come from. However, to say that these images are not already part of a 
“category of knowledge” is to dismiss the argumentative function of the curatorial 
constellation writ large, and the album specifically. Under the guise of the curatorial 
constellation we are given a different type of information, information that not only 
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speaks to the complex relations that make up an idea but also information that allows 
these different elements to touch in compelling ways. The relational narrative it draws 
between legal, philosophical, and cultural histories is indeed part of a genre of historical 
writing, made legible through Benjamin’s constellated thinking and dramatically revealed 
in this curatorial exercise. Both exhibits fashion a vision of the world that is distinctly 
positive and inclusive despite the recent horrors of World War II and the then present 
conditions of the Cold War.  
The use of images from disparate cultures and histories provides a necessary place 
to think about how to go forward with the idea of human dignity. Reconciling the fact 
that both the positive and negative visualizations of human dignity will indeed appear 
different across cultures and in concert with new technologies does not amount to 
relativism, but rather an acknowledgement of dignity’s mediated qualities. If the 
movement of human dignity into the UDHR signals its instrumentalization, then the 
movement of human dignity into this curated album pushes back. The album 
demonstrates how uniformity or universalism is without an ideal home in the embodied 
and visual field of lived experience. Though flawed this translation again begins to reveal 
the assumptions about uniformity and cultural comparison that have been made about 
human dignity and its embodied experience. The struggle to reconcile the album’s 
omissions and equations is in itself revealing of the way human dignity sits in tension 
between universal inclusion and the specificities of historical events. The Human Rights 
Exhibition Album was a imperfect exercise, but it be instructive in terms of uncovering 
how human dignity was thought of and situated as a constellated idea.  
In the album, the 1939 World’s Fair Mantra – interdependence or catastrophe – is 
found over and over again within the grouping of images that cross nations and bridge 
cultures. Within one of the album’s captions the evocation of interdependence is clear in 
terms of media and communication: “the increasing speed, regularity, and safety of 
communications and trade forged ever closer links between all the countries of the 
world…the prosperity of each is now largely dependent on upon the well-being of the 
rest.”. The album does not dramatically upend our presumptions about the world as it 
poses interdependence through human rights, but it does gently force us back on issues of 
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what artificial frameworks bind us together. Human rights is importantly one of these 
artificial frameworks, and the album a forceful tool to communicate its nascent set of 
post-war relations. Whereas Sander was fascinated with the “characteristic movements” 
of social subjects, movement in this album is often tied to specific tools rather than 
specific people. The tool comes to act as a metaphor for how the UN envisioned its 
declaration to be used, as a tool that could be picked up and implemented globally. In this 
way, progress without regret, is tangible. However, the dispersal of the UN’s ideas within 
this project begin to poke holes in this narrative. Just as the form of the atlas began to 
show slippages in the social masks Sander’s subjects wore, the album works to disrupt 
the tidy narrative of progress imagined by the UDHR by simply connecting its ideas to a 
broad range of people, cultures, and histories of the world. Examining how a “common 
heritage of all mankind” or the “myth of human community” is constructed need not only 
focus on or produce analytical language that calls out differences and injustices expressed 
in the visual arena. The mediated aspects of the constellation help to make tangible sites 
where dignity might be contested and imagined differently. 
 The album ought not to be replicated, but we should think about how its various 
parts might be updated and hopefully continually updated, so as to chart the various 
periods and struggles that confront it. What might this album look like today? What 
might the inclusion of other historical moments, artefacts, and philosophies do to this 
constellation? What might the album look like if created by different constellations of 
nations, artists, institutions, and non-profits? Here, the possibilities are endless, but might 
better serve a theory of human dignity that is not just looking for the next ideal figure or 
disaster to prop up its iconography. Finding the points of tension between these two poles 
is indeed important, and work that needs to be continually engaged with.  
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4 Dignity’s New Normativity: Ghost Stories for Adults in 
The Canadian Museum for Human Rights 
 
 Dominant forms of representation can 
and must be disrupted for something 
about the precariousness of life to be 
apprehended. 
—Judith Butler, Precarious Life 
At the beginning of this dissertation I asserted that I see promise within conversations 
around curatorial constellations as a means of visually communicating human dignity, 
within a series of sites that do not trade on an aesthetics of indignity as a way to come to 
its defense. In large part, this conviction stems from participation in and critical 
awareness of the conversations that were happening in relation to the building of the 
Canadian Museum for Human Rights (CMHR), which began taking shape at the meeting 
point of the Red and Assiniboine Rivers in Winnipeg around 2008. Throughout the 
construction and planning of the museum and its galleries there was a hope that this 
museum would be different both from other national museums in Canada and from other 
memorial museums throughout the world. Now, it only seems fitting that a museum that 
sparked my interest in the field of curation and human rights becomes the object of this 
final chapter. Here, I turn my attention towards the CMHR both as a means of connecting 
earlier projects to the contemporary moment and as a means of demonstrating how a 
relational theorization of human dignity might be put to critical use. 
 To be sure, the Canadian Museum for Human Rights never outwardly set out to 
communicate human dignity in itself. What human dignity was or how it might work 
within the museum never entered public debate in name, likely due to its conceptual 
abstraction. However, even though the language of human dignity was never overtly in 
play, questions of inherent human value and what it might mean to shift away from an 
aesthetics of indignity were ever present within the CMHR’s public relations 
communication leading up to its opening.  
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Rather than proceed from the entrenched frames of memory and identity that have 
already played a role in the analysis of the CMHR, this chapter instead questions how the 
CMHR develops connections between an inherent quality such as human dignity and 
outer appearances, both through its early communication strategies, and as it came to 
visualize and materialize human rights within its galleries While I’m sensitive to the role 
that memorial and human rights museums can play in recognizing past abuses and 
playing active roles in processes of justice which have been expressly articulated in 
recent years (Barrett 2015; Carter 2013; Carter and Orange 2012; Failler, Ives, Milne 
2015; Lehrer 2015; Opotow 2015; Orange 2016; Orange and Carter 2012a & 2012b; 
Purbrick 2011), these lines of inquiry often meet the aesthetics of indignity at face value, 
as they work through how representations of injustice come to raise awareness of and 
defend justice. 
A relational reading of the CMHR demonstrates how this institution handled 
cultural difference, how it attempted to stake out positive taxonomies, and is ultimately 
illustrative of contemporary tensions at stake in the idea of human dignity. Understanding 
how the museum makes visible particular histories and context from which these 
relations arise is imperative, both in terms of a space that pushes back against a memorial 
framework, as it tests its political limitations, and as it grapples with crafting a narrative 
untethered from an aesthetics of indignity. I aim to demonstrate how a focus on human 
dignity as relational is imperative if human rights museums are to be effective in moving 
meaningfully beyond discourses of violation or injustices.  
The curatorial constellations found in the CMHR raise important points regarding 
the positive articulation of human dignity. However, the constellation present in the 
CMHR’s first gallery, which will be the focus of this chapter, largely transforms notions 
of status, once reserved for members of monarchy or parliament to the members of its 
historical timeline, effectively sending the message that a dignified body looks a certain 
way. Visually, the first gallery also positions dignity outside of struggle, and as a product 
of one’s individuality and inviolability. In this respect, the CMHR provides another 
venue from which to interrogate how and why curatorial constellations are integral to 
apprehending the visual communication of human dignity, as they blend ideological and 
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material concerns. While I cannot address the entire museum in this chapter due to its 
immense scale, my aim is to demonstrate how the CMHR used media and curation to a 
politically ambiguous end. As the museum attempts to move beyond an aesthetics that 
relies on images of indignity to communicate human rights, it struggles to reconcile what 
new relationships might be made beyond a politics of comparative oppression or 
inclusion. As a system of visual communication, the museum relies upon strategies of 
multivocality and remarkably constellates human dignity between law, philosophy, and 
culture. However, the constellations the CMHR enacts struggle to fulsomely ally cultures 
and histories, and fails to reconcile the fact that multivocality does not spark a more 
complex understanding of human rights. The museum’s lack of confrontation with these 
problem is especially troubling given the subtext of settler-colonial relations and our 
contemporary moment of understanding human dignity in Canada. The CMHR conveys 
that individuals provide an aesthetic answer to the foundational problems of an aesthetics 
of indignity, but in so doing raises questions as to the roles communities and kin play in 
human dignity’s contemporary procession.  
Taking the Long View: Constructing the CMHR 
Whereas UNESCO’s Human Rights Album was conceived and delivered to audiences 
across the globe within two years of the signing of the UDHR, the Canadian Museum for 
Human Rights has a long and well-documented history that spans from the 1990s to its 
official opening in 2014. Most notably, the history of the CMHR’s construction in 
Winnipeg was propelled by contentious debates around public recognition of past 
injustices, including those committed by the Canadian state. In this section, I provide a 
glimpse into the history of the CMHR’s development, and pay particular attention to how 
the politics of representation intersected with competing notions of space and justice and 
normative, negative, and emancipated notions of human dignity. This history sets up the 
remainder of the chapter, which examines how a theorization of human dignity as a 
relational property might be used to critically examine the somewhat apolitical outcomes 
of the museum’s early contention. 
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Primarily, two events formed the basis of the tension surrounding the building of 
the CMHR, a tension which gets to the heart of Canada’s complex relationship with 
human rights. Here the history and legacy of the Holocaust and Indian Residential 
Schools met head on. Both histories exposed prickly problems for Canada, as questions 
concerning what kinds of histories would be told about human rights in Canada 
intersected with broader questions about what kind of stories best communicated human 
rights.  
Holocaust remembrance practice proved integral to the founding of the CMHR. 
Its museological footing was gained with a 1998 proposal to add a Holocaust gallery to 
the Canadian War Museum in Ottawa—a city, which at the time, was home to all of 
Canada’s national museums (Moses, 2012). This plan was deterred by debates about how 
a Holocaust gallery would compete with the stories of Canadian soldiers, beginning a 
theme of comparison that would come to dominate the CMHR’s development and 
subsequent analysis. Eventually, a plan for a privately funded Holocaust and human 
rights museum was proposed in Winnipeg, a small city in the heart of the Canadian 
prairies and thousands of miles away from the capital. This move was also due in large 
part to one of the museum’s greatest funders and advocates, Israel Asper, a man who 
grew up in Winnipeg and whose place within spheres of media production and Jewish 
cultural organizations gave him a unique vision of what this kind of museum could do.51 
Eventually, a deal was reached for the museum to become a private-public partnership 
under the auspices of the Canadian Museum for Human Rights, officially dropping the 
named centrality of the Holocaust from its purview.52   
                                                
51
 Asper was a prominent lawyer and later in his career the founder of CanWest Global Communications, a 
large media company whose properties included television and publishing assets primarily in Canada. He 
also founded the Asper Foundation, which initiated a “Human Rights and Holocaust Studies” program in 
Winnipeg in the 1980s. Part of this program entailed visits to the United States Holocaust Memorial 
Museum. Subsequently, part of the impetus for the CMHR began with the question of why Canada did not 
have a similar museum (Moses, 2012). 
52
 While the Holocaust was dropped from the name of the museum it still remained central in the 
museum’s planning, especially as it came to occupy the central gallery in the museum. The rationalization 
for this decision and how it came to affect the genesis of the museum’s galleries has recently been 
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Parallel to this development, a nascent conversation was beginning to take place 
within Canada about the history and legacies of Indian Residential Schools, a settler 
colonial program in place from 1876 to 1996 that dislocated Indigenous children from 
their homes and aimed to strip them of their language, culture, and traditions. Followed 
by an historic apology by Canada’s Prime Minister for these actions in 2008, a national 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established, the same year the 
Canadian Museum for Human Rights was officially added to the Canadian Museums Act. 
The geographical location of the museum became all the more important as Winnipeg 
became home to key discussions within the TRC and eventually became home to the 
TRC’s official archive now housed at the University of Manitoba.53 As a city with one of 
the largest urban Indigenous populations in Canada, Winnipeg was situated between 
established narratives of Holocaust memory and emerging narratives of colonial 
oppression. The differences between how these two histories were mobilized in the name 
of human rights was starkly contrasted, both as the nation began to take stock of its own 
history and as the museum struggled to communicate human rights within a visual and 
spatial field.  
At the heart of the CMHR’s development and ongoing participation in the human 
rights discourse, was an attempt to grapple with the display and reconciliation of 
                                                                                                                                            
 
explained from an inside perspective by Maron and Curle (2018), both of who worked on developing and 
curating the CMHR’s galleries from an early stage.  
53
 Beyond the politics of the museum’s location outside of Canada’s capital city, much has been written 
about the politics of the museum’s location within Winnipeg itself. The museum is situated at the forks of 
the Red River and the Assiniboine River alongside a national historic site and tourist destination, aptly 
named The Forks. Beyond this current use, the meeting place of these rivers had great importance to the 
history of Indigenous communities before colonization as a meeting point and intermittent settlement, and 
after colonization as a point of trade, most notably with the Hudson’s Bay Company. The symbolic history 
of this meeting place initially met well with the cross-cultural conversations that the CMHR was meant to 
foster. However, many have criticized how the site’s history was selectively used or highlighted, especially 
as it helped to narrate dialogue without mention of colonial violence. Although the museum complied with 
federal and provincial requirements in terms of how it conducted an archeological review of the site, only 
2% of the fork’s location was closely examined for historical clues that would enrich Indigenous history 
(Syms 2009; Busby, Muller, Woolford 2015). Further, as Sharma (2015) explains, the metaphorical use of 
the site’s history by the museum positions Indigenous stakes in this site as “past” and effectively erases 
continued violence of colonial encounter (187). 
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historical and cultural difference along the lines of justice and injustice. Familiar 
questions, some of which were addressed in the previous chapter remained pertinent: 
How could a museum tell the story of human rights without levelling differences between 
historical moments or essentializing cultural identity? And, how could a museum visually 
communicate human dignity without relying on sloppy equivocations between the body 
and the soul or between historical injustices? 
For many academics, the answer to these questions came through an engagement 
with memory studies, wherein “memory wars” or “oppression olympics” became a 
shorthand for how the museum responded to debates about who would be publicly 
acknowledged in the museum (Busby, Muller, Woolford 2015; Chatterly 2015; 
Hankivisky & Dhamoon 2013; Logan 2014; Moses 2012). Linking claims of justice to 
that of space, the CMHR’s planning mirrors a problem explored in the previous chapter 
regarding the way disparate cultures and histories were brought together to communicate 
human rights in the Human Rights Exhibition Album. For the UN and UNESCO, both 
institutions founded on the ideas of international collaboration and human rights broadly, 
there would undoubtedly be claims of decontextualizing artefacts or histories under their 
sweeping umbrellas. In the case of the CMHR, however, the universal mandate of human 
rights met bluntly with the interests of the nation. The issue of how the museum’s 
expansive galleries would be allocated towards a growing national conversation met the 
terrain of established memory regimes. Space became an entrenched metaphor for justice 
and recognition, as the failure to represent one group’s story came to be framed as a 
slight on another group’s identity (Logan 2014). Notions of justice became tied to the 
spatial limitations of the museum. Despite its enormous floor space of 47,000 feet, the 
physical size of the museum seemed small in comparison to the range of voices that were 
vying for attention. Inclusion in the plan became shorthand for a community or group’s 
worth, their dignity, and validation of their suffering and/or contributions to the history of 
human rights. In one of the most extreme cases, a complaint was raised by the Ukrainian 
Canadian Congress about the location of a panel documenting the Holodomor genocide 
near a public restroom (Rollason 2013). In response to a swirling controversy about 
which atrocities and genocides would be featured in the CMHR, the museum’s then 
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CEO, Stuart Murray, pointedly asked: “how could we ever do them all justice?” (Kives, 
2012).54 This question has given me pause on several occasions. At face value this 
question recognizes the spatial limitations of the museum alongside the countless stories 
of injustice. It also communicates something about the structure and system of the 
museum itself. The museum aims to be something other than a compendium of suffering, 
or a dictionary of injustice. Its galleries were to be constructed to a specific end aimed at 
the communication of human rights, a task that went beyond basic factors of inclusion 
and multivocality.  
At many points in the public debates over whose stories would be told or 
included, debates which often veered towards heuristics of physical measurement, 
broader questions of educational importance were overshadowed. As questions were 
asked about whose stories would be told, or how they might do justice to human rights 
violations, questions more central to human rights writ large were pushed to the side. 
How might a museum visually communicate human dignity? How might physical space 
indeed alter the very conception of human dignity? Though the questions that were being 
asked depended on assumptions about human value and the translation of that value into 
square feet or display cases, the question of human dignity and display was displaced.  
A Different Kind of Museum: Telling Positive Stories 
Though only implied with Murray’s rhetorical question, there was a sense from early on 
in the CMHR’s development that stories and image of injustice could not fully 
                                                
54
 How the museum chose to engage genocide alongside human rights was and remains controversial. 
While there had been initial plans to construct an “atrocities” gallery, which would feature some 80 
historical narratives of atrocity, in 2012 these plans were radically reduced to a genocide gallery which 
would feature the five genocides that the Canadian Government officially recognized: the Armenian 
Genocide, the Holodomor, the Holocaust, The Rwandan Genocide, and the Srebrenica Genocide in Bosnia. 
On top of the fact that the museum openly showed its allegiance with the federal government in this 
decision, this move also demonstrated tensions between showcasing human rights abuses and telling 
positive stories. Further, in 2013 the question of how and to what ends the concept of genocide was defined 
became even more contentious in terms of a growing call for Indian Residential Schools to be recognized 
as an act of genocide. Given that the Canadian Government does not recognize Indian Residential Schools 
as genocide, it was not named as such in the museum or prominently featured in the atrocity gallery. For 
more on how the museum approached definitions of genocide see Hankivsky and Dhamoon (2013), Kives 
(2012), Logan (2014), Moses (2012). 
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encapsulate what the museum was attempting to achieve. The narrative of inclusion 
would have to be tempered with substance and tone. Despite the legacies of genocide and 
colonialism that accompanied the planning of the CMHR, there was a notable shift away 
from frameworks of memorialization or a strict association with suffering in the 
museum’s messaging. As the CMHR’s director of communications related in 2011:  
There are many museums dedicated to particular human rights issues, and their 
role is very often to memorialize those events...that’s not our role. We want to 
respect the victims, but part of the objective of the museum is to pull out the 
lessons of these human rights violations, and take lessons from human rights 
triumphs. That’s a bit different (than) pure memorialization.” (Angela Cassie, 
CMHR representative, quoted in: Martin 2011). 
Therefore, along with a wide interest in whose stories were going to be told in the 
CMHR, there was a strong emphasis on what kind of stories would be told. Beginning 
with the CMHR’s mandate, there was a concerted effort to disrupt an easy reliance on 
suffering as the rationale for both the museum and for the program of human rights put 
forward by this federal institution. Despite the relationship that had been built between 
memorial museums and human rights beginning in the 1990s (Duffy 2000; Sodaro 2018; 
Williams 2007), the CMHR was attempting to forge another path.  
The museum’s mandate is telling about this shift and should be inspected closely. 
As a national museum, the Canadian Museum for Human Rights joined a bureaucratic 
and corporate network that oversees Canadian heritage and “contributes to the collective 
memory and sense of identity of all Canadians” (Canadian Museums Act). As a national 
museum, the CMHR became endowed with specific corporate rights for operating under 
a state umbrella, especially as it concerned financial and political affiliation with the 
Canadian government.55 The CMHR’s mandate is itself short, but defines a museum 
untethered from indignity and injustice specifically:  
                                                
55 The CMHR is officially described as “a distinct legal entity, wholly-owned by the Crown, which 
operates at arm's length from the Government in its day to day operations, activities and programming. The 
Museum is governed by the regime for Crown Corporation control and accountability established under 
Part X of the Financial Administration Act. It is a member of the Canadian Heritage Portfolio and reports to 
Parliament through the Minister of Canadian Heritage and Official Languages. The Museum's Board of 
Trustees serves as its governing body and is accountable to Parliament for the stewardship of the Museum 
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The purpose of the Canadian Museum for Human Rights is to explore the subject 
of human rights, with special but not exclusive reference to Canada, in order to 
enhance the public’s understanding of human rights, to promote respect for others 
and to encourage reflection and dialogue. (Canadian Museums Act, 15.2)  
This pronouncement sets out a very broad and education oriented program, and provided 
the scope to address histories not exclusive to Canada despite the CMHR’s role as a 
national museum. On the one hand, this phrasing of “special but not exclusive reference 
to Canada” allowed the museum to keep its initial emphasis on the Holocaust, given its 
growth from an initial plan to build a Holocaust museum itself. On the other hand, the 
phrase allowed the museum to stretch its view farther afield than many other human 
rights museums, which focused on national issues. For example, Museo de la Memoria y 
los Derechos Humanos (Museum of Memory and Human Rights) which opened in 2011 
in Santiago, Chile was conceived as a space of memorialization, reflection, and 
documentation for the human rights abuses carried out under Augusto Pinochet in the 
1970s and 1980s, while Kazerne Dossin (Mechelen, Belgium), a memorial museum and 
documentation centre on the Holocaust and human rights that opened the same year as 
the CMHR, similarly framed itself around a particular event, the Holocaust, and is open 
about its commemorative function. The CMHR mandate signaled a tension built into the 
founding of the museum that mirrors those found in human rights writ large—between 
national and international interests on the one hand, and between acknowledgment of 
violent histories and idealized visions on the other. The choice to move away from 
atrocity specifically would come to have a sizable impact on the way the museum ended 
up presenting an idea of what human dignity meant in the Canadian context.  
The constellation that the CMHR was beginning to form, was thus not aligned 
with the past concretely but more so interested in material that would “encourage 
                                                                                                                                            
 
through the Minister of Canadian Heritage and Official Languages. The Board represents various regions of 
the country and is appointed by the Governor in Council” (Canadian Museum for Human Rights, “Info 
Source”).  
 
146 
 
reflection and dialogue.” While true to the politics of human rights, in which the line 
between a nation and the world and the tension between past, present, and future goals 
remain in flux, the line between Canadian content and those stories that would best 
promote respect or communicate human rights was unclear from the start, thus opening 
up more questions as to whose stories would be told, and to what end. More pointedly, in 
terms of my own discussion of human dignity, the mandate does not name this idea as an 
organizing force, but as it turned to issues of equality and justice on a global scale it was 
never far away. 
In response to questions concerning the allocation of museum space to Canadian 
and international histories that advanced the CMHR’s mandate, the museum began to 
craft its identity as an “ideas museum.” On the one hand, museums, such as those 
revolving around peace, tolerance, and human rights, are categorized as ideas museums 
because they rarely have permanent collections in the way that art or history museums 
do, and thus need to rely on storytelling and visual reproductions that complement their 
mandates. On the other hand, “ideas” or “issues” museums imply a direct material 
engagement with an otherwise immaterial property “not only as a theme of 
representation, but one of ongoing debate” (Carter and Orange, 2012; 112). In the case of 
the CMHR, the museum built a narrative around positivity and inspiration, setting it apart 
from other institutions that focused on historical violation particular to a nation or a group 
of people.56  
Despite the growing acknowledgement of physical and cultural atrocities 
committed against Indigenous people in Canada, some of which were directly sponsored 
by the state, it was clear that exclusive emphasis on this suffering would not become a 
way forward for the CMHR. This departure from memorialization allowed the museum 
to frame some of its exclusions within a narrative that positioned shock and horror as a 
                                                
56
 Carter and Orange describe the distinction between issues and ideas museums as follows: “We prefer the 
use of the term ‘issues-based’ to the more general designation of ‘ideas-based’ museum, for its implicit 
insistence on a topic that is not only a theme of representation, but one of ongoing debate” (2012, 112). For 
them, the term “ideas museum” signals the representation of something whose limits have been defined. 
“Issues” museum signals a debate about an idea that is ongoing. 
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block to education and inspiration.57 There was, indeed, great care taken to tell interested 
parties that the museum would not be in the business of overwhelming or depressing 
visitors with a deluge of negative content (Kives 2012). At a 2012 Public Annual 
Meeting then CEO Stuart Murray rationalized this distinction in the following way: “If 
your museum is intended to memorialize and commemorate, then it might be appropriate 
to focus only on tragedy. But if your museum is intended to educate and inspire action, 
then you must also include examples of where action has led to progress on human 
rights” (CMHR, 2012). The anxiety that the CMHR would become a “hall of grievances” 
was repackaged through positive and progressive stories that aimed to evoke “hope.”58  
The CMHR’s shift away from an aesthetics of indignity was indeed significant 
and disruptive. While the museum did keep the Holocaust as a separate gallery and while 
it does tell stories of atrocity, there was a concerted effort to find other ways of 
communicating human rights. Though there are distinct and estimably insurmountable 
problems that came with framing human rights within positive narratives, most notably in 
regard to an overemphasis on individuals and limited engagement with the politics of 
reconciliation underway, the CMHR’s decisions were and remain profound departures. 
Moving away from dominant forms of human rights representation, from a reliance on 
suffering offered new ground to test the limits of the visual communication of human 
dignity. In the context of this dissertation, the CMHR’s planning around a more balanced 
narrative provides a remarkable moment of public recognition that relying on images, 
                                                
57 For many museum scholars the relationship between trauma, education, and engaged visitors has been 
discussed in relation to the idea of “difficult knowledge” (Blumer 2015; Failler, Ives, Milne 2015; Lehrer 
2015; Lehrer and Milton 2011; Milne 2015; Sharma, 2015; Simon 2000, 2011 & 2014; Simon and Failler 
2015; Wodtke 2015). Adapted from Deborah Britzman’s concept (1998, 2000, Pitt & Britzman, 2003), the 
museological notion of difficult knowledge moves away from learning about facts and towards learning 
from the provocation of affect and the assimilation of solidarity that is meant to come from the 
exhibitionary experience that challenges the visitors assumptions about history and their roles in the 
ongoing development of that history: “in learning about, knowledge is taken to be an object separate from 
or outside of the self that can nevertheless be acquired, owned, or mastered; in learning from, knowledge is 
understood as a relation contingent on a willingness to recognize one’s connectedness to an event or 
experience that might well be ‘separate’ in the sense of belonging to another time, place, or people but that 
can nevertheless be seen for its enmeshment with the structures, privileges, and constraints of one’s own 
life” (Failer and Simon, 173). 
58 See Failler (2015) for more on the different types of hope the museum expresses.  
148 
 
video, and narrative of human violation would no longer suffice in regard to cultivating a 
strong understanding of human rights. In the development of the CMHR’s exhibits and 
messaging there was keen awareness that the negative tropes that had become central in 
communicating human rights and human dignity were limiting. However, as “taking the 
long view” began to “involve seeing not only discrimination and oppression, but also 
revival” a clear new path was not readily available from which to mount this balance 
(CAC 2010, 39). 
The Expression of Human Dignity  
As it moved away from frameworks that couched human rights within narratives of 
“never again”, the CMHR did indeed stake out important new territory in the visual 
communication of human dignity. This shift brought about new questions: would 
positivity or narratives of progress overshadow the work that was still needed in ongoing 
human rights issues? How might this turn align or interfere with Canada’s own trajectory 
of reconciliation? Was it responsible to jump over recognizing injustice to representing 
justice? And, in the context of this dissertation, how might an aesthetics of dignity 
founded on relation provide new routes that confidently come to the defense of human 
rights? In what follows I use the heuristic of the curatorial constellation and my 
understanding of human dignity as a relational property as a way to begin to articulate 
what the fears about linking human rights to positivity and comparison allude to more 
broadly within this system and as a way to model the type of intervention a constellated 
theorization holds. Shifting attention to how the CMHR communicates an understanding 
of dignity invigorates discussions between cultural factions that formed the foundations 
for the CMHR’s development.  Importantly, this shift gives context to the positive path 
the CMHR has tried to forge. 
One space where the desire to exhibit progress and elicit hope occurs prominently 
within the CMHR is in the first gallery, interrogatively titled “What are Human Rights?” 
This exhibit is a cavernous, dark, and somewhat narrow area with a timeline on one of its 
long walls and a looping video on its other long wall (Fig. 24). In many ways, this space 
most literally resembles the astrological night sky as the high black walls and ceiling 
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provide the backdrop for the array of information hung in its orbit. With the text of the 
UDHR’s first article etched prominently into the back wall in bold white letters, “All 
humans are born free and equal in dignity and rights,” the tone this exhibit sets is a 
mixture of solemnity and hope right from the outset. As you enter the gallery the first 
screen, equipped with sensors, responds when a visitor stands in front of it (Fig 25); 
stopping prompts a video of a man or woman to start playing. The mediated subject steps 
into the frame, giving the illusion of an approaching friend or acquaintance, and begins to 
tell the visitor what human rights mean to him or her personally.  
The giant timeline stretches across the length of the gallery signalling that a 
historical narrative is underway. The timeline connects one-hundred ideas, events and 
measures creating a multicultural and multimedia history of human rights expanding 
from as early as 4000 B.C.E. to 2012 A.D. The looping video to your right showcases 
perspectives on human rights from different cultures, broadly mirroring the information 
on your left and lending it more narrative weight. Finally, what is also in the line of sight 
from the first gallery is the “Indigenous Perspectives” gallery (Fig. 24 & 27), the view 
and position of which I will address in greater detail in the following section. For now, I 
limit my analysis to the politics of this timeline, as a way to set up the relationship 
between human dignity and the material world that the CMHR did indeed build.  
 
Figure 24: CMHR, "What are Human Rights?" gallery, photograph by author. 
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Figure 25: CMHR, "What are Human Rights?" gallery, photograph by author.  
Though never spelled out in this first gallery, a planning document from 2012 
outlines the role of dignity within this space. One of this document’s key objectives for 
this gallery states: “After visiting the zone, the visitor will: Learn that human rights are an 
expression of human dignity, and that the struggle for their achievement is still not over” 
(CMHR, planning). The CMHR takes a strong stance here as it imagines human rights as 
emerging from the establishment of human dignity, as an equalizing and normative force. 
In this view, human rights are only achievable when the ideal of inherent and equitable 
human value is adopted. The understanding that “human rights are the expression of 
human dignity,” spells out a relationship that was never clearly claimed or declared in 
previous curatorial endeavors encountered in this dissertation. The introductory text to 
this gallery signifies these beliefs: “Throughout history, people have grappled with ideas 
about human dignity, respect and responsibility. Today the term ‘human rights’ generally 
refers to the rights we have simply because we are human. It is an idea thousands of years 
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in the making.” The implication that this idea was made connects it to notions of 
progress: to arrive at a point where human rights mean something inherent signals a 
temporal and historical position within the narrative of human rights. An odd tension here 
again plays out along the lines of human dignity, as something that must now signal a 
universal mandate, and thus shed its historical connotations, and as something that is 
particularly historical in this gallery, which the timeline makes visible. The CMHR is 
clear that human dignity must be taxonomic rather than normative (Donnelly 2015, 2), as 
something we have simply because we are humans. However, the CMHR’s own 
existence, as a visual medium, opens up this idea to questions of countenance, history, 
taxonomy, and communication more broadly.  
The planning document’s language is compelling not only in terms of how it 
positions human dignity as “foundational”, but also in terms of its framing of human 
rights as an expression of human dignity. This sentiment recalls Schiller’s understanding 
of dignity as “the expression of a noble disposition of the mind” (370; my italics). Both 
iterations of expressive language, point towards the same issue fundamental to this 
dissertation; that is, how something intangible or inherent is made visible. Taking 
seriously the representational and performative aspects that intersect with human dignity 
risks undermining its foundational and equalizing bond with the human person, but is 
necessary as its communication is made central. How, indeed, can visitors understand 
human rights as the expression of human dignity when dignity’s own expressive qualities 
have been largely ignored or framed in terms of a binary between normative and negative 
experiences? And, what expressive argument is the CMHR in the business of making?  
Presumably, the CMHR’s understanding of human rights, as the expression of 
human dignity, speaks to the way all humans must be thought of equally for the 
enterprise of human rights to work. However, the museum does not outwardly attempt to 
extend this line of thought into its spatial and visual field, as it only vaguely grapples 
with human dignity’s expressive or mediated properties head on. In its first gallery, 
underneath the emboldened fragment of the UDHR’s first article, one clue as to this 
“expressive” relationship reads, “our rights and freedoms may be expressed in many 
ways – on paper, in our traditions, and in how we choose to live our lives and treat 
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others.” Here there is an attempt to connect dignity to different forms of mediated 
expressions, but the statement is equally as broad and declarative as the one above it. As 
with the Human Rights Exhibition Album, curation is needed to help expand these 
declarative statements and bring cultural complexity to this often-disembodied concept.  
Primarily, this first gallery uses its timeline to constellate its expressive qualities. 
Before the timeline a panel reads:  
Throughout history and across cultures, people have talked about how we 
should treat one another and what freedoms we ought to have. These 
important conversations have led to ideas, events, and measures that tell 
the global story of human rights. This timeline offers 100 key moments 
from the advancements and setbacks in our human rights journey. What 
would you add or take away? 
This gallery does important work in terms creating another constellation of human 
dignity. The timeline makes a compelling case that the idea of human rights, as the 
expression of human dignity, is not to be found in an object, a historical moment, or one 
legal document. For Benjamin, the heuristic of the constellation spells out a relationship 
between ideas and objects that affirms differences and reflects the fragmentation of 
modern culture. In terms of human dignity, this line of thought has helped to foreground 
the material dimensions of human dignity without demanding uniformity. In the CMHR, 
the constellated nature of human dignity is on full display. The law is not the only logical 
home of human dignity, but rather exists across cultures, philosophies, religions, and 
peoples. Just as the Human Rights Exhibition Album desired to craft a visual narrative 
where “all races, all civilizations, all nations” made their contributions to human rights, 
the CMHR similarly aims to create a sense of inclusion, and human dignity, along vast 
intersecting historical moment. For instance, the first three points on the timeline, all with 
dates unknown, emphasize philosophies of respect, good deeds, and interconnectedness 
across Ubuntu, Persian, and Whakapapa cultures. Until recently these contributions have 
not been central to our understanding of human dignity, and the CMHR’s first gallery 
effectively opens up transnational, cultural, and historical possibilities that underwrite 
this idea. While this gesture towards inclusion should be looked at critically, especially in 
relation to the urgent politics of human rights, it is indeed important that this type of 
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genealogy is attempted, thus complicating a search for an origin or the reliance on 
simplistic sequential histories.  
Whereas the Human Rights Exhibition Album worked through the history of ideas 
and events that led up to the signing of the UDHR within a 100 page album, the CMHR 
does this work in 100 moments, each of which corresponds to supplementary digital 
information and images within the interactive tables below the timeline (Fig. 26). 100 key 
moments are a lot to take in, and this is only the first gallery of the museum. With the 
addition of a question – what would you add or take away? – there is an odd hesitation 
within the CMHR’s messaging in terms of the way this timeline functions in the museum, 
and in terms of the way it functions alongside human dignity.59 That is, there is a 
simultaneous desire to provide an objective account of what has helped to shape human 
dignity as an idea, knowledge that these choices will never be all encompassing, and a 
move towards subjectivity allowing visitors to insert their own experiences. Visitors can 
learn more about each item on the timeline by using one of the four interactive tables in 
the gallery, which provide contextualizing information and images about each point 
found above. The technology in this gallery appears as an answer to the claims of 
historical flatness within visual modes of communication met in the last chapter. Rather 
than face charges of being “held back at the surface of identity” (Barthes 1957, 101) 
through its visual strategy of communication, the CMHR aimed to provide historical 
depth through digital technology.  
                                                
59
 The addition of this question can be further related to a growing trend in museums and curation around 
“interrogation” (Karp and Kratz 2015; Shelton 2013; Lorente 2015; Piotrowski & Murawska-Muthesius 
2015). Questions are seen to not only engage visitors, but open up museum collections to the gaze of 
entrenched power relations. As noted in the introduction, there is considerably more critical work to be 
done in terms of how a constellated approach works alongside visitors to these museums. Interrogation 
might be considered one way of encouraging visitors to feel as though their knowledge might be thought of 
as important to a constellation and properly expanding it.  
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Figure 26: CMHR, timeline in the "What are Human Rights?" gallery, 
photography by author.  
This added depth has interesting consequences in terms of the visitor’s subjective 
position, and the messaging of the museum in terms of individuality and autonomy. Each 
visitor must make personal choices in terms of which items from the timeline they want 
to explore. And with 100 moments to choose from, there is ample room for their own 
selections. This vast number of choices and supplemental information precludes any 
sense of being able to fully engage with each of these moments. With corresponding 
information for each point on the timeline in the interactive technology, a vast amount of 
information is at the visitor’s fingertips, but at the same time hidden and time-consuming. 
The question, “what would you add or take away?”, becomes unmoored in this light, as 
there is no real way to both take in and comprehend the CMHR’s inclusions and 
exclusions without spending hours hunched over an interactive table. How can a visitor 
know what should be taken away when they do not know what is all there? 
The glut of information provided by the timeline and the technology that 
accompanies it often abandons a strong argumentative function. As an ideas museum 
without a permanent collection, and thus not tied to issues of aura or history in the same 
way as art or history museums, the CMHR had an opportunity to embrace its own 
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materiality in a different light. If the constellated museum, “suggests a spectator no 
longer focused on the auratic contemplation of individual works, but one who is aware of 
being presented with arguments and positions to read or contest,” the CMHR failed to 
present its visitors with a clear argument (Bishop 2013, 59). As Erica Lehrer (2015) has 
argued, “the overall result has a “kitchen sink” feel, where inclusivity takes precedence 
over coherence, and the global strife over first-world definitions of rights and justice is 
nowhere debated” (Lehrer, 1199). While the CMHR seems wary about overwhelming its 
visitors with too many horrifying stories, it failed to recognize that it could also 
overwhelm its visitors with too many positive stories. In turning towards a more 
inspirational message, the politics of inclusion won out over a strong political message. 
Rather than forming a succinct constellation of images and quotes that stake out a 
political or argumentative function about an idea, a vast universe of information is at the 
visitor’s disposal. Whereas the ancients seemed to understand that they needed to make 
order out of the stars, bringing into effect the idea of the constellation out of the vast 
carpet of brightly lit dots that lined the night sky, the CMHR shies away from such 
pattern making, ultimately shying away from a compelling political function. 
Without a succinct or political message about human rights or human dignity the 
visitor is left with the task of picking out and piecing moments together guided by their 
own interests or internal compasses. Rather than forcing visitors back on their own 
assumptions about how human rights or human dignity are to proceed, they are prompted 
to allow their assumptions to propel their experience. In many ways, this gesture 
foregrounds the importance of the individual in the CMHR’s narrative, in spite of its 
curatorial constellation. In many ways, the inclination towards subjectivity works in 
tandem with recent museological research that acknowledges that visitors come with 
experience that shape their visit, that they are not empty vessels to be filled up (Falk 
2009; Simon 2014; Simon and Failler 2015). Interrogative models, that ask visitors to 
think about what they would add or take away is not unique to the CMHR. However, in 
this context, the mass of information neuters the potential for the museum to have a 
political force that extends beyond the physical space.  
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The CMHR has notably defended its information strategy, relying on a vision of 
objectivity despite an ever-growing awareness that museums are not neutral. In an article 
regarding the museum’s objectivity, a spokesperson from the CMHR posits that the 
museum might act as an alternate form of journalism, that is, as an institution that 
provides information rather than opinion: “sometimes we’ll get the question of, ‘What is 
the museum’s position on some of these issues?’ And through the exhibits we don’t take 
a position or tell visitors what they should think...we often see ourselves as a platform for 
debate, for presenting different perspectives, competing perspectives at times, but we 
generally try to avoid advocating one way or another” (Wallace 2017). The 
acknowledgement of visitor subjectivity and divestment of the timeline’s political thrust 
to the visitor does lip service to the museum’s mandate to promote human rights as part 
of an “ongoing dialogue.” Posing the question, “what would you add or take away?”, 
does indeed prompt thought, and hopefully discussion, but it is questionable as to 
whether and how this space is conducive to performing a relationship with the ongoing or 
the yet to come, or even facilitating debate as we will see later in this chapter. There is 
little room in this space to think beyond the timeline. Indeed, the timeline stops at 2012, 
and does not ask visitors to think about a more pertinent and political question: what 
current or ongoing human rights abuses or victories might be added to this two-
dimensional timeline at its chronological end? What definitions or understandings of 
human dignity are here promoted? 
The final gallery in the museum (four floors and ten galleries later) asks visitors to 
write what they “imagine” human rights to be and add their note to an inspirational wall. 
However, by the time visitors get there they are spatially and temporally divorced from 
their interrogative starting point. Despite the modern technologies available to the 
CMHR, which could potentially allow visitors to make more complex connections 
throughout history, for example to compare the way actions looked in different moments 
or make links between laws that similarly address gender, race, or human dignity, there is 
no such intricacy. The points on the timeline do not speak to each other coherently 
beyond their colour-coded labels of ideas, events, and measures. The two-dimensional 
timeline is not aided by the digital tables that expand the points on the timeline, but 
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further weighed down by it, posing a constellation without much consequence and 
divorced from ongoing and often comparable real-world stories. If, as Carter and Orange 
propose, “museums not only reflect historical and current human rights but are also 
participating in the prospective shaping of those rights” (2012, 119), the rights the 
CMHR is shaping is largely divorced from both global and local challenges 
contemporary to the very foundations of these rights, that is to human dignity.   
Constellating Communities 
As a reflection of historical and current human rights issues, the backdrop to the first 
gallery’s timeline, the “Indigenous Perspectives” gallery, is evocative in terms of the 
CMHR’s engagement with local human rights challenges and broader ruptures within the 
idea of human dignity. Under the guise that “everything we do is interrelated,” a phrase 
heard in the first gallery’s video montage, it is jarring just how disconnected these two 
spaces feel and look. The Indigenous gallery has distinct visual qualities.  Its two main 
features are inspired by Indigenous practices of basket weaving and beading, which can 
be seen on the outside of the gallery’s theatre in the centre of the room and in Rebecca 
Belmore’s powerful and looming art installation, Trace, on the back wall (Fig. 27).60 
However, the relation between these two spaces provides a compelling study in terms of 
the constellated understandings of human dignity that exist today.  
                                                
60 Trace is made with over 14,000 hand-pressed clay beads. Community members in Winnipeg and across 
Canada were invited to volunteer in bead-making workshops. Each bead is “the size of the ‘negative space’ 
formed by a clenched fist, were made from excess Red River Valley grey gumbo (clay) dug up by 
municipally contracted sewer and utility workers and donated to the artist” (Failler 2014, 242). Strung 
together, the sculpture spans over 40-feet. In many ways, beyond its symbolic connotations of a blanket or 
towel draped over a doorknob, this piece sends a strong message in terms of its own constellated approach. 
Community involvement and the material impressions of volunteers’ hands combine to visualize alliance 
and colonial entanglement in a remarkable way.  
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Figure 27: CMHR, view of the “Indigenous Perspectives” gallery, photograph by 
author. 
 
Figure 28: CMHR, Installed view of "Trace” by Rebecca Belmore, photograph by 
author. 
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It should be noted that the decision to have a separate Indigenous gallery was 
done in consultation with Indigenous communities. Creating a human rights museum did 
not mean denying cultural difference or creating a homogenous narrative, but rather a 
continued effort to show how diverse cultures approach human rights. A Winnipeg Free 
Press article from 2010 that outlined the main galleries of the museum described the 
“Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights Zone” as:   
An examination of human rights through the cultures and traditions of Canada’s 
aboriginal peoples. This zone will explain that aboriginal cultures had their own 
distinct approach to human rights that, in some ways, was far advanced from 
other cultures. It will also acknowledge that western museums have, for too long, 
been dominated by a non-aboriginal view of aboriginal culture. (“Floor by Floor” 
2010)  
This purview was mirrored in the Content Advisory Report published earlier in 2010, 
which clearly states that “Indigenous Peoples may justly require that the Museum do 
more than simply view them through an anthropological or cultural lens” (CAC, 28). The 
CMHR was, in these respects, forging new relationships with Indigenous people in 
Canada, both as an acknowledgment of the current state of human rights, which required 
an understanding of rights that was not one-dimensional, and as an acknowledgement of 
past museological practices, which were largely discriminatory to Indigenous people and 
their knowledge.61 
Historically, museums have worked to communicate an “imperial vision” of 
Indigenous peoples, overlaying cultural narratives and artefacts with taxonomies that 
entrenched separation in space, time, and ultimately Western ideals of what progress 
looks like (Mirzeoff 2011, 197). This approach situates Indigenous people as things to be 
known and not bearers of knowledge in their own right. The CMHR’s position, that 
Indigenous people and their ideas of human rights should not be treated as 
anthropological is part of a contemporary shift in museological practice. It is a response 
to the centuries of exclusion and objectification that were entwined with the founding of 
                                                
61
 See especially Lonetree (2012), Philips (2011 & 2015), Wrightson (2017), and Sleeper-Smith (2009) for 
more fulsome discussion of the historical relationship between museums and Indigenous knowledge.  
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many museums and collections and ultimately the ways we have come to know other 
cultures. This shift in museological practice was integral to the movement of human 
rights into museums, as it signaled a respect and recognition of voices and knowledge 
that had not previously been privileged in the museum sphere. Along with a move 
towards “new museology,” a turn in museum practice that privileges diverse communities 
and which has been seen as integral to the development of human rights museums (Failler 
2015; Scharma 2015), the CMHR positioned its attitude towards Indigenous knowledge 
in Canada at the forefront of museological practice. In this way, museological practice 
itself becomes indicative of a constellated model that does not reduce one way of 
knowing or being to another. And further, it becomes necessary to thinking about human 
dignity as part of visual communication that can grapple with difference without 
deferring to outdated hierarchies of display and knowledge. Whether or not the final 
product in the museum is a reflection of this initial intention is another matter. 
Indeed, the move towards more community consultation and greater recognition 
of different ways of knowing within museums has not been without critique. Recently, 
Wrightson (2017) has argued that key Canadian museological events in the last twenty 
years demonstrate that increased recognition does not mean increased power or better 
messaging for those previously excluded or spoken for. Using Glen Coulthard’s (2014) 
distinction between politics of assimilation and politics of recognition, as a basis for her 
argument. Wrightson shows that giving a voice to other cultures or embracing 
multivocality only does lip service to the underlying power imbalance. For Coulthard:  
Settler colonial power relations have shifted away from the violence of 
domination and force (though this still demonstrably occurs), and manifest more 
frequently through the affirmative relationship between recognition and freedom, 
which produces ‘colonized subjects’ and “specific modes of colonial thought, 
desire and behavior that implicitly or explicitly commit the colonized to the types 
of practices and subject positions that are required for their continued domination. 
(Coulthard 2014, 16) 
Wrightson argues that despite the turn towards recognition of other voices and 
recognition of the negative roles museums have played in colonial relations, the new 
relationship “retains the asymmetric relationship between museums and Indigenous 
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communities” (42). Thus, in this frame there is not so much as a new relationship but a 
transfiguration of an old one.  
On first glance, the Indigenous Perspectives gallery does exactly what was 
promised: communicating that Indigenous communities have their own approach to 
human rights is signaled through the distinct look and feel. However, the promise that the 
gallery would “acknowledge that western museums have, for too long, been dominated 
by a non-aboriginal view of aboriginal culture” is nowhere to be found. The reason for 
having a stand-alone Indigenous gallery is indeed not communicated whatsoever in the 
museum. If, as the video narrative in the first gallery provokes, human rights are 
“interrelated and connect us all to each other,” then why separate these knowledges? As 
the museum attempted to grapple with what stories best communicated human rights, and 
as the public debate around whether any one group or event should be given a stand-
alone gallery, the CMHR’s messaging demonstrates the fraught relationship with 
recognition on one hand, and the museum’s constellated demands on the other. 
Answering the question of whether or not this was a Canadian museum for human rights 
meant placing Canadian (and presumably Indigenous people in Canada) content 
throughout the museum’s galleries (Kives 2012). Thus, there was a sense that the 
museum wanted Indigenous knowledge to work in two ways, as a source of value in its 
own right and as something that worked alongside pre-existing assumptions about human 
rights writ large. As a case study in relationality, this decision does not deny differences 
between cultures, but it does not present a deep understanding of how different histories 
position us in relation to one another. Including Canadian content/contexts and 
Indigenous content/context requires not just presenting these two ways of thinking as co-
present. To pretend these perspectives have been granted equal footing or exit alongside 
one another without imbalance is naïve. Yet addressing the history of this relationship, 
which would enliven Canada as a perpetrator of human rights violations, comes up 
against the CMHR’s intent to focus on stories that are not primarily about suffering.  
More pointedly, the Indigenous Perspective gallery is low on information beyond 
the fact of its isolation. Indeed, it was one of the galleries where a more “balanced 
approach” was implemented in a forceful manner; here, the wording of certain panels in 
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relation to colonial genocide and other state sponsored violence against Indigenous 
Canadians has been well-documented (Busby, Muller, and Woolford 2014; Failler 2015; 
Logan 2014). Tricia Logan, a former curator at the CMHR speaks of the tension behind 
this balance: “I was consistently reminded that every mention of state-perpetrated atrocity 
against Indigenous peoples in Canada must be matched with a ‘balanced’ statement that 
indicates reconciliation, apology or compensation provided by the government. In cases 
where those issues are not reconciled or where accusations of abuse against the 
government continue to this day, the stories are reduced in scope or are removed from the 
museum” (Logan, 120). This was a troubling development, especially in regard to a 
politics of recognition, and its nod towards redistributive justice. As the museum 
attempted to move away from an aesthetics of indignity, it failed to tackle how its 
procedures and final product were raising different stakes in the way human dignity was 
being expressed.  
The differences, and ultimate conflict, between the “What are Human Rights?” 
gallery and the “Indigenous Perspectives Gallery” are complex. We should be critical of 
those instances where voices were silenced or relegated to partial recognition. Where the 
CMHR included Indigenous voices under the guise of a more balanced approach is fair 
ground for the limits of recognition within institutional boundaries. Further, the 
juxtaposition between the two spaces, between chronology and craft, should not be taken 
without a fair dose of suspicion. Positioning these schemes as having equal authority in 
this multivocal universe may actually serve asymmetrical power relations. Placing 
‘objective’ scientific discourse against Indigenous perspectives may serve new 
museological pursuits of multivocality, while at the same time avoiding the process 
through which the museum legitimates certain voices and eschews real debate about the 
inconsistencies of these epistemological models (Wrightson, 43). Timelines carry 
assumptions about history, about the primacy of chronological understanding, and make 
political choices appear natural (Lubar 2013, 169). The use of chronology as the main 
epistemological model in the first gallery works to create a sense of accumulation and 
positive change, and is something that many visitors will ultimately feel comfortable with 
in museums that aim to create universalizing narratives. Chronology “removes the 
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storyteller from the story, so that history seems to tell itself, as if things must have 
happened that way” (Lubar 2013, 170). More pointedly, in the dialogue between the two 
galleries, which juxtapose chronology and craft, what is lost is how chronology itself has 
been used in progressive histories of development and hierarchy so central to the 
violation of Indigenous nations and the justification for that violence in the first place. In 
presenting the timeline as an impartial way of collecting and representing multi-vocal 
ideas, this progressive technology is offered as unbiased, rather than itself a source of 
human rights violation. While a move away from anthropological lenses towards 
multivocality is a positive step, it is not value neutral. And, as we have seen, the museum 
failed to make the reasons behind its decisions unclear to its visitors, creating an 
alternative without creating a strong message behind its function. 
 Though the museum positioned itself at the forefront of museological practice, 
this position could only possibly be genuine if we are to ignore Indigenous people’s 
museological practices. In reference to museums in the United States, Amy Lonetree 
(2009) argues that though national museums may honour Indigenous understandings of 
history, they often “fail to present a clear and coherent understanding of colonialism and 
its ongoing effects” (322). In this context, it seems naïve to read the CMHR’s decision to 
eschew an emphasis on suffering or an aesthetics of indignity as a signal of progress in 
museum practice as compared to a prior generation of memorial museums, which treat 
Indigenous suffering as part of the past, or anthropological museums, which treat 
Indigenous traditions as part of the past. The difference between the museum’s treatment 
of Indigenous histories in Canada, which were often violent, and lack of attention to 
ongoing effects of colonialism is political. In this respect, the Content Advisory Report’s 
conclusion about inclusion of positive Indigenous stories should be taken as a both a 
political and aesthetic stance; it states: “although the record is full of incidents of the 
wrongful taking of land and resources as well as Aboriginal lives, it is not the ethnocide 
and genocide of Indigenous nations that must ground the work of respectfully including 
the First Peoples in the Museum” (CAC, 72). This stance assumes that a new aesthetics 
of human dignity can appropriately function even if the group in question has not had 
their experiences of indignity enshrined in the public mind or sufficiently rendered 
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publicly visible. Throughout this dissertation I have focused on how dignity might be 
represented without a sole reliance on its negation. Here though, the complex relationship 
between human dignity, human memory, colonization, recognition, and visual 
communication weave a complicated web. The CMHR’s shift towards positive stories, in 
this light, might be considered a shift rather than real progress. 
However, this shift in perspective is important in terms of the move towards a 
relational understanding of human dignity that does not trade upon an aesthetics of 
indignity. The final product enlivened in the CMHR’s galleries goes only so far in 
communicating the magnitude of this shift. The decision to place Indigenous values of 
human rights outside of the first gallery feels important under the auspices of human 
dignity as series of relations, as a system of understanding that need not subsume one 
method, identity, or history under another. This separateness and difference in 
arrangement is significant in terms of what a contemporary project of human rights might 
look like. Here there is no pretense that a simple or homogenously universal 
understanding of human rights is achievable. Moving from a linear timeline with a glut of 
information in the first gallery to a very light scheme, both in terms of colour and content, 
seems to underscore the sentiment of “interrelation.” Though not necessarily a fluid 
relation, the juxtaposition between the two spaces sends a strong message about what a 
contemporary understanding of human dignity might look or feel like, as different, but 
ultimately under the same umbrella.  
 For Indigenous scholars, the heuristic of the constellation has a distinct function, 
which has been taken up more recently in the frame of reconciliation and recognition. 
Jarrett Martineau, an Indigenous scholar and journalist, has recently defined the 
constellation as “a strategic relational arrangement of space and subjects that provides 
Indigenous artists and allied communities of struggle, with a mutable for shared creation 
and action that can be networked to produce collective power” (2015, 215). In 
Martineau’s understanding, the constellation prioritizes being and action, and “assume 
the primacy of the body and lived experience as the front line of decolonial struggle” 
(275). In this way, the constellation becomes more than just a heuristic that helps us to 
see the relation between an idea and the material or mediated world, but also a necessary 
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starting point that demonstrates how relations to each other must be cultivated, “by 
creating decolonial constellations of existence and love as mechanisms to ensure we are 
no longer complacent in the oppression of each other” (Simpson, 2014; 1).  
In relation to the idea of human dignity, these contributions are crucial, and 
deserve further critical attention in the sphere of human rights. Human dignity requires a 
framework that is itself no longer complacent in the oppression of each other. In relation 
to museums, a constellated decolonial line of thought is also critical. As museums situate 
themselves in concert with decolonial struggle, an awareness of how museum space and 
visual communication conceive of alliance and collective power is just as necessary as 
the existence of multivocality. The inclusion of more diverse perspectives cannot be 
looked at through the lens of more inclusive museum practice alone. In the CMHR, 
positioning Indigenous perspectives in its own gallery does indeed provide much needed 
space to hear different voices, and demonstrates how one way of knowing need not be 
subsumed under another. However, like the first gallery, which presents more of a 
universe than a constellation, it is unclear what alliances, connections, or visions of 
networked relations that ties struggles for equality and human dignity are to be drawn in 
this space. For some, the relations between these two galleries might cement notions of 
finite asymmetry, for others, the relations between the two might open up a world of 
infinite connections and possibilities. In both instances, the contemporary state of human 
dignity is enlivened, both as an idea that can exist in different forms and cultures and as 
an idea that is always in tension between the power relations of these same forms and 
cultures.  
The Faults in Our Stars  
In general, the Canadian Museum for Human Rights has a difficult time holding tension 
up to the light. As the museum attempts to move away from an aesthetics of indignity it 
often shies away from tension in favour of resolution. The first gallery is again telling in 
this regard. Though there is a desire to frame the moments on the timeline under the 
auspices that everything is connected, the representational model reverts to old notions of 
normative images and personal autonomy to frame its series of relations. This is most 
166 
 
evident in the images that appear underneath the timeline, which cling to individuals and 
their success as the sites from which to learn about human rights, and ultimately sites that 
express human dignity. This section closely reads a number of these images and 
demonstrates how this curatorial constellation might be read through a relational 
understanding of human dignity. Like the relationship between the first and second 
galleries, the relationship between these images demonstrates important shifts in the 
contemporary visualization of human dignity.  
The images underneath the first gallery’s timeline follow a chronological order. 
Though not every image corresponds to a point on the timeline above, in a most basic 
sense, their presence serves to ground and open up the brevity of the ideas, measures, and 
events. Here the message is quite clear: at stake is not only the ideas or events that 
happened, but real people who lived through, stood up for, and largely prevailed within 
the arena of human rights. The row of images brings together people who have all 
responded to a similar human quandary, that is, how humans are meant to live together, 
and more pointedly, how inherent human worth should be mobilized. Two things stand 
out about these images: first, they are, taxonomically, images of people who have 
arguably advanced human rights, and, second, they are stylistically similar in terms of 
their emphasis on individuals vis-à-vis portraiture.62 Together, these bodies continue the 
emphasis on positive stories.  
Instead of holding up instances of human rights violation, the museum chose to 
emphasize moments where justice prevailed in this gallery, thus constituting a 
progressive vision. Though an interesting choice for a human rights museum, given the 
dominant emphasis on suffering and violation in most other human rights museums, the 
CMHR is not alone in its attempt to shift course. Most recently, Sarah Lewis (2016) has 
argued, “the endeavor to affirm the dignity of human life cannot be waged without 
pictures, without representational justice” (11). At first glance, this statement rests upon 
                                                
62
 Only one photograph contains more than one person, and only two of the 60 images are of things rather 
than people (the other two being documents representing Mohammed, the founder of Islam (approx. 570-
632 BCE), and Abu Mansur al-Maturidi, a Persian theologian and legal scholar (853-944 BC)). 
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an idea of inclusion; representational justice works as a facet of including images and 
narratives that were once deemed invaluable to the history of the nation. On second 
thought, Lewis raises questions as to the type of images that affirm the dignity of the 
human life, “how we should imagine dignity in the face of oppression” (Lewis, 12). 
Representational justice, then, works on these two levels: inclusion and substance. The 
CMHR struggled on both fronts. Inclusion became a litmus test for the value of a 
community, nation, or people. And, substance became, in many instances, flattened. As 
the museum moved towards an aesthetics of human dignity that did not trade on an 
aesthetics of indignity, old notions of normativity and bodily integrity resurfaced as a 
means of communicating inclusion, and in so doing limited the imaginative capacity of 
curatorial complexity.  
As an exercise in constellated thinking, the range of individuals included 
underneath the timeline speaks volumes. Harnessing stories across a broad spectrum of 
legal, philosophical, and cultural avenues works towards a rich history of human rights 
and human dignity. Together this group of people, who range from Sophocles to Jesus to 
Ashoka the Great to Alfred the Great to Jean Jacques Rousseau to Olympe de Gouges to 
Louis Riel to Victor Pineda, effectively decenters the primacy of any one area or model 
of human rights and instead disperses the reach of human dignity into a vast constellation 
of people and concerns. The images also decenter any claim that reason alone is the site 
of human dignity, and convincingly demonstrate through their grouping that the body and 
our embodied characteristics are necessary to the project of human dignity, and distinctly 
make it visible. In this sense, representational justice is waged through inclusion across 
cultures, geographies, histories, and bodies. 
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Figure 29: CMHR, first three portraits underneath the “What are Human Rights?” 
timeline. From left to right: Zoroaster, Cyrus the Great, Cleisthenes, photograph by 
author.  
 
Figure 30: CMHR, section of the portraits underneath the “What are Human 
Rights?” timeline. From left to right: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Thomas Paine, 
Toussaint Louverture, Olaudah Equiano, Olympe de Gouges, photograph by 
author.  
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Figure 31: CMHR, final section of the portraits underneath the “What are Human 
Rights?” timeline. From left to right: General Romeo Dallaire, Louise Arbour, 
Rigoberta Menchu, Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, Victor Pineda, photograph by 
author.  
However, the range of representatives collected in this first gallery is 
taxonomically narrow. In many ways, the mass of images in the first gallery seems 
brought together in a similar way as one of Sander’s groups. Rather than grouping 
farmers or professionals together the timeline groups advocates together; the types 
subsumed here include crusaders, commanders, campaigners, law-makers, protestors, 
philosophers, and so-on. Thus, the gallery offers a narrow slice of the world through its 
emphasis on these exemplary types. In this sense, the gallery is already much less 
expansive than Sander’s atlas; though it covers a much broader period of time, the limits 
of its own inclusion are defined by these constricted taxonomies of added-value. The 
gallery offers a visual form of knowledge that is indeed important to the way human 
dignity ought to be expressed, but offers a constricted range of imaginative possibilities. 
It narrowly defines new territory. Importantly, the images in this timeline demonstrate a 
growing constituency of those with rights look like, as the gradual inclusion of gendered, 
racial, and bodily difference does increase throughout the timeline. However, the growing 
inclusion of different bodies, cultures, and histories within the framework of human 
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dignity, appears limiting. Though more and more cultural difference is added as the 
timeline of images progress, additions that we now come to see as a logical opening up of 
right via race, class, gender, and ability, there is odd sense of conformity that comes from 
their inclusion. 
Unlike Sander’s atlas, which revealed a sense of contingency necessary to the 
concept of human dignity built on social relations, the portraits in the CMHR only seem 
to be able to say something about time and place very broadly. As the CMHR turned 
away from an aesthetics of indignity, it instead positioned human dignity as a property of 
autonomy, inviolability, and an ideal after. For example, Toussaint Louverture (Fig. 30), 
a well-known leader of the Haitian Revolution, expands the reach of human rights in the 
area of race. Similarly, the inclusion of Dr. Victor Pineda (Fig. 31), a notable advocate 
for disability rights, signals another important expansion of human dignity in the area of 
disability. However, despite their inclusion, they do not serve to raise questions about 
how difference is to be negotiated or how human dignity is might be imagined outside of 
these victories, as a property made in relation through the body. Toussaint is “formerly 
enslaved” (italics my emphasis). He is outwardly allied with traditional conventions of 
military rank, thus legitimating his claims to a dignified life through status. His dignity is 
made normatively. Similarly, the photograph of Pineda is cropped in such a way that 
denies the technological and community oriented functions of his life. The wheelchair, on 
which Pineda relies and is critical to his movement in the world, is itself absent. While, 
on the one hand, this decision may signal a basis for equality—he is an activist just like 
the rest of the figures included in this timeline—on the other hand, this decision 
contradicts the very means of his life. Unlike Sander’s photograph of the “Disabled Ex-
Serviceman” (Fig. 12), which is clear about the reality of this man’s movements against 
the existence of his material surroundings, and which conveys an understanding about 
how artificial and biological history make up his dignity, the image of Pineda within this 
mass does not such work.  
Against the frame of what Jeremy Waldron argues is a sense of “upwards 
equalization” (2012, 33) in the history of human dignity, the CMHR transfigures a 
growing sense of inclusion alongside a politics of assimilation. The timeline and the 
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portraits show an expanding and more diverse sense of who can be included as a human 
rights hero (or even as properly human), which may show us something about the 
expansive quality of liberalism. However, as an exercise in apprehending how people 
must make themselves appear as belonging, as bearing dignity in order to make claims of 
rights and recognition, the options are narrowly defined. Recalling the portraits of 
Frederick Douglass (Fig. 3) does important work here, because his self-stylization applies 
to Louverture and Pineda as well. The disagreeable parts of Louverture and Pineda’s 
humanness are either dressed up in culturally acceptable markers or rendered invisible in 
order to be recognized as “fully human.” In the CMHR’s timeline difference is subsumed 
under a normative and idyllic banner where bodies are whole and conflict is absent. 
Rather than instructing viewers to see and come to terms with difference, the images iron 
out these disparities and quiet questions in the process. The CMHR’s focus on a similar 
style, marked by inviolability and autonomy, provides an arrangement that demonstrates 
a simplistic understanding of the ends of human dignity. Despite the fact that the majority 
of these subjects rose above struggles, they are leveled in their outward alliance with 
these traits.  
Another aspect of the arrangement that cements their importance as individuals is 
through their names. As opposed to Sander’s subjects, who were identified by profession 
or occupation, these people are identified by proper nouns. Dates on specific photographs 
are traded in for birth dates and death dates. In terms of the politics of taxonomy, which 
we first encountered within the scope of August Sander’s projects, this process of 
labelling seems innocent enough. Though a small change, this shift to proper nouns is an 
important point that corresponds with an emphasis on the individual, not as a social actor 
but as a self-contained entity. The visitor is here given precise information, not about the 
social or environmental realities of these figures, but about the data that belongs to them 
specifically. If taxonomy is a political technique of naming and ordering, it is here 
politically used as a way to constitute the centrality of the individual within the CMHR’s 
narrative of human rights. It “makes up” the subject of human dignity not through 
appeals to rationality or consciousness alone, but to their self-enclosed properties as 
individuals. Even though the images assume a move towards a progressive and 
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generalized type, portraits come to signal faith in the primacy of the autonomous 
individual. Though these images introduce a visual form of knowledge to the claim that 
“All humans are born free and equal in dignity and rights,” they introduce a form of 
knowledge that is self-evident and teleological. Human rights and human dignity looks a 
certain way, has a certain form, one that revolves around the individual and is free from 
conflict.  
An example here is helpful to understand the subtle levelling that is underway in 
this gallery. Take for instance the photograph of General Romeo Dallaire (Fig. 32). The 
brief account underneath his photo describes him as: “Canadian Commander of the UN 
peacekeeping force during Rwandan Genocide.” In Canada, Dallaire has become widely 
known for his role in the Rwandan Genocide, his advocacy for child soldiers and 
veterans, and as a parliamentary Senator.  In the image used on the timeline. Dallaire 
stands alone in front of a tank, his arms folded, and a deep look of pain and incredulity on 
his face. That he is standing alone is perhaps a metaphor for his role in the Rwandan 
Genocide; despite his insistent warnings leading up to and during the genocide, few 
nations or international organizations came to the aid of the people he was advocating 
for. Dallaire’s emotional despair concerning the acts of genocide he is surrounded by 
positions him as a dignified subject amidst the unseen chaos of the genocidaires. Like the 
description of dignity Schiller uses, “calm in suffering,” which we saw in relation to the 
Laocoön statue (Fig. 5), Dallaire is visibly agonized, but his hands are both literally and 
figuratively tied. Indeed, Dallaire holds a similar position as the Laocoön, warning of an 
immanent danger without any aid.  
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Figure 32: CMHR timeline, General Romeo Daillaire as pictured in the “What are 
Human Rights?” gallery, photograph by author. 
However, unlike the Laocoön, which is surrounded by the conceit of the Virgil’s 
sorrow, Dallaire’s dignity is starkly distilled. The CMHR’s turn towards beacons of 
justice and advocacy result in a broader narrative of wholeness and autonomy that 
haunted normative formations of human dignity based around status and success. 
Dallaire’s position of dignity is entrenched in relief of those massacred in the Rwandan 
genocide and against those who experienced its brutality. While Dallaire contributes to 
the emphasis on Canadian content in the CMHR, his place in the timeline does little to 
complicate our understanding that human dignity goes beyond violation on the one hand 
and purity on the other. In this timeline, he is another figure that helps to prop up an idea 
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of what human dignity looks like as something embodied alone, and as a product of his 
privileged status. The historical and technological field frames him as another whole and 
autonomous body whose material struggles concerning human dignity are not immanent. 
Though we can infer that Dallaire’s mentality is laden with questions of human worth, he 
is physically situated removed from the carnage of his environment and therefore from 
the cultures and bodies that marked the divestment of human dignity during the Rwandan 
Genocide in the first place. 
Despite the fact that these people pictured underneath the timeline are connected 
through their advocacy, and despite the fact that their “positive” contributions were made 
through struggles – protest, war, government, debate – and between peoples, cultures, 
and communities, they are visually removed from this context. Figures like Mary 
Wollstonecraft, who wrote in response to human rights declarations in France in 
America, or Louis Riel, who rebelled against the diminishing rights and access to culture 
and land in Manitoba in the mid 1800s, or Martin Luther King Jr.’s impassioned protest 
and fight for civil rights in the U.S.A. are all pictured in way that is isolated from these 
struggles. Only one photograph in the entire group provides a glimpse of how protest 
might work alongside the expression of human dignity. The image of the Mothers of the 
Plaza de Mayo (Fig. 31) presents a palpable scene of dissatisfaction with the state of 
human rights, while avoiding iconic images of suffering or harm. The Mothers, who 
march on a weekly basis for the return of their children who were disappeared during 
Argentina’s Dirty War (1976-83), are seen holding placards with photographs of their 
children and small bits of information about their lives. Beyond calling for the return of 
their loved ones, the Mothers hold an important place in this constellation, demonstrating 
how a struggle for human dignity might actually be part of a less sensationalized 
aesthetics of human dignity itself. Anger, outrage, or confrontation need not be eschewed 
as something uncivilized and thus unsightly in the context of a new aesthetics of human 
dignity, but rather something that richly demonstrates how actions have material 
consequences and ultimately how we might vocalize and visualize discontent. In turn, 
more images depicting protest might put a critical focus on ongoing issues, on what lacks 
continue to put the idea of human dignity in the balance.  
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Beyond the Mothers, museum visitors are not given a sense of how these humans 
were impinged upon by ideological or material forces or how they waged their 
dissatisfaction, but rather pictured in a way that signals a desire for individuality and 
harmonious ends. Visitors are not shown the how of these struggles or the moments 
where embodied and ideological differences clashed, but predominantly the outcome of 
these struggles, which are outwardly whole and autonomous individuals. We are left with 
some large and unanswered questions here: is protest not dignified? Should clashes be 
seen as means to an end? Are the means of human dignity too complex to communicate 
in this institutional structure? Just as chronology tends to remove the storyteller from the 
story, making it seem as if things just happened in specific way, the emphasis on endings 
similarly seems to promote a narrative of human dignity that favours uncomplicated 
relations with similar embodied outcomes.  
Through isolation and chronology, a simplistic understanding of human dignity is 
presented within this space, which has the potential to be wonderfully complex. Curation 
is not used to experiment with new models of human dignity based on its underlying 
epistemic functions, which can work to bring difference together in compelling ways. 
Rather, the museum uses the exhibitionary medium against its own instincts to fit current 
understandings of normative assumptions within this mold. These images all demonstrate 
a bodily command and a visual calm that is reminiscent of Sliwinski’s (2015) analysis of 
Frederick Douglass’ portraits; that is, these faces are particularly potent in terms of 
claiming a sort of aesthetic emancipation based on a normative ideal. They convey a 
sense of bodily command, which was key in Douglass’ time, yet feels underdeveloped 
here. Bodily command and autonomy seem to be the only end of human dignity. Yet that 
belies our mediated connectivity. We are not islands, and we are not alone in our 
struggles. Our dignity is made in the orbit of others, and framing this property as product 
of individual command fundamentally denies the realities of everyday life. If, 
“possessing a photographic ‘likeness’” was a way for Douglass to fashion his own 
dignified subjectivity, then the museum takes this one step further and uses “likeness” to 
fashion an idea of human dignity that is tied to the body in a standardized and idealized 
form. Their similar comportment, autonomy, and wholeness gives dignity a shape that 
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speaks to a sense of stability over time, and a sense of assimilating difference rather than 
training ourselves to recognize the limits of our own aestheticization. Unlike the subjects 
in August Sander’s atlas, who were largely removed from morally laden taxonomies, here 
a sense of moral contingency pulls these people together and frames them in a positive 
and enduring light.  
More recently the flatness and stability of the CMHR’s timeline has been 
confronted with a falling star, and the hagiographic thrust of its members tested. In 
November 2017 one the timeline’s members was effectively called into question. Aung 
San Suu Kyi is included in this timeline for her role as a “Burmese pro-democracy leader, 
political prisoner, 1991 Nobel Peace Prize Winner.”63 Like most of the images 
underneath the timeline, visitors are given little information to go on. While some images 
correspond with a point on the timeline, others do not. And, for the ones that do not have 
a corresponding point overhead, that means there is also no supplemental information 
provided on the interactive tables. Aung San Suu Kyi’s likeness is one such image that 
stands apart from the timeline. Beyond the quoted description above, there is no 
supplemental information that makes her a complex subject of human rights. Until last 
year, her inclusion alongside other exalted subjects was never in question. Aung San Suu 
Kyi rose to prominence as a political figure in the 1980’s as an advocate for non-violent 
protest in Burma. For her involvement in these protests, Suu Kyi was placed under house 
arrest for a period of 15 years between 1989 and 2010. In this time period, she became 
the country’s unofficial leader and continued to stand in opposition to the military led 
government through her popular support. In 2012 Suu Kyi became part Myanmar’s 
government, and in 2016 became State Councilor.64  
                                                
63
 An image of Aung San Suu Kyi also appears in a second gallery in the museum, “Turning Points for 
Humanity.” In this gallery, she is positioned alongside other honorary Canadian citizens, including Nelson 
Mandela.  
64
 In 1989 Burma was renamed Myanmar. Because Aung Sun Suu Kyi has children who are not citizens of 
Myanmar she is constitutionally barred from becoming its leader. She is thus State Councillor in title, but 
for all intents and purposes considered to be in charge. 
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However, Myanmar has had a particularly troubled relationship with the different 
ethnic groups that call this territory home since the days of its independence in 1948. One 
of these minority groups, the Rohingya, has an especially fraught relationship with the 
government of Myanmar in recent times. The Rohingya have faced a litany of human 
rights abuses ranging from discrimination, dehumanization, and death. In 2012 the 
Rohingya were restricted to “secure zones” in the country, and in 2014, as an act of 
cultural and national erasure, the Rohingya were removed from the national census, their 
presence no longer acknowledged in the government’s official language or policy. As 
Myanmar’s leader, Aung San Suu Kyi has notably done nothing to prevent these 
measures or support the Rohingya’s human rights claims. At best, she has been silent 
about these abuses; at worst, she is complicit in the perpetration of genocide. Either way, 
there is a definitive sense that she has not lived up to the monikers that made her famous 
in the first place. “Pro-democracy leader, political prisoner, Nobel Peace Prize winner” 
seem far away, and her position as a role model in these categories in the balance.  
As the focus on Aung Sun Suu Kyi’s actions grew, so too did the awareness of 
her contradictory role in the CMHR. After calls were made to have her likeness removed 
from the museum, the CMHR decided to address these contradictions with a sign placed 
in front of her picture (Fig. 33). It reads:  
Serious concerns have emerged about the plight of Myanmar’s Muslim Rohingya 
minority. Hundreds of thousands have fled to escape violence and persecution.  
Many Canadians are critical of Aung San Suu Kyi for failing to condemn these 
targeted attacks against the Rohingya and thousands are calling for her honorary 
Canadian citizenship to be revoked.  
What do you think? How should we view previous human rights achievements in 
the face of present-day violations? Join the discussion and share your thoughts on 
the Museum’s Facebook page. 
I do not intend on getting into a detailed critique of the CMHR’s approach here. As I 
noted earlier in the chapter, there is nowhere in this gallery for visitors to express what 
they think, but are rather encouraged to restrict their comments to a social media site. 
And yet, there is no specific thread or discussion forum on this topic on the museum’s 
Facebook page. Though this case certainly prompts discussion, it is both deferred and 
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intangible. Like the limits of the timeline’s interrogative approach, which asks visitors 
what they would or would not take away, the museum’s structure refuses to engage in 
contemporary human rights debate in any meaningful way.  
 
Figure 33: CMHR, sign placed in front of Aung San Suu Kyi's photograph 
underneath the “What are Human Rights” timeline, photograph by author. 
I do, however, want to linger on other aspects of this message, most notably the 
question of how past achievements should be judged in light of present day violations. At 
the heart of this question remain assumptions about stability, about how one should 
appear as dignified over time. The change in Suu Kyi’s role is indicative of how human 
dignity is built on relations: of governance, of family, of everyday entanglements. 
Further, this change demonstrates how these relations are not stable. Of course, the case 
of Aung San Suu Kyi is an egregious example of a very public and dramatic turn of a 
celebrated figure. However, her fall from grace is indicative of the way we have not only 
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strived for a pure form of human dignity, but also a pure form of knowledge on this topic. 
Just as the atlas “introduces a fundamental impurity,” sullying factual and scientific 
knowledge, there is a clear need to introduce a fundamental impurity into the CMHR’s 
galleries. Resolution need not be the only form of representational justice, and revision, 
debate, and a focus on how relations can change might be a way forward.  
As an ideas museum, the CMHR needs to probe deeper into its own museological 
logics, which desire resolution in the name of archival and taxonomic stability. What 
might a human rights museum look like that deeply explored the life of someone who 
was violated or victimized, not just at the moment of indignity, but through moments 
where their lives and dignity were made in positive and nuanced relation? What would a 
human rights museum look like that deeply explored the biography of a person who was 
more than just a saint? Many of these figures made complex decisions alongside other 
people and other groups. While Martin Luther King Jr. was a “Baptist minister, leader of 
African American civil rights movement” he was also a complicated figure in terms of 
his views on gender equality, capitalism, and war. In focusing on the ends, and ultimately 
the saints at the ends of these battles, the CMHR also bypasses the complexities of 
political struggle, the sometimes-vicious nature of sorting through competing priorities.  
This is the complexity that the communication of human dignity requires. Ultimately, this 
kind of complexity is not on offer at the CMHR. 
Conclusion 
A relational reading of the CMHR demonstrates its political limitations. Even as it 
attempts to move beyond a sole focus on scenes of violation, it fails to use the 
technological complexity of its space to form a constellation that goes beyond a 
regurgitation of normative ideas. Just as the emphasis on bodily suffering eliminates a 
wide variety of daily indignities, the normative emphasis on separate and inviolable 
bodies “posits a dangerously purified subject, one purged of the body’s assumedly 
appetencies: its needs and desires, its vulnerability and decay” (Anker 2012, 4). The 
CMHR is reflective of this impasse, most notably in the images used in the first gallery. 
In its desire to tell “positive stories” the CMHR has cast a series of aspirational, solitary, 
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and ultimately inviolable dignified subjects. These are subjects uncoupled from the 
needs, desire, vulnerability, and decay of which their thoughts and actions were 
historically responding to. The complexity of their positions is reduced to “key figures,” 
“preachers of tolerance,” “formerly enslaved,” “advocates,” or “peacekeepers.”  These 
are all people who reflect the declarative function of the UDHR, and their complicated 
histories, vulnerabilities, and ultimately dignity are subsumed under this flat ordering 
system. Unlike the album, which I argued had the capacity to capture a moment of human 
rights history and provide a usable image of the law, this series seems to desire that the 
achievement of human rights should look similarly over time. 
 Though debates around the building and final galleries of the CMHR have 
revolved around the idea of recognition as a means of cultural value, centering the idea of 
human dignity means moving beyond the contestation over whose stories are told and 
delves into value laden narratives that are ultimately made. As Hanivisky and Dhamoon 
note, “the seductive prospect of being recognized by the state and the CMHR is a 
technology of white supremacy and necessarily implicates minorities in the oppression of 
others, even as those minorities experience exclusion and oppression” (2015, 912). 
Though it is important to remain attuned to who is included in the rubric of recognition, 
and to strive for representational justice, it is also imperative when debating the value of a 
human rights museum to think more critically about the fundamentals of its 
communication – the logics of taxonomy, cultural comparison, chronology – that make 
up its epistemic system. 
In the Canadian context, museums have a distinct and fraught history, especially 
as it concerns Indigenous knowledge, relations, and recognition. Examining the media-
epistemic models that have come to envelope these relationships in the museum reveals 
how human value is made through both overt and covert gestures of difference and 
legitimization. Though the CMHR attempts to sell itself as neutral and objective, letting 
visitors decide what they would add or take away or whether a figure like Aung San Suu 
Kyi should be removed, there is nothing neutral about its positive choices. Creating a 
constellation that relies upon taxonomically similar images and which leans upon visions 
of autonomy and self-enclosure, leaves the idea of human dignity tethered to a binary of 
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purity and violation. By emphasizing images of bodies removed from their historical and 
cultural struggles, the CMHR poses dignity as a property that is always already the same.  
Its first gallery does little to add nuance to the trope of a separate and the self-enclosed 
subject that anchors a positive material conception of human dignity. Despite the fact that 
using this giant timeline proposes a desire to couple human rights with progress and 
change, these figures do not expand the complexity of dignity as it is situated within 
material and visual worlds.  
For a national institution caught between competing memories of genocide and 
injustice, comfortable tropes of separateness and inviolability seems to capture prickly 
problems of cultural comparison and national identity. It seems easier to lean upon 
narratives of liberal individualism than to delve into the way we are connected, and thus 
the ways we might be implicated in the lives of others through human dignity as the most 
basic human principle. Shying away from complicated stories of community and 
vulnerability, the museum promotes individuals and individual control as a key to our 
current human rights problems.  
 As space was tied to justice, and as positive stories came to interrupt a focus on 
suffering, the museum was placed in an unenviable position. While the CMHR was 
largely disruptive in terms of the shift from an emphasis on bodily suffering and 
violation, it did not go far enough to disrupt the physiognomies, taxonomies, and cultural 
divisions that have held dignity in an abstract orbit. For an institution that had enormous 
monetary and technological resources behind it, not enough care was taken in terms of 
how to communicate human dignity, to lead debates about its contemporary meaning. 
Rather than becoming a testing ground for the categories and properties that bolster 
human dignity, for the substance of what makes us vulnerable, and ultimately how human 
dignity might be thought anew within the space of a museum, the CMHR leaves its 
visitors with a depoliticized universe rather than a clear argumentative constellation. 
Rather than helping its visitors develop a keen awareness of human dignity as founded on 
a complex network of relations, the museum diminishes the means of human dignity to 
cases where injustice was overcome, thus creating a falsely enduring sense of what 
human dignity looks like, and how it might be visually communicated.  
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5 Conclusion – Human Dignity in Relation  
 
Contemplation of the sky is the grace and 
curse of humanity 
-Aby Warburg, Images from the Region of the 
Pueblo Indians of North America 
 
We can predict the revolution of the stars 
thanks to the laws of astronomy, but who can 
predict that of peoples in history? 
-George Didi-Huberman, Uprisings 
 
Throughout the process of writing this dissertation I found myself in a constant struggle 
as I attempted to find a balance between describing how human dignity has been visually 
depicted and analyzing the curatorial systems that hold images, and ultimately dignity, 
together. Over and over I found myself questioning how to engage the mediated frames 
of human dignity, shifting attention from individual photographs and individuals 
themselves to processes of curation and community, while still giving space to specific 
situations of human dignity their due.  
Focusing on the body itself, as an interface between the individual and these 
systems, became one answer to the above-mentioned frictions. If I was going to 
demonstrate how human dignity could be taken up in visual communication beyond its 
violation or idealization, I had to find ways of demonstrating its communicative 
properties, as something that has not only been drawn, photographed, and represented, 
but as a facet of communication itself. Enlivening the abstract tendencies of human 
dignity on the body opened up new challenges. The body has been for years a central part 
of the visual communication of human dignity, especially in instances of violation. The 
connection between human dignity and violated bodies is in many ways a logical pairing. 
We feel comfortable talking about human dignity in relation to violation because it is 
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something we are all susceptible to. Within visual narratives of human dignity, violation 
is oddly equalizing. In a similar way, communicating human dignity through individuals 
that appear fully in control of their own personhood seems equally palatable. In the 
opposite direction of violation, the inviolability, or that which should not be infringed or 
broken, of human dignity is hopeful and unifying. Forging a middle ground between 
these two points is indeed difficult, but ultimately necessary if the idea of human dignity 
is to take hold within media and cultural studies. Though it is uncomfortable to think of 
taxonomies and outer appearances, otherwise scientific and aesthetic techniques that have 
been used to delimit human dignity, as themselves constituting human dignity in the age 
of mass culture, together they form one facet of human dignity’s complex visual legacy.    
When I first began work on this dissertation, I was fixated by the following 
question: how could human dignity be thought of as a gesture? Looking back, I realize 
that I was struggling to articulate a different question: how could human dignity be 
thought of as more mundane gestures, outside of violation or idealization? As I attempted 
to think about human dignity as more than an interior, inviolable, or otherwise rational 
property, Giorgio Agamben’s (1999a) definition of gesture continually piqued my 
interest. He writes that a gesture is “the exhibition of a mediality: it is the process of 
making a means visible as such” (Agamben 58: his italics). The idea of making a “means 
visible” seemed to capture part of the contradiction I kept encountering within theories 
and histories of human dignity. In a classical philosophical sense, human dignity is seen 
an “end in itself,” and even within the Universal Declaration of Human Rights “reason 
and conscience” foreground actions. Yet, our lives are nothing if not a series of gestures 
that expose the means of our existence. Human gestures make exhibitions of our bodies, 
and act as conduits of complex meaning making. As such, we are more than our rational 
and inviolable selves, and any idea that aims to capture something essentially human 
must also look to the exhibition of bodies for clues to its existence. August Sander’s 
photographs were in this sense generative, as his focus on bodily action and comportment 
outside of extreme suffering provided one place to begin to think through the intersection 
of bodily gestures and visual communication. As John Durham Peters so aptly writes, 
“the body is our existence, not our container…any adequate account of the social life of 
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word and gesture – of ‘communication’ in the broadest sense – needs to face the splendid 
and flawed material by which we make common cause with each other” (2000, 65). I 
thought that framing human dignity as gesture might reconcile it as something valued 
beyond a price and understood as something “endured and supported” (Agamben 1999a, 
57).   
As I turned the question of how human dignity might be thought of as a gesture 
over and over, the human gesture seemed too narrow a focus. No single gesture could 
capture the multitude of actions that make up a dignified life. No typology or 
“pathosformula” could encapsulate the multitudes of historical, cultural, and 
technological gestures that might be subsumed under the umbrella of human dignity. 
However, rather than seeing human dignity as a gesture in itself, as “the exhibition of a 
mediality,” I began to see exhibitions themselves, and curation more specifically, as a 
grounding metaphor for the way an individual’s means come into contact with the 
multitude. More pointedly, I began to see the gesture of curation, and the constellations 
they endure and support, as critical to our understanding of human dignity beyond 
normative, negative, or emancipatory narratives. Human dignity, as a relational property, 
is about what is endured and supported, and is apprehensible most dramatically within the 
frame of curation as a “form of map-making that opens new routes through a city, a 
people or a world” (Obrist, 1).   
Over the course of this dissertation I have shown how the form of human dignity 
must move away from photography, from declarations, from cultural specificity, and 
from binary poles of normativity and negativity if it is to become a concept that 
destabilizes the myth of the rational individual as the prime location of its value. The case 
studies analyzed throughout help build a theory that demonstrates how the transference of 
bodily ownership from the state to the individual in the late 18th century should be 
complicated in relation to theories of human dignity, especially in its visual 
communication. Thinking about human dignity as a property of individual ownership 
defies the way that this concept is lived and embodied, in relation. Curation can help us to 
map these constellations. An emphasis on curatorial constellations also helps to show 
how real difference must be embraced. August Sander seemed well aware of how the 
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aesthetics of mass society were flattening social distinctions. Outward uniformity was not 
the answer for him, and it is similarly not the answer now. Confronting the realities of 
how outward appearance intersects with the idea of human dignity is ongoing and should 
not be brushed aside as a simple problem of style or aesthetics. Cultural difference, an 
issue central in chapters 3 and 4, is also vital to the visual communication of human 
dignity. Difference must be embraced if the idea of human dignity is to be useful within a 
global and transnational human rights agenda. As an artificial framework that binds us 
together, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the idea of human dignity found 
within must be open to cultural complexity that is only bound to increase as our 
technological environments become more intricate. For these, and other reasons, it is 
troubling that the Canadian Museum for Human Rights engaged with its own 
technological parameters in limited ways. While the museum marvellously performs a 
constellated understanding of human dignity, as something that exists across philosophy, 
law, and culture, it appears to only vaguely engage with the importance of its own 
taxonomies, its own temporal epistemologies, and its own technological depth. There is a 
need to tell stories, both visually and narratively, about the way we depend on one 
another to make human dignity, again and again, each day anew. 
Curatorial strategies are not neutral, but they are in many ways central to the 
modern idea of human dignity. Curatorial constellations can help us imagine 
communities and engage with taxonomic, comprehensive, and comparative models, as 
they situate human dignity en masse and in relation, and as they reveal the complex 
visual legacies that help to prop up human dignity in the material world. From August 
Sander’s atlas, to the exhibitionary structures of the UN and UNESCO, to the galleries of 
the Canadian Museum for Human Rights, we have seen how human dignity’s visual 
communication shifts and changes, as it is tethered to culture as much as it is tethered to 
legal or philosophical thought.  
The idea of human dignity does not have an illustrious track record, nor is it 
always easy to grasp. In one of the most famous critiques of human dignity, Hannah 
Arendt organized her appraisal of the UDHR around the plight of refugees. Her question, 
which still resonates today, was this: “whether or not there really exist such ‘human 
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rights,’ independent of all specific political status and deriving solely from the fact of 
being human?” (1949, 25). Whether or not human rights can derive solely from the fact 
of being human is a question of human dignity. It is also a question of systems: laws, 
cultures, taxonomies, nations, and borders. For Arendt, refugees are positioned as the 
products of these systems, and especially of borders. Refugees are people who have no 
state, no law to stand in front of, and as such test the premise that one’s humanness; one’s 
dignity alone is seen as incapable of proffering human rights: “only in a completely 
organized humanity could the loss of home and political status become identical with 
being expelled from humanity altogether” (Arendt, 30). Territorial control of nations and 
borders that separate zones of law or civil rights demarcate humans more generally as 
dignified. Thus, Arendt’s answer to the question of where human rights comes from does 
not stem from the fact of being human, but rather the “right to belong to a political 
community” (37).  
The political community is indeed an important system, but it too remains abstract 
in relation to our understanding of human dignity, or the fact of our humanness. In this 
dissertation, I have articulated a conceptualization that similarly rests upon communities. 
However, I did not offer law or politics as the only route to this knowledge or potential 
understanding of human dignity. Cultural and curatorial systems became a path forward.  
The notion of the constellation performs the following functions alongside human dignity 
and these strategies might be taken up in future curatorial endeavours as a means of 
stretching notions of cultural inclusion: i) comparing multiple objects at one time, thus 
dispersing an idea amongst bodies; ii) enlivening the tension between what is enduring 
and what is constantly changing or decaying; iii) reframing notions of unviability and 
violation, thus allowing complex personhood; iv) being radically pluralistic and open to 
local use values; and v) demanding that knowledge is neither sequential or hierarchical. 
These traits provide an opportunity to disarm the threat of a “completely organized 
humanity,” and to imagine and experiment with different configurations that might make 
this idea apprehensible and powerful.   
 I have attempted to offer three cultural systems—the atlas, the album, and the 
museum—that help to apprehend the struggle for human dignity. Of course, these 
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systems are not models that aid in the immediate defense of human rights or human 
dignity, but they do provide spaces from which to imagine different borders, to see the 
lines of social and historical organization, and to ask questions of the way we understand 
human dignity as inalienable, inviolable, and individual. Political communities are indeed 
important to human rights, but they are not the only place where we can come to know 
them. Atlases, albums, and museums are indeed political, but they have the power to be 
constitutive and creative about the terms and limits of human dignity not available 
elsewhere.  
We are at a particular moment where human rights have explicitly entered 
museums and make the problem of human dignity’s visual communication all the more 
pressing. However, my understanding of human dignity as a relational property extends 
beyond explicitly curatorial media. Just as Lehrer and Milton (2011), position the 
etymological history of curation, as a form of caretaking, to expand their discussion 
regarding the curation of difficult knowledge “from museums and exhibitions to 
encompass heritage sites, memorials, and other (including virtual locations” (4), bringing 
the discussion of curation into the field of media studies might similarly allow the 
analysis undertaken in this dissertation to be taken up farther afield. The case studies 
examined here offer three exercises of thinking with curation, as much as they are 
analysis of the systems that make this thinking possible. As media studies turns toward 
networks and algorithms, these analogue systems, which center the human being might 
provide points of connection and historical context to the constellations which we inhabit 
today. Though this dissertation addressed exhibitions in the particular, my claim extends 
beyond curatorial sites.  
In terms of the constitutive and creative aspects of human dignity, the path 
forward, then, must not only include visual analysis, but also a deeper engagement with 
the systems of communication that put this idea into context. Critique alone is easy. What 
is needed is an understanding of such systems and experimentation with their limits. We 
need to apprehend moments not only where lives are degraded without regard for their 
value. In these instances, vulnerability has already been foreclosed. Similarly, instances 
where our individuality is presented as the only end of human dignity is equally 
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delimiting. As Judith Butler writes, “to make ourselves secure at the expense of every 
other human consideration is to eradicate one of the most important resources from which 
we must take our bearings and find our way” (2006, 30). Curatorial constellations lead us 
towards the fact of our vulnerability, whether through taxonomic signifiers, historical and 
cultural diversity, or more plainly in the act of editing and arranging. The atlases, albums, 
and museums considered here are not perfect models, but we should learn from their 
attempts to visually communicate human dignity outside of its previously assumed limits. 
A relational theory of human dignity thus compels a way of looking that engages 
diversities and vulnerabilities without subsuming one way of being under another. The 
tension between the compulsion towards a stable and eternal truth of human dignity must 
be met over and over again with the inherent transitorness of the human body and with 
the evolving technologies that mediate our vulnerabilities.  
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Appendix A: Exhibition Outlines 
Face of Our Time 
1. Farmer, Westerwald, 1913 
2. Shepherd, 1913 
3. Westerwald farming woman 1912/13 
4. Farming couple, Westerwald, 1912 
5.  Three generations of a farming family, 1912 
6. Young farmers, Westerwald, ca. 1914 
7. Country girls, ca. 1928 
8. Country bride and groom, ca. 1914 
9. Prizewinners from a country choral society, ca. 1927 
10. The landowner, ca. 1928 
11. The teacher, 1913 
12. Small-ton citizens, Monschau 1925/26 
13. Boxers, Paul Roderstein and Hein Heese. Cologne, ca. 1928 
14. Locksmith, Lindenthal, Cologne, ca. 1924 
15. Interior decorator, Berlin, 1928 
16. Pastrycook, Lindenthal, Cologne, ca. 1928 
17. Mother and daughter, wives of a farmer and a miner, 1912 
18. Proletarian children in the country 1911/12 
19. Worker’s family, Leuscheid, ca. 1905 
20. Proletarian mother, ca. 1928 
21. Coalman, Berlin, 1929 
22. Worker’s council in the Ruhr, 1928/29 
23. Bricklayer, Cologne, ca. 1928 
24. Workers’ leader, Paul Frohlich, official of the Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei (SAP. 
Frankfurt, 1928/29 
25. Revolutionaries: Centre: Erich Muhsam, Berlin. 1928 
26. Working Students. Left: August Sander’s son Erich. Cologne, ca. 1926 
27. The herbal medicine expert, Cologne, ca. 1928 
28. Catholic clergyman, cologne. 1925/26 
29. Protestant clergyman with candiates for confirmation, Cologne. 1925 
30. Middle-class family, ca. 1923 
31. Young mother, middle-class, Cologne, 1927/8 
32. Middle-class child, ca. 1927 
33. Teacher active in the youth movement, Cologne, 1923 
34. Postman delivering money orders, Cologne, 1928 
35. Police constable, 1925 
36. Customs officials, Hamburg, 1929 
37. Production engineer, 1925/26 
38. The young businessman 
39. Grammar-schoool girl, Cologne, 1928 
40. Grammar-school boy, Cologne, 1926 
41. Member of a student dueling society, Cologne, ca. 1928 
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42. Member of parliament (democrat), Cologne, ca. 1928 
43. The art scholar. Prof Wilhelm Schafer. Cologne, ca. 1927 
44. The doctor. Prof. Schleyer. Berlin, ca. 1928 
45. The industrialist, Hilden near Wuppertal, ca. 1928 
46. Tycoon, Kommerzeinrat A. von Guillaume. Cologne, 1928 
47. Wholesale merchant and iwfe, Cologne, 1927 
48. Middle-class professional couple, 1927/28 
49. The architect. Prof Hns Poelzig. Berlin 
50. The painter. Jankel Adler. Cologne, 1924 
51. Sculptress. Ingeborg vom Rath, 1929.  
52. The composer Paul Hindetih, Cologne, 1926 
53. The pianist, Max von de Sandt. Cologne, 1928 
54. Writer and literary critic D.H.S. 
55. The tenor Leonardo Aramesco, Cologne, 1928 
56. Bohemia. The painters Willi Bongard and Gottfried Brockmann. Cologne, 1924 
57. Barman 
58. Cleaning woman, Cologne, 1928 
59. Redundant seaman. Hamburg, 1928 
60. Unemployed. Cologne, 1928.  
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People of the Twentieth Century 
(Plan from 1924; italics refer to later additions) 
 
The Farmer “Germinal Portfolio” 
Group 1 
 The Young Farmer 
The Farm child and the Mother 
The Farmer (his Life and Works) 
The Farmer and the Machine 
The Gentleman Farmer 
The Small-Town People 
Sport 
The Farmer of the Second Half of the Twentieth century 
 
The Craftsman 
Group 2 
 The Master Craftsman 
 The Industrialist 
 The Worker (His Life and Work) 
 Worker Types (Physical and Intellectual) 
 
The Woman  
Group 3 
 The Husband and the Wife 
 The Woman and the Child 
 The Family 
 The Elegant Woman 
The Woman in Intellectual and Practical Occupations 
 The Woman as Domestic 
The Woman as National Socialist.  
 
The Professions 
Group 4 
 The Student 
 The Scholar 
 The Official 
 The Doctor and Pharmacist 
 The Judge and Lawyer 
 The Soldier and National Socialist 
 The Aristcrat 
 The Clergyman 
The teacher and Pedagogue 
 The Businessman 
 The Politician  
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 The Family 
 
The Artist 
Group 5 
 The Writer 
 The Actor 
 The Architect 
 The Sculptor 
 The Painter 
 The Composer 
 The Musician  
 The Art Historian 
 
The Metropolis 
Group 6 
 Vagrants 
 The Street (Hustle and Bustle) 
 Celebrations 
 City Youth 
 Traffic 
 Servants 
 Metropolitan Types and Characters 
 Return to the Reich 
 Radio 
 Political Prisoners of the National Socialists 
 
The Last People 
Group 7 
 The Idiots, Sick, Insane and Matter 
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Human Rights Exhibition Album 
List of Section Titles  
Introduction  
1. Abolition of Slavery 
2. Freedom of Movement 
3. Abolition of Inhuman Treatment 
4. Protection against Arbitrary Treatment; Equality before the law 
5. Dignity of Work and Social Legislation 
6. Standard of living and Property 
7. Social Security, Family and Property 
8. Emancipation of Women 
9. Freedom of Religion 
10. Freedom of Thought and Opinion 
11. Right to Education 
12. Participation in Cultural Life 
13. Freedom of Creative Work 
14. Participation in Government 
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Canadian Museum for Human Rights 
List of Galleries 
 What are Human Rights? 
 Indigenous Perspectives 
 Canadian Journeys 
 Protecting Rights in Canada 
 Examining the Holocaust 
 Turning Points in Humanity 
 Breaking the Silence 
 Actions Count 
 Rights Today 
Inspiring Change 
 
 
Timeline Images from “What are Human Rights?” Gallery 
 
Zarathustra  (Persian priest) 
Cyrus the Great 
Cleisthenes 
Siddhartha Gautama (Buddha) 
Confucious   
Sophocles 
Plato 
Ashoka the Great 
Marcus Tullius Cicero 
Jesus of Nazareth  
Constantin The Great (on Coin) 
Justintin 1 
Muhammad (on scroll, text no face) – founder of Islam 
Alfred the Great 
Abu-Mansur al-maturidi 
Henry 1 
Averroes 
Thomas Aquinas 
Bartolome de la Casas 
Hugo Grotis/ Dutch Jurist 
John Lilburne 
John Locke 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
Thomas Paine 
Toussaint Louverture 
Olaudah Equiano 
Olympe de Gouges 
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Henri Gregoire 
Mary Wollstonecraft  
G.W.F. Hegel 
Harriet Martineau 
John Stewart Mill 
Harriet Beecher Stowe 
Mirza Fatali Akhundov 
Karl Marx 
Harriet Tubman 
Louis Riel 
Lassa Oppenhaim 
Fridtjof Nansen 
Mohandas “Mahatma” Gandhi 
Franklin Roosevelt 
Eleanor Roosevelt  
Lester Pearson 
Raphael Lemkin 
John Humphrey 
Oscar Romero 
Nelson Mandela 
Betty Friedan 
Martin Luther King Jr.  
Harvey Milk 
Chief Oren Lyons 
Desmond Tutu 
Gloria Steinham 
Wangari Maathai 
Mary Robinson 
Harold Cardinal 
Aung San Suu Kyi 
Romeo Dallaire 
Louise Arbour 
Rigoberta Menchu Tum 
Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo 
Victor Pineda 
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